INDIA.

EDITED BY GORDON HEWART, M.A.

FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.

ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.] [OFFICES: 84 AND 85, PALACE CHAMBERS, LONDON, S.W.

VOL. VI., No. 10. (NEW SERIES.) — OCTOBER, 1895. — SUBSCRIPTION, POST PAID, Six Shillings per ann.

CONTENTS:

	PAGE
INDIANA: Paragraphs on Indian Topics, by "Fidus" ..	289
Chitral in the Commons	295
Lord G. Hamilton and Lancashire	296
OUR LONDON LETTER	298
Interview with Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji	300
British Indians in South Africa: Deputation to Mr. Chamberlain	301
THE RETENTION OF CHITRAL:	
I.—Removing the Tall Poppies, by Sir W. Wedderburn, Bart., M.P.	305
II.—A Retrospect and a Moral, by J. Dacosta ..	307
III.—Sir H. Fowler's Speech, by An Anglo-Indian	310
LORD G. HAMILTON'S BUDGET SPEECH, by H. Morgan-Browne, LL.B.	313
ROADS, RAILWAYS AND CANALS AND THE HEALTH OF INDIA, by Parbati C. Roy, B.A.	315
The Cost of Aggression	317
REVIEW: Prehistoric Races	318
BIBLIOGRAPHY of Books and Articles on Indian Subjects ..	319

Indiana.

The debate on the Indian Budget, and the debate on Chitral which preceded it, took up two days of Parliamentary time in spite of the endeavours of the Government to curtail discussion. Even so, the discussion was all too brief and perfunctory. Every member of the House of Commons is, according to Sir Henry Fowler, a member for India. We wonder what British constituents would think of their representatives if they proposed to limit discussion upon the British Budget and the Estimates to two days at the end of a Session, when the House is listless and nearly empty. The debates on the Indian Budget, however, made up in importance what they lacked in completeness. There were three leading topics in the discussion—the retention of Chitral, the finances of India, and the import duties on cotton goods. These matters are dealt with at some length elsewhere. I may note here one or two smaller points which may easily escape notice in a long Parliamentary report.

The motion for going into Committee on the Indian Budget—the motion, that is, "that Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair"—was submitted on September 3rd, whereupon Sir Henry Fowler rose to call attention to the decision recently arrived at by the Government as to the occupation of Chitral. It will be remembered that, on August 19th, Sir W. Wedderburn endeavoured to move an amendment to the Address in reply to the speech from the Throne in these terms:—

> "And we humbly pray that your Majesty will be pleased to direct your Majesty's Ministers to give effect to the instructions issued in June last to the Viceroy of India in Council to withdraw from Chitral at the earliest possible moment consistent with safety and dignity."

When the time came for Sir W. Wedderburn to speak to this amendment Mr. Balfour urged him to postpone it on the ground, *inter alia*, that Sir Henry Fowler had left the House. The result of the discussion which followed was that (under circumstances described in last month's INDIA) Sir W. Wedderburn's amendment was closured before it was moved. For this result Sir Henry Fowler was, in no small degree, responsible. There was no possible excuse for his conduct. But if any excuse had been possible, it would have been that he himself intended at a later stage to submit an amendment and take the opinion of the House on the same subject. Such an opportunity arose on September 3rd, and how did he make use of it? He did, indeed, deliver a speech of great length. But he did not move an amendment, and did not press his opinions to a division. The *Manchester Guardian* probably expressed the feelings, I do not say of all persons interested in the welfare of India, but of all good Liberals, when it wrote of Sir H. Fowler's timidity: "We do not profess to understand so spiritless a proceeding." Nor was Sir H. Fowler's proceeding merely spiritless. Having called attention to the Chitral question, and failed to conclude with a resolution, he made it impossible for any other member, more courageous than himself, to take the opinion of the House on

the same matter. The gratitude, therefore, that is due to Sir H. Fowler for a speech which was in many ways admirable must be tempered with the reflection that on two occasions he prevented the House of Commons from delivering in the division lobbies a verdict upon the policy of the "forward" school. He would have better consulted his dignity—yes, and his prospects as a Liberal leader—if he had been less anxious to display his reluctance to be associated with the Indian Parliamentary Committee and the Indian National Congress.

Sir H. Fowler having fired his blank cartridge and retired, Mr. J. M. Maclean, who is not unknown in India, took the field with an amendment condemning the "forward" policy in general terms:—

"That this House views with apprehension the continual increase in the burdens of Indian taxpayers caused by the annexation or military occupation of large areas of unproductive territory on the land frontier of British India."

The peculiar advantages of this amendment, from Mr. Maclean's point of view, were twofold. It enabled him, as an expert in Indian affairs, to condemn the "forward" policy in general while, as a loyal supporter of the present Government, he excused the retention of Chitral in particular. His speech has, in this sense, been fairly described as a ridiculous attempt to run with the hare and to hunt with the hounds. The other advantage of the amendment from the Conservative point of view was that a division upon it would prevent a division upon the question of the import duties—a question upon which Lord George Hamilton and his colleagues have to steer delicately between the Scylla of injustice to India and the Charybdis of infidelity to Lancashire. Yet Mr. Maclean was hardly more courageous than Sir Henry Fowler. Having moved his amendment, he took fright and refused to "tell" in the division. Mr. M. M. Bhownaggree, who seconded Mr. Maclean's amendment, was afflicted with similar nervousness. Hence it was that the "tellers" for those who voted in favour of Mr. Maclean's amendment were none other than Sir W. Wedderburn and Mr. Henry J. Wilson. Mr. Maclean and Mr. Bhownaggree went so far as to vote for their own amendment, while Sir Henry Fowler, with feelings which may perhaps be better imagined than described, voted in the same lobby with supporters of the Indian National Congress. The other members who declared by their votes that they viewed with apprehension the increasing burden of military expenditure in India were Messrs. J. Brigg, J. Caldwell, R. K. Causton, F. Cawley, W. O. Clough, J. Colville, J. H. Dalziel, P. C. Doogan, T. E. Ellis, E. J. Griffiths, C. H. Hemphill, J. E. Jameson, D. B. Jones, W. Jones, J. H. Lewis, T. Lough, J. H. Maden, E. J. C. Morton, E. H. Pickersgill, R. J. Price, A. D. Provand, J. C. Rickett, J. B. Roberts, P. J. Stanhope, and D. Sullivan.

And who where the members who, by their votes on Mr. Maclean's amendment, declared that they viewed without apprehension the increasing burden of military expenditure? There were 137 of them, besides the "tellers," and they included the following 24 Lancashire members:—The Marquis of Lorne (South Manchester), Lords Balcarres (Chorley) and Stanley (Norwich), Sir G. Baden-Powell (Liverpool), Sir M. White-Ridley (Blackpool), Mr. A. J. Balfour (East Manchester), Mr. G. N. Curzon (Southport), Mr. Walter Long (Liverpool), Col. Blundell (Ince), Col. Foster (Lancaster), Col. Mellor (Radcliffe), Col. Sandys (Bootle), Messrs. R. Ascroft (Oldham), R. F. Cavendish (North Lancashire), O. L. Clare (Eccles), H. Shepherd Cross (Bolton), W. J. Galloway (S.W. Manchester), W. H. Hornby (Blackburn), G. Kemp (Heywood), J. Kenyon (Bury), C. M. Royds (Rochdale), W. E. M. Tomlinson (Preston), G. Whiteley (Rockport), and H. Whiteley (Ashton-under-Lyne). The curious thing is that no sooner had the division on Mr. Maclean's amendment been taken than some of these Lancashire representatives proceeded to bombard Lord George Hamilton with demands for the immediate repeal of the Indian cotton duties, and, if a division could have been taken on Mr. Philip Stanhope's amendment, it is not easy to see how any of them could have supported the import duties without annoying their constituents. But what have Lancashire electors to say to the conduct of these 24 members who, at one and the same time, denounce the cotton duties and declare that they view without apprehension the continual increase of the burden that caused the duties to be imposed and, unless it is relieved, promises to render them permanent? The people of Lancashire are commonly regarded as shrewd and hard-headed. Do they approve of the action of their representatives in applauding and therefore encouraging the cause of a diseased condition which they are pledged to remedy? Or what have the Lancashire Chambers of Commerce to say to what Sir A. Colvin has described as the perilous growth of Indian military expenditure?

Lord George Hamilton delivered his Budget speech on the following day, September 4th. It has commonly been thought that an amendment in respect of the Indian Budget could be moved only on the motion for going into committee, and that once in committee the Budget was unassailable. But this theory, as we foreshadowed in "Our London Letter" last month, received a shock during the recent debate. The formal resolution which was submitted to the House was as follows:—

"That it appears, by the accounts laid before this House,

that the total revenue of India for the year ending the 31st day of March, 1894, was Rx. 90,565,214; that the total expenditure in India and in England charged against the revenue was Rx. 92,112,212; that there was an excess of expenditure over revenue of Rx. 1,546,998; and that the capital outlay on railways and irrigation works was Rx. 3,621,252."

It is obviously no easy matter to move an amendment to so purely formal a resolution, which does not invite the House of Commons to take any particular steps or to express any particular opinion. The difficulty, however, was surmounted on the suggestion of an ingenious member—none other, I believe, than Mr. Arthur O'Connor—and Sir W. Wedderburn gave notice of an amendment expressing regret that, with reference to the net amount of public debt incurred, the accounts were inaccurate and misleading. Sir W. Wedderburn's original purpose was, I understand, to move that these words be substituted for the words of the official resolution. But upon learning from an authoritative quarter that such an amendment would have been out of order, he moved to add the words at the end of the question. The amendment, in this form, was accepted by Mr. Lowther, the chairman of committees. In the course of the subsequent debate it was withdrawn. But the fact that it was moved establishes an important precedent, and may well lead to substantial results on a future occasion. Hitherto the debate on the Indian Budget has been equally unreal in India and in the House of Commons, the result in each case being regarded as a foregone conclusion. It is another matter when an amendment is moved implying a motion of censure upon the Government of India, and, by the same token, upon the Secretary of State and the Ministry of which he is a member.

Lord George Hamilton, as will be seen from our Parliamentary Supplement, gave a remarkable answer on September 3rd, to Mr. E. J. C. Morton's question upon the "exchange compensation allowance." "The allowance," said the Secretary of State for India "is not given 'avowedly for expenditure in England' but to enable officers to meet such expenditure if they think fit." This is a new doctrine. The rupee is still a rupee in India. The exchange compensation allowance was ostensibly granted in the interest of non-domiciled British officials in India who suffered through the fall in exchange when they remitted money to Europe. If that was not the purpose of the allowance, why was it granted, why was it so called, and why was it not extended to Indians in the service of the Government of India?

A Bombay correspondent writes:—We learn that Lord Salisbury thinks the occupation of Chitral will not involve additional troops or expenditure. Nobody in India credits this anticipation. People here speak freely of additional military expenditure to the amount of 30 lakhs. This sum is considered by experts to be too small. We are accustomed to such sanguine estimates as Lord Salisbury's. At the threshold of every annexation the cost of maintaining the acquired territory is supposed to be next to nothing. It was so with the annexation of the Punjab and of Sind. It was so with Upper Burma, which was to have cost 15 to 20 lakhs. How egregiously this optimistic forecast was falsified within a year. The cost was over one and a-half crores. But Upper Burma is virgin land. What with the land revenue, salt excise, and mines, it is somewhat abating its annual expenditure which is now a few thousands under a crore. But Chitral is different. It is a barren region where even ordinary food and forage are scarce enough. It cannot be that retention of this inhospitable region will not entail additional expense. I am afraid that Lord Elgin is proving a failure. He appears to lack initiative. He is very timid and lacks either the will or the strength to act on his own responsibility in matters of grave import. He seems to be overawed by the masterful bureaucracy surrounding him. This condition of affairs, bad as it is, may become worse under a Tory *régime* in Downing Street, with Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office, and Lord G. Hamilton as Secretary of State. The only corrective influence will be that of the Opposition in Parliament.

The following candidates are declared by the Civil Service Commissioners to have obtained the first sixty-six places in the recent Competitive Examination for the Indian Civil Service:—

	Total marks.
Marris, William Sinclair ...	3,738
Seton, Malcolm Cotter Cariston	2,843
Balfour, Charles Frederick...	2.630
Keith, William John ...	2,618
Butler, Montagu Sherard Dawes	2,548
Stow, Alexander Montague	2,375
Twang, Julius Mathison ...	2,354
Gracey, Stephen William ...	2,352
Smallwood, Arthur William	2,142
Rendall, Hugh Davey ...	2,125
Stowell, Vere Arthur ...	2,103
Pringle, John Christian ...	2,088
Jeffries, Francis Joseph ...	2,067
Wallace, Edward Hamilton	2,044
Clayton, Alfred Hare ...	2,041
Skinner, Stephen Stuart ...	2,001
Wilkinson, Charles Robert	1,983
Loxton, Charles William ...	1,977
Yewdall, Frank	1,953
Phelps, Edwin Ashby ...	1,948
Wilberforce, Samuel ...	1,936
Kilby, Reginald George ...	1,925
Stiffe, Norman Cecil... ...	1,924
Vernède, Arthur Henry ...	1,899
Thornton, Hugh Aylmer ...	1,897
Marr, William Alexander ...	1,891
Fergusson, John Carlyle ...	1,887
Stokes, Hopetoun Gabriel ...	1,865
Vernon, Charles Venables ...	1,881
Panton, Edward Brooks Henderson	1,869
Braidwood, Harold Lithgow	1,868
Bird, Benwell Harold ...	1,864
Campbell, Archibald Young Gipps...	1,855
Boyd, Frederick Kennedy ...	1,852
Heycock, William Bissill ...	1,827
Johnston, Frederick William	1,823
Adie, Walter Sibbald ...	1,802
Brinton, Percival Robert ...	1,797
Clarke, Charles Agacy ...	1,788
Pratt, Henry Sheldon ...	1,778
Duval, Herbert Philip ...	1,777
Rossitor, Reginald Arthur ...	1,746
Campbell, William Edgar Marmaduke	1,736
Hammond, Egbert Laurie Lucas	1,729
Rose, Edward Ernest Pilkington	1 726
Smith, James Cowlishaw ...	1.718
Tupper, John Holman Eure	1,713
Moberly, Arthur Norman ...	1,707
Palmer, Charles Edgar ...	1,693
Johnston, James Leonard ...	1,680
Monteath, George	1,660
Donald, James	1,657
Emalie, Harold Heather ...	1,635
Marten, John Thomas ...	1,607
Holland, Robert Erskine ...	1,598
Chotzner, Alfred James ...	1,596
Robinson, Frederick ...	1,587
Hall, Sidney Charles ...	1,583
Burton, Francis Hely ...	1,579
Humphries, Edgar de Montfort	1,567
Hemingway, Percy	1,554
Asghar-Ali, Sheikh	1,519
Graham, John Fuller ...	1,518
Leftwich, Charles Gerrans...	1,508
Barniville, John Joseph ...	1,498
Rogers, Cecil Alfred Pelham	1,493

It would appear that only one of the successful candidates is an Indian. How would the numbers

have stood if the so-called "open" examination had, in accordance with the resolution of the House of Commons, been held simultaneously in India and in London? The difference between the numbers of marks obtained by the first selected candidate and the last is glaring and instructive. It shows plainly that, under the present system, the Indian Civil Service is being recruited, in part, from men of distinctly second-rate capacity.

With reference to the Summary of Events of the administration of the Gondal State, which was noticed in these columns last month, a distinguished Anglo-Indian, who formerly held high office in the Government of India, writes to me: "The Thakor Saheb well deserves your favourable notice and, indeed, the condition of affairs in Gondal contrasts remarkably with our Indian administration, and very much emphasises Sir C. Dilke's contention (in which I most thoroughly agree) that what we need is decentralisation, each British district being administered like a Native State with special regard to the special needs of the locality. Here in Gondal we find leniency and consideration for the rayat, large sums spent in every direction for the good of the people, with plenty of cash on hand for useful public purposes affecting India generally. It is a most instructive contrast to our screwing, grudging, overweening Government, which is nevertheless not ashamed to boast and glorify itself. The whole thing fills me with shame. The action of the Thakor Saheb regarding opium is noticeable. It shows what the native opinion is as regards the use of opium, and is important as showing how much bolder and more effective a Native State can be in moral reform carrying with it local public opinion."

One of the most important matters which have lately occupied the attention of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress is the treatment meted out to British Indian subjects in South Africa. The Memorandum which is printed on another page sets forth in a compendious form the substance of petitions, memorials, and official correspondence dealing with the subject. It has already been noticed in these columns, and the details need not be repeated. But it may be said, briefly, that our Indian fellow subjects in South Africa, to the number, it is estimated, of some 100,000, and including merchants and hawkers as well as labourers and domestic servants, have to complain of a series of grave disabilities. Under four several Governments—those, namely, of Cape Colony, Natal, the South African Republic, and the Orange Free State—restrictions have been, or are being, imposed upon them which debar them from the possession of the franchise, the acquisition of real property, freedom of locomotion, the enjoyment of commercial licenses, and freedom of choice in respect of places of residence and places of business. "The Indian traders," as Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji's Memorandum states "by their thrifty and simple mode of life have become strong competitors in trade with European settlers. This has aroused jealousy and bad feeling among the other colonists, who appear to be treating the Indians in a spirit of persecution and vexatious tyranny." The real motives for this persecution are, of course, concealed. The attempt, for example, to compel British Indians to live apart in special "locations" is based ostensibly on the ground that their mode of life is insanitary. Those who know anything at all about the Hindus and the Muhammadans of India know how grotesque this slander is. "The ablutions of the Hindu have," as the writer of "Indian Affairs" said recently in the *Times*, "passed into a proverb. His religion demands them, and the custom of ages has made them a prime necessity of his daily life." Add to this general statement the fact that three European Doctors in Pretoria and Johannesburg have certified, in the particular case under notice, that "it is impossible to object to the Indian on sanitary grounds," and it will be seen how flimsy is the pretext which commmercial jealousy puts forward.

A deputation, organised by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee, waited upon Mr. Chamberlain at the Colonial Office on August 29th in order to lay the facts before him and to seek redress. The subject is, undoubtedly, complex and intricate, and it might have been well if the Memorandum which was placed before Mr. Chamberlain had been somewhat more precise. The chief grievances of which complaint is made are five in number, and four distinct and heterogeneous Governments are concerned. What, exactly, is the present position of British Indians in Cape Colony, in Natal, in the South African Republic, and in the Orange Free State respectively? Have all the obnoxious restrictions been already imposed in each case? And what, in each case, is the suggested mode of redress? These were preliminary questions, and they do not appear to have been answered fully and clearly by the deputation, who doubtless made the best use of the information at their disposal. Mr. Chamberlain in his reply, which was undoubtedly sympathetic and encouraging, attempted the task of differentiation, but apparently failed to cover the whole field. "So far as the principle is concerned, I do not suppose," Mr. Chamberlain said, "that there is any difference between us. We all desire that all British subjects

should be treated alike, and should have equal rights and equal privileges."

So far, so good. It may be well to analyse the rest of Mr. Chamberlain's reply :—

I. THE TRANSVAAL.—Here we are dealing with "a foreign and friendly Government." "The complaint is that certain subjects of Her Majesty are required to take up a separate residence." ("There is no question of the franchise in the Transvaal.") "I shall be most happy to make any representation upon the subject which I think is likely to have any influence, and from time to time to repeat those representations, in the hope that the Government of the Transvaal may find it to be unnecessary to continue a regulation which undoubtedly is calculated to cause pain." But "the award has been already accepted by Lord Ripon."

II. CAPE COLONY.—Here we are dealing with "a self-governing colony." "The question is as to the exercise of the franchise." "The conditions of the franchise are so drawn that they do as a matter of fact operate more frequently to exclude Asiatics than to exclude persons of any other nationality." "It makes it very much more difficult to appeal against than if any class of Her Majesty's subjects were excluded under that name."

III. NATAL.—Here again we are dealing with "a self-governing colony." "The question is as to the exercise of the franchise." Moreover, "the proposed law in Natal does propose to exclude Asiatics *eo nomine*." But, "the law is not passed." On the contrary, "it is engaging my attention, and I trust that I may be able at a later period to make a satisfactory statement with regard to it."

What, then, is the positive element in Mr. Chamberlain's reply? It is threefold. With regard to the restriction of residence in the Transvaal, he promises to make and, if necessary, to repeat representations urging the Transvaal Government to remove it. With regard to the disfranchisement of Indians in Cape Colony, his words suggest that he will appeal against it, though he regards the task as difficult. With regard to the proposed disfranchisement of Indians, *eo nomine*, in Natal, he hints pretty plainly that he will disallow the proposal. To these three undertakings it may be added that Mr. Chamberlain addressed the deputation in these general terms: "Your claims and your requests have my most sympathetic consideration, and you may be sure that whatever influence I possess will be exercised in your favour."

We turn, however, to Mr. Chamberlain's omissions. The grievances of which British Indians in South Africa complain consist of restrictions upon (i) the acquisition of real property, (ii) the possession of the franchise, (iii) freedom of locomotion by day and night, (iv) the enjoyment of trade licenses, and (v) freedom of choice in respect of places of residence and places of business. Now, Mr. Chamberlain omitted all reference to the Orange Free State. With regard to the Transvaal, he omitted to refer to grievances (i), (iii) and (iv). With regard to Cape Colony, he omitted to refer to grievances (i), (iii), (iv) and (v). With regard to Natal, also, he omitted to refer to grievances (i), (iii), (iv) and (v). It is to be presumed that Mr. Chamberlain's attention will again be directed to these matters when Parliament re-assembles, if not before. Nor are his remarks upon the disfranchisement of British Indians in Cape Colony entirely satisfactory. It may be true that Asiatics are not disfranchised there *eo nomine*. But has Mr. Chamberlain any doubt as to the real purpose of the restrictive qualification? The fundamental question was well summed up by the writer of the article, "Indian Affairs," in the *Times* of September 9th :

"In India the British, the Hindu and the Mussulman communities find themselves face to face with the question as to whether at the outset of the new industrial movements which have been so long and anxiously awaited, Indian traders and workers are or are not to have the same *status* before the law as all other British subjects enjoy. May they or may they not go freely from one British possession to another, and claim the rights of British subjects in Allied States? Or are they to be treated as outcast races, subjected to a system of permits and passes when travelling on their ordinary business avocations and relegated, as the Transvaal Government would relegate them, to a *ghetto* at the permanent centres of their trade? These are questions which apply to all Indians who seek to better their fortunes outside the limits of the Indian Empire."

The tone of Mr. Chamberlain's reply to Mr. Naoroji's deputation shows how he would answer these questions. It remains for the Secretary for the Colonies to prove that "where there's a will, there's a way."

The question of the separate "locations" in the Transvaal calls for special notice. The Convention of Pretoria, 1881 (clause 14), and the Convention of London, 1884, between the British Government and the Government of the Transvaal, enforced the provision that British Indian subjects in the Transvaal should stand upon a footing of equality with other British subjects. Attempts were, however, afterwards made to modify this equitable provision. Law 3 of 1885 sought to amend clause 14 of the Convention of London, and to provide that British Indian subjects might be required to reside and to trade in separate "locations." The British Government refused assent to this amending law, but a subsequent attempt of the same kind was more successful. In 1886 the provisions of Law 3 of 1885 were carried in an amended form, Sir Hercules Robinson withdrawing, upon what were described to him as urgent sanitary grounds, the opposition which had previously been offered. The representations which were made to Sir H. Robinson may not have been fraudulent, but, as Mr. Bonnerjee pointed out to Mr. Chamberlain, they were certainly false. They are contradicted by the certificates of European doctors. Nor is that all. The amendment of 1886 created difficulties instead of removing them, and the differences between the British Government and the Government of the Transvaal were afterwards referred to the arbitration of the

Chief Justice of the Orange Free State. Mr. Chamberlain lays stress upon the difficulty and the danger of going behind an arbitrator's award. But the point is, that the decision of the Chief Justice was not an award in any proper sense of the term. He was "to decide either in favour of the claims put forward by Her Majesty's Government, or by the South African Republic, or to lay down such interpretation of the ordinances, read together with the despatches referring to the question, as shall appear to him to be correct." Three courses were open to him, but he appears to have taken none of them. On the contrary, he appears to have upheld the amendment of 1886, at the same time declaring it to be subject, in case of objections, "to sole and exclusive interpretation in the ordinary course of the tribunals of the country." Yet recourse had been had to arbitration precisely in order that such objections might be dealt with. There should be no great scruples about going behind an award of this remarkable nature.

Since Mr. Naoroji's deputation waited upon Mr. Chamberlain further memorials from Indians residing in Natal have reached us. They are addressed to the Viceroy of India and to Mr. Chamberlain, and they refer to the special question which is dealt with in the Indian Immigration Law Amendment Bill recently passed by the Natal Legislature. This precious measure deprives Indian labourers, who have gone to the colony under contract to work for a term of years, of the option of remaining in the colony, free from interference, on the expiry of the term. The latter alternative has, during the past few years, been chosen by many thousands of Indian labourers, who are now found to constitute a disturbing element in the labour market of South Africa. The new law, which Mr. Chamberlain is urged to disallow, would compel the Indian labourer either to return to India on the expiry of his term or to enter into new indentures—in other words, become a slave. Otherwise, he must "take out year by year a pass or licence to remain in the colony, to be issued by the magistrate of his district," at a yearly cost of £3 sterling—more than three months' pay for an indentured labourer. The proposal is a disgrace to its authors, and an insult to British subjects. To permit it to become law would be to legalise a monstrous wrong. "A man is brought here," as the Attorney-General for Natal has well said, "in theory with his own consent, in practice very often without his consent. He gives the best five years of his life, he forms new ties, forgets the old ones, perhaps establishes a home here, and he cannot, according to my view of right and wrong, be sent back. Better by far to stop the further introduction of Indians altogether than to take what work you can out of them and order them away. The colony, or part of the colony, seems to want Indians, but also wishes to avoid the consequence of Indian immigration." Mr. Chamberlain's course in dealing with the new measure is clear. He hinted, not vaguely, to Mr. Naoroji's deputation that he intended to disallow the Natal measure which expressly proposed to exclude British Indians from the franchise. There is surely no reason to suppose that he will show any more tenderness to the Indian Immigration Law Amendment Bill.

The *Times*, in a leading article published on August 30th, said that the deputation to Mr. Chamberlain "chiefly consisted of Parsi gentlemen living in London." Mr. Naoroji promptly corrected this absurd inaccuracy. He explained, in a letter which appeared in the *Times* of September 2nd, that the deputation consisted of four Hindus—Messrs. Bonnerjee, Haridas, Roy, and Nair; two Muhammadans—Messrs. Ghani and Meerza; and two Parsis—Mr. Bhownaggree M.P., and Mr. Naoroji himself. But why did the *Times* go out of its way to describe the deputation incorrectly?

It would be impossible to exaggerate the strength of the hostility which has been provoked among all sections and classes of the Indian people by the Pilgrim Ships Bill. Memorials to the Viceroy, articles in Indian and Anglo-Indian newspapers, and private letters from well-informed correspondents in India show what a burning question the proposals contained in this ill-starred measure have aroused. Nor can we be surprised at such a result. It is notorious that pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina is one of the articles of the Muhammadan faith. The measure against which such emphatic protest is now being made was framed in accordance with the decisions of a Convention held at Paris. It aims at sanitary reform, and starts from the assumption that Indian pilgrims are responsible for the outbreaks of cholera which occasionally occur in Europe. The grounds for this assumption are not forthcoming. But if they were as substantial as they are actually flimsy, they would not excuse such a measure as the Pilgrim Ships Bill. It is a compact of faults. It was drafted at the dictation of a Convention in which India was not adequately represented. It is diametrically opposed not only to public opinion but also to expert medical opinion in India. It seeks to prevent disease, but it does not grapple with the real cause of such disease as exists—namely, the negligence of the Turkish authorities. It imposes a tax which is so high as to be prohibitive in the case of all the poorer pilgrims, and it compels the Government of India to collect this odious impost from Muham-

madans on behalf of Turkey. It makes demands in respect of space and air on the pilgrim ships which are so sublime as to be ridiculous. It imposes vexatious regulations as to quarantine which, in the opinion of competent judges, would do more harm than good. The requirements of public health undoubtedly justify heavy demands upon the resources and the convenience of private individuals. But the evil which this measure purports to remove is not shown to exist, and it is shown that, if it did exist, this measure would not remove it. The Bill will have to be delayed or submitted to drastic revision. Meantime, although it affects immediately only one religious community in India, the general hostility that it has provoked shows how all the religious communities are really bound together by common sympathies. The Hindu willingly lends aid to his Muhammadan fellow-countryman just as the Muhammadan would doubtless lend aid to the Hindu if occasion arose.

Fidus.

CHITRAL IN THE COMMONS.

The discussion on the future of Chitral, which preceded the introduction of the Indian Budget, proved to be of a singularly futile character. In the circumstances it would have been unduly sanguine to expect any better result. The big battalions were there, in comparative strength at least, to impress the utter formality of debate. Sir Henry Fowler blazed away for a couple of hours, but it was practically with blank cartridge, for his speech was in effect a defence and a protest rather than an attack. Lord George Hamilton picked up a few of Sir Henry's points by way of official courtesy, toyed with them, and thought they were mistaken. He was fluent in assertion, and confident in hopefulness. The solid grounds for either attitude were not made apparent. The evil day of reckoning was staved off. Meantime something may turn up. If the wrong thing turn up, there will be no lack of official explanation that the wit of man could not have obviated the mischance. It is not that either the present or the late Indian Secretary fails in theoretical interest in the fortunes of India. What one seems to miss in their acts and utterances is the imagination that realises. It may be that it is the official system that confines and benumbs them. In any case, this Chitral business might have been made to wear a very different aspect if Sir Henry Fowler had kept the country promptly informed as as to the facts and the tendencies of the Liberal policy, and if Lord George Hamilton had consequently been made to feel that the subject was really worthy of serious treatment. The influence of English party conflict is painfully obvious, and what is worst of all is that the interests of India fall through between her professed well-wishers and champions.

Why is it that Lord George Hamilton has reversed Sir Henry Fowler's policy of evacuation of Chitral? For one thing, he places reliance on the judgment of the Indian Government, and rates his predecessor for not giving due heed to advice from Calcutta. But, to all intents and purposes, the judgment of the Indian Government may be taken to be the wishes of the military party. In these columns, the preponderance of technical opinion upon the strategic value of Chitral has already been fully demonstrated. Take away Lord Roberts, and there is hardly a single name left in support of this forward policy, and Lord Roberts himself is a pervert. It would be difficult to say whether it is less nonsensical to minimise the value of the opinion of Sir Donald Stewart, for example, on the ground, forsooth, that he has not been in India for some years back, or to excuse the suppression of his views on the ground that their publication would necessitate the publication also of the views of Sir George White and Sir Henry Brackenbury, which again would involve exposing "to the whole world an elaborate analysis "of the strong and weak parts of our military "system." As if, indeed, such an analysis were of necessity included in the opinion! As if, indeed, it would matter practically two straws whether such an analysis were published or not! But the excuses are not serious, and do not deserve to be considered seriously. In any case, it is quite evident that the Indian Government cannot have before its mind any essential factor in the situation which officers like Sir Donald Stewart cannot have before their mind with equal vividness. There is no virtue whatever in saying ditto to the Indian Government in such a position of affairs. The judgment of the Home Government, indeed, is much more likely to be clear and unbiassed, and it is bound to be exercised with firm independence.

But, says Lord George Hamilton, what would be the result if we should evacuate Chitral? In the first place, Gilghit "would in all probability have "to be abandoned." Well, but where is the probability? We held Gilghit before we took hold of Chitral; why, in the light of all the circumstances, could we not go on holding it as before? It cannot be implied that the Chitralis would swarm over the hills and drive us away, or exterminate our Agency. Again, would it be so very serious a loss to India if we did abandon Gilghit? Gilghit is a very expensive luxury. It is even less accessible than Chitral will be by the new road. It is quite a recent establishment. Really, it is difficult to imagine why Gilghit should be so precious in the eyes of the Indian Secretary. But to make an assumed probability of the abandonment of Gilghit a reason for the military occupation of Chitral is a stroke of argument worthy of permanent record. In the second place, if we evacuated Chitral, "we should "have lighted a fire there which would be limited "only by the extent over which it spread." That is the way with all fires; it is not a peculiarity of Chitral fires. But there is danger in metaphors. What does Lord George Hamilton mean by "a fire"? We are surprised at his moderation; he might have called the thing a conflagration. Well, if we retired, no doubt there would be the traditional course of "dynastic murder, and civil "war." But, then, what in the world does it

matter to India? The dynastic murder is not an event that calls for more than passing notice from anybody. The civil war, notwithstanding the meaning of which the words are capable, implies nothing more than a fight or two between opposing handfuls of tribesmen. Look back on the history of Chitral; there is no record of India's being one whit the worse for all the "dynastic murder" and "civil war" that Chitral has witnessed—until we went into the thick of the fray and made a fuss over the native practice. But, further, says Lord George, each of the Powers, England and Russia, is bound to do its utmost to prevent anarchy, disorder, and disturbance, within its borders. How is it possible to keep a grave face over the suggestion that the faction fights of rival cut-throats are likely to disturb the peace of the neighbouring protégés of Russia? If our people would only keep within their own boundaries, Chitral would never be heard of, whatever its disturbances. But, once more, according to Lord George, "the mere fact of "our retiring before the face of the whole world, "and admitting that we were unable to perform "the duties we had practically undertaken, would "have been an invitation to the neighbouring "Power to step in and perform the duties we had "abandoned." It is not worth while to quarrel with the assumptions of Lord George's phraseology. But if our Pamirs boundary agreement with Russia be a thing of any pith and moment, it is hard to see how Russia could justify an entrance upon our neglected duties in Chitral. Would it not be a vastly simpler matter to send the fleet to the Baltic and the Black Sea in case of real need, than to pother about in this ridiculous, and ridiculously expensive, fashion in the barren mountains of the North-West? "I think," says Lord George, "that "the considerations of a moral rather than of a "strategic character force us to remain." The assertion fitly caps the rest.

On the other hand, what are the results likely to come from our remaining in Chitral? Here there at once leaps forward a consideration of a moral character that might have been expected to command a little more respect than it has received. The Viceroy's Proclamation unquestionably conveyed the impression that we should retire. But for that promise, the opposition of the intermediate tribes would certainly have been persistent and determined. Now, however, Lord George tells us that the independent mountaineers are charmed with our invasion, and would break their hearts if we should leave their country. Who is so hopelessly childish as to believe any such thing? By the judicious distribution of *douceurs* it is easy enough to get up an appearance of satisfaction in a limited circle of bribees; but that is the full extent of the alleged newborn love of these tribesmen for the society of the Anglo-Indian. The whole thing is, as Sir Henry Fowler properly characterised it, a gross breach of faith; and while, on the face of the Proclamation, we could have retired without the loss of an atom of prestige, there can be no doubt whatever that our breach of faith will grievously damage our real prestige in its most vital part, throughout the whole of India. Lord George Hamilton may quibble over the point to a heedless and party-bound House of Commons, but it is an uncommonly ostrich-like proceeding in view of the leaders of Indian opinion. The cost of occupation—for men, for cantonments, for the road, for bribes, for further developments—will, to a certainty, far exceed any estimate that has yet been adventured, and might in ordinary decency have commanded some reasonable discussion. Lord George, it is true, professes his anxiety about the expenditure. "Constantly increasing taxation," he says, "is a serious danger to the stability of the Govern-"ment." But he has nothing to set against this awful danger, except vague aspirations for a golden age of "quietude and economy." Such an age would indeed be a surprising development in Indian administration. In the light of past history, the aspiration of the Indian Secretary is beyond criticism; it can only be regarded with respectful amazement. Such amazement is only deepened by a study of Lord George Hamilton's exposition of the Indian Budget. But on the financial side of the question there needs no further debate in the columns in INDIA. We can only hope that some lucky accident may at length awaken the people of England to the extreme danger that now threatens India between the rampant spirit of militarism and the rottenness of the whole financial system. The debates in connexion with the Budget in the fag-end of the present session go far to justify the gloomiest fears of those who believe that Englishmen will never take the affairs of India seriously in hand except on the compulsion of a catastrophe.

LORD G. HAMILTON AND LANCASHIRE.

CYNICAL politicians, if any politicians are cynical, must have found material for a grim kind of amusement in the contrast between Lord George Hamilton's utterances on the subject of the cotton duties before and after the General Election. Everybody remembers the exciting incident of February 21st last, when Sir Henry James, at that time member for Bury, but now a peer and a member of Lord Salisbury's Cabinet, moved the adjournment of the House of Commons in order to call attention to the effect of the reimposition of the cotton duties. Sir H. James's motion, contrary to expectations which were entertained earlier in the day, was defeated, but it served a useful purpose for the Conservative party. It did not bring about the immediate overthrow of Lord Rosebery's Administration, but the debate and the division upon it contributed greatly to the defeat of the Liberals at the subsequent General Election. The motion was rejected by 195 votes. But of the Conservative members who were present in the House when the division was taken, 101 voted against the cotton duties, and only 51 for them. A five-lined whip had been issued to Conservative members, and among those who voted with Sir Henry James were the Conservative whips and the eldest son of Lord Salisbury. That was not all, nor nearly all. Before the division was taken Lord George Hamilton delivered a speech which, if it had been deliberately prepared as an electioneering

manifesto for Conservative candidates in Lancashire, could not have served the purpose more perfectly. "The views," said Lord George, "which I myself "held twenty years ago as to the impolicy of im- "posing cotton duties upon English goods, I hold "still, and the distinguished chief under whom I "then had the honour of serving, Lord Salisbury, "held those views, and also holds them still." Lord George Hamilton, who appears to mistake reiteration for emphasis, repeated the substance of this declaration a score of times before he sat down. He stated the reasons for which Lord Salisbury and he had formed opinions hostile to the cotton duties. They held that the tax was unfair to Lancashire, and dangerous to the stability of British rule in India. He declared that if one wanted to hear the real voice of India he must not go to Bombay or Calcutta where Western ideas had introduced Western methods of agitation. "I know," he asserted solemnly, "the gentlemen who get up "these agitations." Lord George Hamilton protested strongly against a measure which must, he said, result in the erection of a hostile barrier against the importation of cotton goods into India. He "disbelieved altogether" in the efficiency of a countervailing excise-duty. He demanded that the Government of India should "pay some attention to "the wishes and wants of English electors," asserting that India, unlike a self-governing colony, lived on the material support which it derived from England. In his closing words he announced that he would vote with Sir H. James "as a protest against "the unwisdom and unfairness of putting the whole "burden of saving the solvency of the Indian "Government on the shoulders of one already very "distressed industry."

Lord George Hamilton's speech had in Lancashire the effect which might have been expected, and when its author was appointed to be Secretary of State for India in Lord Salisbury's Government, only one thing further was required to confirm Lancashire electors in the belief that the Conservatives would repeal the cotton duties. That was an assurance that Lord George Hamilton retained in office the opinions which he had expressed as a member of the Opposition. The assurance was forthcoming from Lord G. Hamilton himself. Writing to "a "leading Conservative" in the Accrington division of Lancashire, in response to an invitation to speak in the constituency, the Secretary of State for India said: "I am tied here, and working day and night "until this contest is over, so I cannot come to "Accrington. My views on the extra duties are "stated in a speech of mine I made this spring in "in the House of Commons, and my appointment to "India ought in consequence to help in your elec- "tion." This letter supplied the last link in the chain, and it is no exaggeration to say that in the Lancashire constituencies the Conservative candidates made all possible capital out of the circumstance that, while Sir Henry Fowler had sanctioned the cotton duties, Lord George Hamilton had denounced them. We have referred previously to the election addresses issued by the Conservative candidates in Oldham, Preston, Burnley, Bury, and the Heywood division of Lancashire. Where a candidate refrained from mentioning the cotton duties in his address, the subject received adequate attention at his meetings. The result was an overwhelming victory for the Conservatives. But now comes the mysterious sequel. No sooner had the new Government met Parliament, strong in a majority of 152, than Lord George Hamilton performed a feat of tergiversation which is, we imagine, second to none in the whole history of politics. He not only departed from the language which he had previously used, and emphasised by repetition, but he so completely reversed it that on September 4th, at the close of the debate on the Indian Budget, Mr. Balfour was able to say that he could not make out that Sir Henry Fowler differed in any important particular from Lord George Hamilton. If Mr. Balfour had said that, or anything like that, before the pollings took place, the representation of Lancashire in the House of Commons would be different from what it is. We need not attempt to characterise Lord George Hamilton's conduct. Apparently he does not think that he has changed his mind or contradicted himself. "I adhere," he said in reply to Mr. Stanhope on August 26th, "to the speech I "made on February 21st, and have nothing to "retract in connexion with it." In other words, he still holds that the reimposition of the cotton duties was unwise, impolitic, and unfair, and that the countervailing excise duty is useless. Yet in his reply to Mr. Stanhope he added: "I certainly "ought not to be expected to give any opinion on "the question until the Indian Government have "had an opportunity of fully stating their views." Needless to say, the Government of India had already stated its views as fully as Lord George Hamilton had stated his own.

The indignation of Lancashire electors at this piece of tergiversation is natural enough, whatever opinion may be entertained as to the reasonableness of the Lancashire demand. That demand is that the cotton duties should either be removed, or neutralised by "a complete and effectual excise- "duty on the whole of the production of the Indian "mills." The present agitation in Lancashire has had one admirable result. It has excited an unprecedented degree of interest in the underlying problems of Indian finance. Lancashire electors are coming to perceive that extravagant military expenditure in India is not only bad for India, but is bad also for Lancashire. "It is," the *Manchester Guardian* wrote the other day, "the unceasing and "enormous demands for larger and ever larger "expenditure in pursuance of a military policy "which the best and coolest heads believe to be "radically mistaken which is at the root of our "present trouble, and will, if it is allowed to pre- "vail, be the fruitful source of many more." Similarly we find Mr. F. Cawley, the newly elected member for the Prestwich division of Lancashire, declaring to his constituents on September 7th that "what the Liberals have got to do as a party is to "insist that this continual military expenditure "should be kept down. Then they would be able "to cut their coat according to their cloth, and they "would be able to remove the duties." There is good reason to believe that this type of argument is

becoming common on Liberal platforms. If so, India will gain and Lancashire will gain too. It cannot be too often insisted that the United Kingdom would reap enormous advantage if an economical policy were pursued in India. Prosperity would then take the place of poverty among the Indian people, and the market for British goods would be proportionately improved. This belief is undoubtedly gaining ground in Lancashire. But it will have to make a good deal of headway yet before the aggressive military schemes of the Government of India are seriously checked by public opinion in the United Kingdom. Many Lancashire Conservatives, for example, voted against Mr. Maclean's amendment on September 3rd, and thereby certified that they viewed without apprehension the continual increase in the burdens of Indian taxpayers caused by annexation or military occupation. Mr. James Kenyon, the member for Bury, and Mr. George Kemp, the member for the Heywood division, voted against Mr. Maclean's amendment. Yet both of these gentlemen denounced the cotton duties in their election addresses, and on September 4th, Mr. James Kenyon, in a speech not devoid of a certain rough vigour, protested against them in the House of Commons. One would like to know whether the constituents of these inconsistent members have invited them to reconcile their speeches with their votes. One thing, at any rate, is certain. Now, if ever, the Indian reform party has an excellent opportunity of enlisting the active sympathies of Lancashire electors on the side of a policy of retrenchment in India.

OUR LONDON LETTER.

The Queen has been pleased to approve of the appointment of Colonel the Right Honourable Sir Joseph West Ridgeway, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., as Governor of Ceylon in the Room of Sir Arthur Elibank Havelock, G.C.M.G., appointed to be Governor of Madras.

Sir Joseph West Ridgeway is the son of a Tunbridge Wells clergyman, and was born in 1844. He entered the Bengal army in 1861, and was attached to the 25th Bengal Native Infantry and the 3rd Goorkhas. In 1869 he was appointed by Lord Mayo to the political service. He served in the Afghan War, and was twice mentioned in despatches, and soon afterwards was made Under-Secretary to the Government of India (Foreign Department). In 1884-5 he was in charge of the Afghan Frontier-Commission. On his return to India he was appointed to succeed the late Sir Robert Hamilton as Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle. He never attempted to win the sympathy of the people. When Mr. Morley became Chief Secretary, it was felt that a change of officials was desirable and in 1893 Sir West Ridgeway was sent on a special mission to Morocco. He has since had an interval of rest as Governor of the Isle of Man. Lady Ridgeway, whom he married in 1881, is a daughter of Mr. R. C. Bewicke, of Coulby Manor, Yorkshire.

The London Indian Society held its second annual dinner on September 4th at the Holborn Restaurant, under the presidency of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji. About fifty covers were laid. Amongst those present were Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee and Professor A. F. Murison. Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P., Mr. A. Webb, Mr. Hume, Mr. Caine, Mr. Seymour Keay, and other friends of India were unavoidably absent. On his entry into the reception room Mr. Naoroji was enthusiastically welcomed.

The chairman read a telegram from the Liberals of Central Finsbury expressing regret at the recent defeat of Mr. Naoroji and hoping that an early opportunity would occur to secure his return to Parliament. A reply thanking them for their kind wishes was forwarded. Professor Murison proposed the toast of India, regretting the defeat of Mr. Naoroji, and condemning the "forward" military policy and the annexation of Chitral. In acknowledging this toast, Mr. Bonnerjee declared that if the present policy continued it would not be long before the ordinary territorial limits of India were eliminated and the Government became bankrupt. Mr. H. N. Heridas followed. Mr. M. A. Ghani proposed the toast of the Indian National Congress and the British Committee, and Mr. Martin Wood and Mr. H. Morgan-Browne replied. The other speakers included Mr. Gopal Singh, Mr. J. Oldfield, Mr. C. Menon, Mr. C. H. Vora, Mr. K. A. Ghaswalla, Mr. J. Meerza, Mr. D. U. Parekh, Mr. H. N. Khairaj, and Mr. J. V. Desai.

It is impossible within our limits of space to do justice to the "opinions of the press" upon the recent discussions of Indian affairs in the House of Commons. On the whole they are highly disappointing. The decision of Lord Rosebery's Government to withdraw from Chitral and the contrary decision of Lord Salisbury's Government ranged the two political parties, and their organs, in opposition to each other in respect of the "forward" policy, and while the *Daily News* and the *Speaker* and other Liberal newspapers praised Sir Henry Fowler, the *Standard* and the *Times* and other Conservative newspapers praised Lord George Hamilton. There was less division on the subject of the import duties, though some Conservative critics in Lancashire protested very mildly against Lord G. Hamilton's breach of faith. As for the underlying problems of Indian finance, there was, as usual, very little attempt on either side to come to terms with them.

Referring to Lord George Hamilton's hopes for "a period of quietude and economy" in India, the *Daily Chronicle* asked:—"What hope is there of quietude? Ever since the inauguration of the new Forward Policy—that is to say, during the past eighteen years—we have almost constantly been on the war-path along the Indian frontier. What hope can there be of economy? Is it not written, even in an official return, that the military expenditure of India during that period has been no less a sum than Rx.30,611,109? That calculation, it is to be remembered, does not include the Waziri Expedition, nor yet the Chitral Expedition. Whether the Chitral Expedition is to cost £13,000 or £130,000 in Lord George Hamilton's estimate is a matter of

moonshine. It may not eventually cost twenty times that estimate, on the expansive model of the Afghanistan Expedition, but everybody knows that £130,000 is an estimate *pour rire*. Further, the admitted sum of Rx.30,611,109 does not include the remarkable item of Rx.11,032,781, which during the eight years ending 1892-93 was spent on expeditions and warlike preparations, though it was not considered worthy of exhibition under separate headings in the ordinary accounts. Here, then, we have an average expenditure on war in India at the rate of at least two millions a year, and it would take a hardy statistician to deny that the whole amount for the eighteen years equals, if it does not materially exceed, the whole cost of the military operations for putting down the Mutiny of 1857!"

There were, however, at least two notable exceptions to this rule. The *Daily Chronicle*, though hardly with its former fulness, and the *Manchester Guardian*, probed more deeply into the problems of Indian financial embarrassments. "The great farce of the political year," wrote the *Daily Chronicle* on September 4th—"or is it not, rather, the gloomiest tragedy of the season?—occupied the boards at Westminster last night. We are so inured to the spectacle of the discussion of the affairs of our great Eastern Dependency in an odd evening at the fag-end of the Session, and in a sparse and listless House, that it requires some effort to realise the fatuity of the proceeding. Our legislators do not scruple to devote weeks and weeks to debate over questions that appear to be more important only because they lie nearer to our sight and feeling—and especially to our political contentiousness. Yet here is the administration of India—a question that all those who have got through the alphabet of the matter regard with the deepest concern, not unmixed with dread, a question in comparison with which Sir William Wilson Hunter himself has publicly declared that even Home Rule is but a bagatelle—the administration of India, in whose weal or woe the very foundations of our Imperial power are seriously, not to say essentially, involved, is passed upon in a single hurried debate, in a thin, wearied, and impatient House, and in the common knowledge that the result is a foregone and empty conclusion."

A series of admirable articles appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* at the end of August and the beginning of September. Indian readers who wish to see sympathetic English opinion at its best would do well to secure copies of the *Guardian* for August 29th and 30th and September 4th. Discussing on the last-named day the financial embarrassment of India, the *Guardian* wrote: "There are, of course, not wanting those who see in the removal, by one means or another, of the anomaly that India has no money in common with that of the rest of the empire the only final solution of the difficulty. But meanwhile there are others, and notably the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, of which Sir W. Wedderburn is the Chairman, who hold that, as the Indian Government has for years had the exchange difficulty facing it at every turn and likely each year to increase the drain on its exchequer, it ought above all things to have 'cut its coat according to its cloth.' It is not denied that a certain amount of increased expenditure by the Government of India has been 'not only necessary but desirable in the interests of good government, and even legitimate under all the circumstances.' But it is urged that the civil and military expenditure and the gold liabilities have been increased at an extravagant rate not justified by any consideration of prudence, and that so long as the burdens on the Indian Exchequer are added to or are likely to be added to by falling exchange even the plea that fresh expenditure is 'eminently useful and desirable' should be rigorously disregarded if the expenditure is not of supreme necessity."

"And," continued the *Manchester Guardian*, "it is the plain fact that whereas the expenditure on civil and military services alone has increased by Rx. 5,429,034 during the past seven years, irrespective of an increase of Rx. 4,195,628 due to loss by exchange in the payments of these departments, in other departments, such as the debt, commercial and special services, there have been decreased expenditure and increased profits amounting to Rx. 5,715,802, which have more than counterbalanced a loss by exchange on these accounts amounting to Rx. 3,309,692. It is plain, therefore, that the loss by exchange is not the main cause of the present financial difficulties of India, but that if the Military Budget stood to-day where it stood seven years ago, there would have been no deficit to provide for and no need for the imposition of new taxes. It is the unceasing and enormous demands for larger and ever larger expenditure in pursuance of a military policy which the best and coolest heads believe to be radically mistaken which is at the root of our present trouble, and will, if it is allowed to prevail, be the fruitful source of many more."

Mr. A. Wylie, M.P., has given notice of the following motion for the next Session of Parliament: "That this House whilst sympathising with Her Majesty's Government in their financial difficulty in India, has noted with regret the reimposition of Import Duties which were abolished with such acknowledged advantage in 1882, and is of opinion that the amount of revenue derived from them is small compared with the cost, direct and indirect, of collection and the annoyance and obstruction necessarily caused to trade, and that this House is also of opinion that the countervailing Excise Cotton Duties have not removed the element of protection, and therefore craves Her Majesty's Government to take steps as soon as possible for entirely repealing those Duties."

Mr. B. L. Cohen, M.P., informs us that he does not regard Lord G. Hamilton's answer as conclusive on the subject (discussed in the debate on the Indian Budget) of Imperial Guarantee for Indian Debt. Mr. Cohen intends "to pursue the motion further with a view, if possible, to surmount some objections to his proposal which were not mentioned by Lord G. Hamilton, but which Mr. Cohen is aware do apply to it."

Sir Henry Fowler's daughter, Miss Ellen T.

Fowler, has written another volume of poetry, which Messrs. Cassell will publish this autumn, under the title, "Verses, Wise and Otherwise." Her first book of poems, "Verses, Grave and Gay," appeared some time ago.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. DADABHAI NAOROJI.

If for no other reason than that the ex-M.P. for Central Finsbury was the first native of India who represented a British constituency in Parliament, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji would (writes a representative of *Great Thoughts*) be entitled to an honourable place in the roll of Indian statesmen. But this is only one, and the least, of his claims to distinction. No Indian subject of Her Majesty has laboured with such constant assiduity for the advancement of his country's interests as this greatest of Indian patriots.

"Tell me," said I, at a recent interview, "how far your efforts have been successful in throwing open the Indian Civil Service to natives?"

"On June 3rd, 1893," was the reply, "the House of Commons passed a resolution agreeing to the holding of simultaneous examinations for all the Civil Services in India and England. Now it was the duty of the Government to give effect to that resolution, but from the first the Secretary of State for India set his face against it. Therefore, instead of carrying it out, the English Government asked the opinion of the Indian Legislature, who were well known to be always averse to it. In regard to English affairs, if a resolution is passed relating to any department of the public service, the Government are bound to give effect to it. They would never think of first consulting that particular department. But, unfortunately, in Indian matters the Indian authorities invariably ignore or resist any resolution or Act which tends to benefit the native population. They do all they can to render it a dead letter. This has been their policy ever since 1833, when the first Act was passed 'to treat Englishmen and Indians in His Majesty's Service on the same footing, without regard to race, colour, or creed'."

"Do you mean to say," I asked in astonishment, "that the terms of this Act have not been faithfully observed?"

"They have been a dead letter up to the present day," said my host. "The violation of the pledges made to India time after time has been scandalous."

"How do you account for it? Do you not think that the English Government is sincerely anxious for the social welfare of India?"

"The Government may be anxious to promote India's welfare," said Mr. Naoroji, "but, unfortunately, its action is simply a reflex of the India Office. We are suffering severely from the transference of Indian rule from the East India Company to the Crown. We are worse off now than before, because in the days of the old East India Company we could appeal to Parliament against any unjust act of the Company. But now the Government feels that it ought to uphold the Secretary of State for India, whoever he may be, and he is usually a man without adequate knowledge of Indian affairs, who plays into the hands of the Indian Council; while the Council itself is out of touch with the native public opinion of the day. The Indian side of a question is, therefore, seldom understood by the Government. Under these circumstances, even a Liberal Government becomes anti-Indian or Anglo-Indian, which is the same thing."

Mr. Naoroji went on to charge the Home Government with violating their pledge to allow one-sixth of the appointments of the Covenanted Civil Service to be given every year in India. For six or seven years, he said, they ignored the Act altogether, and then framed rules nullifying the Act of Parliament, and even tried to bring discredit on the home-chosen portion of the Service by selecting indifferent men; "and what is still worse," continued Mr. Naoroji with rising indignation, "the Secretary of State for India of his own free will, and without the slightest reference to the House of Commons, has abolished this wrongly-styled 'statutory service' of 1870."

"And what do you think must be the ultimate result of such a policy?" I asked.

"I prophesy," said Mr. Naoroji, earnestly and deliberately, "that this constant violation of pledges, this persistent opposition to Indian interests, and the deterioration and impoverishment of the country by an evil administration, must lead, sooner or later, to a rebellion. I hope I may prove a false prophet, but in the interests of the British Empire I say that forces are gathering, vast and powerful, which will succeed in shattering the British Indian Empire, if the present evil and destructive system of administration be not thoroughly reformed. The pity of it is that the British people and Parliament are genuinely desirous of promoting the interests of India and constituting it an integral part of the British Empire, but the Indian authorities disobey their desires and stultify their wishes."

"Why should they do so? What interest have they in so acting?"

"Simply in order to reserve to themselves the sweets of power and pay, or, as one eminent Anglo-Indian expressed it, 'in order to provide for our boys.' The usual plausible excuse is that they think that the larger the number of Europeans in the service the safer India is. But this is a complete mistake, and will prove their chief Nemesis and retribution. Let us consider first the European civil service and population. They are scattered over a vast empire, and would be the immediate victims of any rebellion. The last mutiny furnished us with an object lesson in this respect. But the Indian authorities won't learn by experience. Many a European owed his safety to the loyalty of the natives by whom he was surrounded. Then there are the military services. In such a contingency the civilians could not even depend on the native army for protection, because there is the possibility that the native army would side with their kith and kin. As for the European army, their duty would be

divided between opposing the native army, putting down the rebellion, and helping the Europeans—an impossibility. Lord Roberts has himself admitted that even were the army much larger than it is at present, and even were it perfection itself, the safety of British rule would nevertheless depend entirely on the satisfaction of the people.

"There is one further element of danger," continued Mr. Naoroji. "Suppose that while some such trouble as this was brewing, Russia, which is on the other side of the hedge, were to seize her opportunity to strike a blow at England. What would be easier? Indeed, the Indian authorities are doing everything in their power to tempt Russia to invade India, both by their policy of dissatisfying the Indian people with their rule, and by making an easy road for Russia through the mountains of Afghanistan at our expense. Depend upon it, the 'Forward' policy is a suicidal one. By penetrating to Afghanistan, we only bring ourselves the nearer to Russia, and Russia nearer to ourselves."

"What then do you consider would be a wise policy to pursue with regard to India?"

"To satisfy her with the justice of British rule, to be honest and honourable in all our solemn pledges, and thus to make Indians feel that to fight for the British rule is to fight for their own hearths and homes and property. With Indian subjects of such a temper you could defy half-a-dozen Russias. Another most important point, which is not understood in England, is this: that the effect of a large European service is to impoverish the Indian people both financially and intellectually. For not only do retired servants carry their pensions and savings clean out of the country, but the country is drained of its wisdom and experience. We have no elders left to guide us. A third point is that we should keep within India proper. The river Indus and the mountains of Afghanistan are our natural protection against all enemies. It is as if Nature herself had planted them there for that very purpose of protecting our Empire. Last, but not least, every expenditure of every kind is thrown upon India, while Britain does not contribute a farthing to it in return for the vast benefits she derives from connection with that country. Do you think that the Indians are not keenly alive to this degradation, this 'slavery,' as Macaulay very justly called it? To me it is well nigh inexplicable how British statesmen can continue so blind to the common-sense dictates of righteousness, so untrue to their own honourable character, and so unyielding to the demands of civilisation."

BRITISH INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

DEPUTATION TO MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

Mr. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, received at the Colonial Office on August 29th a representative deputation of Indian gentlemen, now resident in London, who desired to lay before the Government certain grievances of British Indian subjects in Africa. The right hon. gentleman was accompanied by the Hon. T. H. Cochrane, M.P., Mr. E. Fairfield, C.B., and Mr. H. F. Wilson (private secretary). The deputation, organised by the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, consisted of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee, Mr. M. M. Bhownaggree, M.P., Mr. Hardeoram N. Haridas, Mr. Parbati C. Roy, Mr. T. M. Nair, Mr. M. A. Ghani, and Mr. J. Meerza.

Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI, introducing the deputation, said that from the memorial sent to Mr. Chamberlain it would be seen that there were over 100,000 British Indian subjects residing in South Africa—that was, in Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, etc. The Indian traders had become strong competitors in the trade with European settlers, and a determined effort had been made to lower the status of British Indian subjects. It was being attempted to impose restrictions which would prevent British Indians acquiring real property, the possession of the franchise, freedom of locomotion both by day and night, the granting of trade licences, and freedom of choice as regarded places of residence and business. They asked that Indian British subjects should have extended to them the protection to which every British subject was entitled, and which was exemplified in the case of the recent outrages in China and Armenia. Lord Ripon had assured them that it was "the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the Queen's Indian subjects should be treated on a footing of equality with all Her Majesty's subjects," and it was upon that basis that they asked that these Indian subjects in South Africa should be treated. The principal ground that had been urged by the South African authorities for imposing those restrictions was the unsanitary mode of life of these Asiatics. On this subject the *Times* of the 24th June said: "It is needless to say that the Indian Hindus and Mussulmans stand out as examples of bodily cleanliness among Asiatic races, and, we may add, among the races of the world. The ablutions of the Hindu have passed into a proverb. His religion demands them, and the custom of ages has made them a prime necessity of his daily life. As regards their religion teaching them to consider all women as soulless and Christians as natural prey, the Indian memorial indignantly remarks: 'Your petitioners ask, Can there be a grosser libel on the great faiths prevailing in India, or a greater insult to the Indian nation?'" Then the writer in the *Times* went on to say: "The whole question resolves itself into this: Are Her Majesty's Indian subjects to be treated as a degraded and outcast race by a friendly Government, or are they to have the same rights and status as other British subjects enjoy? Are leading Muhammadan merchants, who might sit in the Legislative Council at Bombay, to be liable to indignities and outrage in the South African Republic? We are continually telling our Indian subjects that the economic future of their country depends on their ability to spread themselves out and to develop their foreign trade. What answer can our Indian Government give them if it fails to secure to them the same protection abroad which is secured to the subjects of every other dependency of the Crown?" The *Times of India* also denounced the oppression of British Indian subjects in South Africa.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I would like you, or some other member of the deputation, to put a little more practically what are the exact measures which you think that we can and ought to take.

Mr. NAOROJI replied that the Convention of 1881 put Indian British subjects on the same footing as other British subjects, and what they wanted was to have the amendments that were carried out in 1884-5-6 done away with or repealed.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, but you are speaking as though the Convention were an Act of Parliament which we had passed, and which, therefore, we could repeal or alter. It is really a treaty which has been signed by two parties, and it cannot be altered without the consent of both.

Mr. NAOROJI: And we do not want to alter the Convention of 1881. We want them to be put in the position which the Convention gave them.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am speaking of the subsequent arrangement, which was equally an arrangement by treaty. I am not arguing on the merits of the alteration, but I want you to address yourself to the fact that that was a convention or

agreement between two friendly Powers—the Republic of the Transvaal on the one hand, and the British Government on the other. Having agreed to that, we cannot alter it, *mero motu*, by our own efforts, unless the Republic of the Transvaal will consent to alter it too. We can make friendly appeals to that Government to vary the treaty, but if they refuse we cannot undertake that they shall be forced to do it —that would mean an act of war.

Mr. W. C. BONNERJEE said that the amendment was agreed to by Sir Hercules Robinson on a representation by the Transvaal Government of circumstances which did not exist.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Is it your contention that the assent of the British Government was obtained under false pretences?

Mr. BONNERJEE said he would not go so far as that, for no doubt the President of the Republic believed what had been represented to him as to the alleged unsanitary condition of British Indian subjects in the Transvaal.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Even assuming all that to be true, it does not give us ground for insisting that the Acts shall be repealed. I could quote a case in which a dispute arose between two Powers as to a boundary, and an agreement was come to upon the presentation of a map which has been subsequently proved to be false. But the agreement was made, and it was impossible to go back upon it.

Mr. W. C. BONNERJEE said that the present was a different case. According to the Convention of London, as he understood it, no law affecting British subjects in the Transvaal would be binding on them, unless the British representative gave his sanction to it. Sir Hercules Robinson refused his sanction to the Act of 1885, and it was amended in 1886, and his sanction to the Act as amended was obtained on the representation that the health of the Republic depended upon it. It was subsequently discovered that this representation was not in accordance with the facts, and correspondence took place between the two Governments, with the ultimate result that the matter was referred to arbitration. The point referred, however, was not decided by the arbitrator, and the controversy now remained where it was before the reference. The practical remedy the Indians in South Africa desired was that the case should be remitted back to the arbitrator for his decision on the point at issue, and failing his doing so, that steps should be taken to obtain the repeal of the Act of 1885 as amended.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: In the paper you have handed to me, you ask that we should go behind that arbitration. That is destructive of the principle of arbitration, of which I know some of you are very strong advocates. Whatever doubt I might have had myself upon the subject would have been entirely removed by the decision of my predecessor. Lord Ripon, who, as you say, was most sympathetic, as I am myself, with what you wish to do, found it impossible to go behind the arbitration, and has instructed the High Commissioner to inform President Kruger that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the award of the arbitrator in respect to the Indian traders.

Mr. W. C. BONNERJEE said that that was not known to them when preparing the paper, but it was not easy to understand how an award which did not decide the point at issue came to be accepted by Lord Ripon. He hoped that the British officials would keep their eyes open, so that his fellow-countrymen should not be reduced to the class of Kaffirs, for the Republican authorities had been trying to bring them down to that level.

Mr. BHOWNAGGREE, M.P., said that his countrymen had four other grievances in South Africa, namely, that the acquisition by them of real property had been made a difficulty, if not entirely denied; that the franchise, although not directly denied, had been made almost impossible of attainment; that they had no freedom of locomotion both by day and by night; and that trade licences were granted to them in a different way from that in which they were granted to Europeans. For information as to these grievances he had been obliged to rely upon his friend Mr. Naoroji, but they struck him as real grievances under which no British subject ought to be allowed to suffer. He hoped that Mr. Chamberlain would not consider these grievances were more fanciful than real.

Mr. NAOROJI said these grievances did not exist in the Transvaal only, but existed in Natal and Cape Colony, especially as regarded the franchise. The grievances they had stated were only typical, and representative of grievances that spread over the whole of South Africa.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, in reply, said: The matter which you have brought before me is one of very great importance, and one which has already engaged my careful attention. I have taken the care to make myself acquainted with all the points in the case, and with the decisions which have been come to in regard to it by my predecessor. So far as the principle is concerned, I do not suppose there is any difference whatever between us. We all desire that all British subjects should be treated alike, and should have equal rights and equal privileges. Let me say in passing that one member of the deputation made a comparison which, I think, was rather invidious, for he said he was anxious that his fellow-countrymen should not be treated like Kaffirs; but I may point out to him that Kaffirs also have an equal claim, for they also are British subjects, and are entitled as British subjects to the same rights as every other nationality in that capacity. I should not be inclined to say, as Mr. Bhownaggree has suggested, that your grievances in this respect were fanciful or imaginative. I think that they are real grievances, and that they have not the less importance because they are sentimental and moral rather than material. But I must also protest against any kind of exaggeration. When Mr. Naoroji goes on to compare the grievances under which our Asiatic fellow-subjects are suffering in South Africa with the outrages upon British subjects in China or upon Armenians in one of the provinces of Turkey, that surely is to mix up two totally different things. You are not complaining of personal and bodily outrage, which would undoubtedly be resented if it were suffered by you in any country of the world, but you are complaining that certain rights and privileges, partly social and partly political, have been wrongfully withheld from you. The difficulty that I have is in finding a practical way of dealing with the question. I am very desirous to meet your wishes, but it is evident to me that my predecessor was unable to find any way of meeting them satisfactorily or immediately, and I also was hopeful that you would give me suggestions which I had not been able to find for myself. We are dealing with two classes of Governments—in the first place with a foreign and friendly Government, and in the second place with self-governing colonies. Over neither of these have we sufficient influence to deal of our own motion, and by our own authority, with questions of this kind. We could, as I have said, deal at once with anything in the nature of a personal outrage, but when all that we have to say is that some privilege has been withheld, it is a matter no doubt for the exercise of influence, but it is not a subject that we can settle by our own intervention and without much friendly negotiation. The complaint in the Transvaal is that certain subjects of Her Majesty, as I understand, are required to take up a separate residence. There is no question of the franchise in the Transvaal, because the Government of the Transvaal refuse that privilege quite as much to Englishmen and to other subjects of Her Majesty as they do to Asiatics. It is not a special denial which applies only to our Asiatic fellow-subjects, but it applies equally to all who are not already burghers. The complaint made is as to this separation, which is thought to cast a stigma. I shall be most happy to make any representation upon the subject which I think is likely to have any influence, and from time to time to repeat those representations, in the hope that the Government of the Transvaal may find it to be unnecessary to continue a regulation which undoubtedly is calculated to cause pain. But I have already pointed out to you that I have no absolute power. It is nothing more than the exercise of this kind of influence that I can promise you, because the award has been already accepted by Lord Ripon. Then as regards the self-governing colonies, the question is as to the exercise of the franchise. I understand that in no case has any refusal of this privilege been established against Asiatics as such. There is no mention of any particular class of Her Majesty's subjects in any form of exclusion. The only grievance, therefore—if there is a grievance—is that the conditions of the franchise are so drawn that they do as a matter of fact operate more frequently to exclude Asiatics than to exclude persons of any other nationality. That may be the case, but it makes it very much more difficult to appeal against than if any class of Her Majesty's subjects were excluded under that name. That is not the case; it is only accidentally and incidentally that Asiatics have been excluded, if they have been excluded, from the franchise.

Mr. BHOWNAGGREE: You are speaking of the qualification to sign?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. The condition of the franchise is that the person claiming it shall be able to sign his name in English, and it is said that that does, as a matter of fact, exclude a considerable number of Asiatics. That may be the case, but, as I say, it is not an exclusion directed against Asiatics, but it is directed against persons who are unacquainted with the English language.

Mr. NAOROJI: In Natal it is actually directed against Asiatics.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes; but there, permit me to say, the law is not passed. The proposed law in Natal does, as Mr. Naoroji has pointed out, propose to exclude Asiatics *eo nomine*. I think that is undoubtedly a provision which requires the most serious consideration. It is now engaging my attention, and I trust that I may be able at a later period to make a satisfactory statement with regard to it. I think, therefore, it will be seen—and I hope the deputation will accept that as really being the extent to which I can go to-day—that your claims and your requests have my most sympathetic consideration, and that while I am bound to point out to you that I am not so powerful as I think you imagine I am, yet you may be sure that whatever influence I do possess will be exercised in your favour.

Mr. BONNERJEE explained that the Kaffirs he had referred to were the Kaffirs who were subjects of the Transvaal Republic, and not those who were British subjects.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: We have fellow-subjects who are Kaffirs in the Transvaal.

Mr. NAOROJI, in thanking Mr. Chamberlain for the very sympathetic and considerate manner in which he had received them, said that he had not intended to exaggerate their grievances by his reference to China and Armenia, his object being simply to point out the principle upon which the British Government acted in regard to the protection of British subjects. He hoped that such influence as the Government could exercise would be used to improve the conditions of British Indian subjects in South Africa, and that in the colonies, where Her Majesty had the right of vetoing any Act, nothing would be sanctioned which would make a difference between British Indian subjects and British subjects of other complexions.

The deputation then withdrew.

The following Memorandum, signed by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, and dated August 28th, was supplied to Mr. Chamberlain before the deputation waited upon him:—

1. There are over 100,000 British Indian subjects residing in South Africa, *i.e.*, in Cape Colony, Natal, the South African Republic (Transvaal), and the Orange Free State. These may be roughly divided into four main classes as follows:—

(1) Merchants.
(2) Hawkers.
(3) Domestic servants.
(4) Labourers, *i.e.*, indentured coolies whose indentures have expired.

In the Transvaal alone there are 200 merchants (with liquidated assets valued at £100,000), about 2,000 hawkers, and 1,500 domestic servants.

2. The Indian traders by their thrifty and simple mode of life have become strong competitors in trade with European settlers. This has aroused jealousy and bad feeling among the other colonists, who appear to be treating the Indians in a spirit of persecution and vexatious tyranny; and more especially by means of their preponderating voice in the several South African States, to be making a determined effort to lower the *status* of those British subjects who happen to be natives of British India.

3. The following are some of the matte[illegible] in which it is attempted [illegible] impose restrictions [illegible] British Indians, by [illegible] Cape Colony, Natal, the South African Republic (Transvaal), and the Orange Free State:—

(1) The acquisition of Real Property.
(2) The possession of the Franchise.
(3) Freedom of locomotion both by day and night.
(4) The granting of Trade licenses (which are necessary for all engaged in trade).
(5) Freedom of choice as regards places of residence and places of business.

Early in this year the Cape Assembly passed a Bill authorising the East London Municipality to legislate with a view to compel British Indians to reside in locations and to take out passes should they want to leave their homes after 9 p.m. Generally, an attempt is being made to treat all Indians, whatever their caste and position, as "coolies," *i.e.*, labourers (generally assisted emigrants whose indentures have expired); and further, to class all "coolies" with Kaffirs and other native races, however uncivilised.

4. Trade jealousy is at the root of this hostile treatment, but other pleas are put forward, namely, that the Indians are uncivilised barbarians, and more particularly that their insanitary mode of life is a standing menace to the health of the community. On this latter point, however, the evidence appears to be all the other way. *Vide post*, para. 9.

5. The most urgent matter is perhaps the attempt which is being made to compel the Indians to confine themselves both for purposes of residence and of trade to certain fixed "locations," necessarily inconvenient for trade, as being away from the actual town, and possibly dangerous to health, as being in a situation for which no one has any particular use except it may be the deposit of town refuse. [Such a case actually occurred in 1893, and elicited a strong protest from the British Agent against the action of the Transvaal Government. *Vide* Green Book No. II. of 1893.] Such an unreasonable restriction on liberty can at the best mean nothing less than financial ruin to a merchant.

6. What appears to have taken place in the Transvaal is this. The Convention of Pretoria, 1881, clause 14, and the Convention of London, 1884, between the South African Republic and Great Britain, alike provide that equal treatment in the eye of the law shall be received by all persons residing in the Republic save and except natives of the place. These Conventions did not confer any *status* on the Indians or any other British subjects. They merely safeguarded that "footing of equality with all Her Majesty's other subjects" upon which successive Secretaries of State for the Colonies have desired that the Queen's Indian subjects should be treated.

7. Clause 14 of the Convention was amended by Law 3 of 1885 in the direction of allowing British Indian subjects to be required to reside and trade in separate "locations." But to this Law Her Majesty's Government refused assent, stating most emphatically in the course of the correspondence on the subject that separate streets might be set apart for the Indians in the interests of the public health, but that they could not be compelled to trade in certain fixed parts only of the towns.

8. In 1886 an amended form of Law 3 of 1885 was passed, and the then High Commissioner, Sir

H. Robinson, in withdrawing his opposition thereto, made it clear that even in its amended form this departure from the Convention was only permitted on what had been represented to him as urgent sanitary grounds. In his letter dated 26th September, 1886, at p. 46 of Green Book No. 1 of 1894, he says, "Although the amended law is still a contravention of the 14th Article of London, I shall not advise Her Majesty's Government to offer further opposition to it in view of your Honour's opinion that it is necessary for the protection of the public health." It is to be regretted that Sir H. Robinson did not take steps to ascertain for himself whether or not the state of things in existence at the time justified the opinion of the Head of the Republic as expressed to him.

9. The assumption that any sanitary necessity exists for this curtailment of the liberties of British Indian subjects appears to be singularly ill-founded. The following three certificates from European doctors resident in Pretoria and Johannesburg speak for themselves:—

"I hereby certify that I have practised as a general medical practitioner in the town of Pretoria for the last five years.

"During that period I have had a considerable practice amongst the Indians, especially about three years ago, when they were more numerous than at present.

"I have generally found them cleanly in their persons, and free from the personal diseases due to dirt or careless habits. Their dwellings are generally clean, and sanitation is willingly attended to by them. Class considered, I should be of opinion that the lowest class Indian compares most favourably with the lowest class white, *i.e.*, the lowest class Indian lives better and in better habitation, and with more regard to sanitary measures, than the lowest class white.

"I have, further, found that during the period that small-pox was epidemic in the town and district, and is still epidemic in the district, that although every nation nearly had one or more of its members at some time in the lazaretto, there was not a single Indian attacked.

"Generally, in my opinion, it is impossible to object to the Indian on sanitary grounds, provided always the inspection of the sanitary authorities is made as strictly and regularly for the Indian as for the white.

"H. Prior Veale, B.A., M.B., B.C. Cantab.

"Pretoria, Z.A.R., 27th April, 1895."

"Johannesburg, 1895.

"This is to certify that I have examined the residences of the bearers of this note, and that they are in a sanitary and hygienic condition, and in fact such as any European might inhabit. I have resided in India, I can certify that their habitations here in the Z A.R. are far superior to those of their native country.

"C. P. Spink, M.R.C.S. and L.R.C.P. (Lond.)."

"Having frequently occasion to visit the better class of the Indian population of Johannesburg (merchants, etc., coming from Bombay) in my professional quality, I give as my opinion that they are as clean in their habits and domestic life as white people of the same standing.

"Dr. Nahmmacher, M.D., etc.

"Johannesburg, 14th March, 1895."

10. Here, however, the matter was not allowed to rest. Difficulties again arose on the subject of the British Indian subjects, and further correspondence took place between the British Government and the Republic, the result of which was that some time ago the differences between the two Governments were referred to the arbitration of the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State to whom power was given "to decide either in favour of the claims put forward by Her Majesty's Government or by the South African Republic, *or to lay down such interpretation of the ordinances, read together with the despatches referring to the question, as shall appear to him to be correct.*"

11. The Chief Justice has made his award, but if the text of it as given in a petition to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from the British Indian subjects residing in the South African Republic is correct then certainly he has not decided the principal question referred to him. He was required to lay down such interpretation of the ordinances as should appear to *him* to be correct. He has not done so. He refers to law 3 of 1885, and its amendment in 1886, and says that the Republic is bound and entitled to give full force and effect to this law subject in case of objections "to sole and exclusive interpretation in the ordinary course of the tribunals of the country." The law and the tribunals of the country were in existence before the reference to the arbitrator, and both the disputants were well aware of the fact. What they wanted was the Chief Justice's interpretation of the law read with the dispatches, and not the interpretation of the law by the tribunals of the country. He has not given it to them, and there can be no doubt but that the award apart altogether from its unsatisfactory character, is not binding on either party, and the controversy remains where it was when the reference was made to the Chief Justice.

12. So far the British Government would seem to have acted in the interests of their Indian subjects, but hitherto their action has not borne fruit, and the grievances remain unredressed. The first step towards this end is the repeal of the unconstitutional amendments to clause 14 of the Convention of London.

13. From information which has come to this country it is clear that an attempt is being made to disfranchise British Indian subjects throughout South Africa by means of new legislation imposing conditions which are a practical bar to Indians retaining or obtaining the Franchise. As regards Cape Colony, it appears that an Act, namely, Act 9 of 1892, was passed by the Colonial Parliament, and promulgated on August 16th, 1892. The Indians objected to it as being in effect a disfranchisement Act so far as they were concerned, and they petitioned the Crown to withhold its assent from it; the reasons on which the petition is based are contained in a letter sent by the Indians to the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated October 24, 1892. As regards Natal also, a disfranchising Act was passed in 1894. The Indians protested and, failing in the Colony, sent a petition to the Secretary of State for the Colonies praying that the Act might be disallowed by Her Majesty. There is reason to believe that this petition has not yet been disposed of by the Colonial Office.

14. The matters above dealt with are of extreme gravity. They touch directly the well-being of British Indian subjects in South Africa, and indirectly the rights and privileges of such subjects emigrating to other parts of Her Majesty's dominions. It is hoped that they will receive earnest and sympathetic consideration on the part of the authorities at home, an[illegible] such steps taken as will ensure to the British [illegible]n subject the privileges which he enjoyed be-[illegible] measures [illegible] of were taken in hand.

NOTICES.

TO CONTRIBUTORS.

The Editor of India cannot hold himself responsible in any case for the return of MS. He will, however, always be glad to consider any contributions which may be submitted to him; and when postage stamps are enclosed every effort will be made to return rejected contributions promptly.—Address: Editor of India, 84 and 85, Palace Chambers, Westminster, London, S.W.

TO SUBSCRIBERS.

The annual subscription to India (post free) is six shillings for England and six rupees for India. Subscriptions are payable in advance. Remittances, or communications relating to subscriptions or to any other matter of business connected with India, should in all cases be sent to the Manager of India, 84 and 85, Palace Chambers, Westminster, London, S.W.

Cheques and Post-office orders should be made payable to Mr. W. Douglas Hall.

Copies of India can be obtained from the Offices of the Paper; from Mr. Elliott Stock, Paternoster Row, London, E.C.; from Messrs. Deighton, Bell and Co., Trinity Street, Cambridge; and to order at any Railway Bookstall.

TO ADVERTISERS.

India presents unique advantages as an advertising medium. All communications as to advertisements should be sent to the Advertisement Manager of India, 84 and 85, Palace Chambers, Westminster, London, S.W., who will, on application, forward lists of charges.

INDIA.

LONDON, OCTOBER, 1895.

THE RETENTION OF CHITRAL.

REMOVING THE TALL POPPIES.

By Sir W. Wedderburn, Bart., M.P.

Twenty years ago, when we first came into political relations with Chitral, a tough old Chief, Aman-ul-Mulk, was the ruler of that territory. He probably did not possess all the cardinal virtues; but he possessed those particular qualifications which we most required in a frontier neighbour; he was strong enough to keep order; he was fairly popular with the local tribes; and he was well disposed towards the British Government. Indeed his friendly disposition towards us was of a pronounced and practical kind. For in 1876 he voluntarily tendered his allegiance to our feudatory the Máháràja of Kashmir, and afterwards proposed still closer relations with the Indian Government. He was in fact prepared heartily to throw in his lot with us. What condition of frontier affairs could be better than this? And what was the secret of this fierce old barbarian's attachment to our rule? The reason was a simple one. His ruling passion was, and the ruling passion of all these tribes is, love of independence; and that independence was threatened from the side of Afghanistan. Hence his affection for us. The motive was self-preservation, a motive which governs human nature all the world over. I remember long ago a rebellious little mite being put into the corner until she should promise amendment. To the surprise of all she immediately reported, "Alice is good." But the mystery was cleared up when hastily retreating from the corner, she added *sotto voce* "Alice is very much afraid of that big spider!" In the present case the Amír of Kabul was the big spider, whose threatening attitude produced such good inclinations among the frontier tribes. Aman-ul-Mulk thought we might help him to maintain his independence, and that we did not covet his territory. Hence he drew towards us, and became our willing ally. To use the words of the Government of India in their despatch of the 8th of May last, "fear of Afghan aggression threw Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk into the arms of Kashmir, and thus led to British suzerainty."

This Aman-ul-Mulk was not one of those helpless puppets set up by ourselves, who get their throats cut the moment we are in difficulties. Of such puppets, to our sorrow, we have had large experience, from Shah Shujah in the first Afghan War down to Nizam-ul-Mulk in the present complications. No; Aman-ul-Mulk was a ruler able and willing to bring help to his friends in time of need. And this he did effectually for us, a short time afterwards, when we got ourselves into trouble with the tribes at Gilghit. In the Gilghit direction we had followed the "forward" policy, which means encroachment upon the tribes. Instead of, as at Chitral, supporting the tribes against outside aggression, we had ourselves become the trespassers upon their independence; and in pursuance of this policy had established a frontier post at Gilghit, an isolated position far away among the most inaccessible ranges of the Hindu Kush, some 250 miles from Chitral, and more than that distance from the British frontier. Here, unmindful of the tragic fate of Sir Alexander Burnes, and of Sir Louis Cavagnari, we had located Major Biddulph, as our agent, with a small escort of native troops. Thus isolated he was at the mercy of the wild frontier tribes, being cut off by the snows, even from Kashmir, during six months of the year. From this precious coign of vantage Major Biddulph was supposed to keep watch and ward over the safety of the Empire; but in point of fact he was not in a position to secure even his own safety. Being viewed with jealousy and distrust by the tribes whose independence he was invading, he was without sources of information, and quite in the dark as to what was going on around him. The result was that just as winter was setting in, and the passes were closed, a bolt fell upon him out of the blue. Quite unexpectedly the tribes were raised against him by the Chief of Yasin, a supposed friend and ally, and but for the intervention of Aman-ul-Mulk, he would undoubtedly have been destroyed before help could reach him. The following is the guarded official account of our narrow escape on this occasion (*vide* Government of India Despatch of 22nd December, 1880, printed at page 4 of the Chitral Blue Book): "On the 29th October, a force of 750 men, led by Pehlwan Bahadur, the Chief of Yasin, surprised the frontier fort of Gakuch, and marched upon Gilghit. The Kashmir fort at Sher was invested and attacked, and Major Biddulph was informed that more than one of the neighbouring Chiefs only awaited its fall to join the insurgents. He advanced to its relief with his own escort of 20

native infantry and some Kashmir troops, but the attempt failed, and for a time there was a prospect of his being himself beseiged. On the 19th November, however, we received news that Pehlwan Bahadur had broken up the investment of Sher and withdrawn; and it appears from later intelligence that, attacked or threatened in the rear by the Chitral Chief, he had been abandoned by his men, and had fled almost alone towards Wakhan. The rising has therefore for the present completely collapsed, and there is reason to hope that no further disturbances may take place. The causes and objects of the rising are still obscure." Of course they were obscure, as regards particulars. For all purposes of local information poor Major Biddulph was up in a balloon. But as regards the general cause and object of the rising there could be no doubt. The cause was hatred of intruders, and the object was to get rid of them. Political officers may say what they like, but that is the root of the whole matter. And this truth was shortly afterwards admitted by the Government of India which, having temporarily returned to sanity under the guidance of Lord Ripon and Lord Hartington, withdrew the irritating presence of the Gilghit outpost. Then there was peace on the frontier. When the thorn in the flesh was removed the inflammation disappeared.

This Yasin incident, with the opportune arrival of Aman-ul-Mulk as a *Deus ex machinâ*, illustrates vividly the wisdom of Lord Lawrence's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of frontier States, whether large or small. Far the most important act of internal self-government in these tribal States is the choice of their ruler, and Lord Lawrence's policy was to leave this matter to the people themselves. When, by the rough and ready methods customary in such primitive communities, the survival of the fittest has been secured, then is the time for the Government of India to recognise him as the *de facto* ruler, not for his personal merits, nor on account of any supposed partiality for ourselves, but because he represents the people of the State, and because he has shown himself capable of maintaining order among them. According to this policy our one abiding interest in our relations with these frontier States is that the ruler should be a strong and responsible man; strong in his personal character, and strong in his influence over the tribes. And whatever his original feeling may have been, we may reckon with confidence on his drawing towards us and becoming, like Aman-ul-Mulk, an effective supporter, if we can only convince him that we have no designs against his independence. Dost Muhammad, a really strong ruler, was an instance in point. Though we treated him as an enemy in the first Afghan War, and drove him from Kabul, in order to set up our puppet Shah Shujah, he nevertheless became our staunch ally when, having regained his throne, he became satisfied that we had given up our insane idea of occupying Afghanistan.

What Dost Muhammad was on a large scale, Aman-ul-Mulk was on a small one. And if our Indian Government had been wise they would, on his death, have allowed the process of natural selection to provide Chitral with a successor of similar qualifications. While the delicate operation of selecting the fittest is going on, outside interference is purely mischievous. Our political officers, being as a rule in the hands of intriguing subordinates, are generally ignorant of the real character and disposition of the various claimants, and their attempts at king-making would seem farcical if the results were not so disastrous and humiliating. What were the events which followed on the death of Aman-ul-Mulk in August 1892? First, one of his sons named Afzul-ul-Mulk violently seized upon the reins of government, setting aside his eldest brother, Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was his father's acknowledged heir. This Afzul-ul-Mulk next proceeded to put to death three of his remaining brothers, and then wrote to the Viceroy announcing his succession, which he described as having taken place "with the unanimous consent" of his brothers. This was grim irony, worthy of Philip of Spain. But it will hardly be credited that the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, being aware of the above facts, at once wrote in reply to this blood-stained usurper, and actually congratulated him on his accession with the consent of his brothers (*vide* Blue Book, p. 18). This uncouth attempt to worship the rising sun proved abortive. For a month had hardly elapsed before the one strong man in the Chitral imbroglio appeared on the scene. This was Sher Afzul, brother of Aman-ul-Mulk, who had for some time been a refugee in Afghanistan. As usual the political officers were quite taken by surprise. They were just contemplating a British mission to Chitral, "in order to consolidate our relations" with the usurper, when Sher Afzul entered Chitral territory with a small party of horsemen. He was joined by large numbers of adherents, and immediately marched upon Chitral fort, which he took, killing Afzul-ul-Mulk. As he was a capable and popular man the people at once submitted to him, and there seemed some prospect of a settled government in Chitral. But these arrangements did not commend themselves to Colonel Durand the British agent at Gilghit, who, without the sanction of Government, proceeded to take part in an expedition against Sher Afzul, despatching a force of 250 rifles and two guns, besides local levies, in support of Nizam-ul-Mulk another claimant for the throne. Not being strong enough to resist this combination, Sher Afzul again took refuge in Afghanistan, to bide his time there; and Nizam-ul-Mulk reigned in his stead. These were strange proceedings, involving the unauthorised dethronement of a *de facto* ruler, whose authority had been accepted by the people, and with whom we had no quarrel. Stranger still, these proceedings of Colonel Durand received the "full approval" of the Viceroy. Having thus set up a puppet king a British agent with troops had to be moved up to Chitral in order to keep him on his legs. Did this revolutionary violence produce order and security? Not at all. Dr. Robertson the British Agent reported, "We seem to be on a volcano here. . . . the atmosphere of Chitral is one of conspiracy and intrigue." Later on he stated that "the country was in a distracted condition, torn by factions; the Mehtar was highly unpopular; the English were looked upon with suspicion and dislike by the influential classes." And this is how he describes the unhappy puppet king: "An unnerved

terror-stricken Chief, who was conscious that he ruled on the merest sufferance a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks of violence was entirely due to a doubt and fear lest the Government of India might have the will and also the power to avenge any injury to its nominee." Such was the outcome of our blundering interference. We had, however, to descend to lower depths of discredit and humiliation. Our poor puppet Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered by his brother Amir-ul-Mulk, who then proclaimed himself Mehtar. Where was our control then? Our local agent Lieut. Gurdon, far from controlling events, found himself in a very precarious position, and was compelled to receive personal visits from this Amir-ul-Mulk, redhanded from the murder of his brother, our friend and nominee. And things became still worse when Dr. Robertson arrived at Chitral, and found himself shut up in the fort with the murderer, and besieged by Sher Afzul. Misfortune makes us acquainted with strange bed-fellows; and Dr. Robertson reported that his only hope was "by showing that he and Amir-ul-Mulk were working in thorough accord." Comment upon such a degrading situation seems unnecessary. The outcome of all this costly blundering was that our wretched puppet was murdered under our very eyes, and that our representative immediately afterwards was found fighting for his life on the side of the murderer, for the purpose of preventing the people of Chitral having as their ruler the man of their choice, that man being the only competent member of the reigning family. So tangled was the knot woven by these marvellous diplomatists that it could not be unloosed. To cut it an expedition of 15,000 men was necessary at a cost of two millions, to be paid by the blameless and starving Indian rayat. *Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.*

Does it not seem perverse that our diplomatic wisdom should thus always result in the selection of the unfittest? What is the secret of this perversity? The *causa causans* is inseparable from despotic rule. For it is the nature of despotic governments, and of the agents of despotic governments, to fear and dislike strong and independent men; not recognising the force of the aphorism that, in politics as in physics, where there is no resistance there is no support. Hence despotism, for its tools, must have recourse to the servile and the venal, to those who are willing to betray their own countrymen, and who, when opportunity offers, will betray their employers. Once, on a memorable occasion, Sir John Gorst, when Under-Secretary for India, in an unwonted outburst of candour, bore emphatic testimony to this important truth. It was in the debate on Manipur, in July, 1891, and he pointed out how, in that melancholy imbroglio, the Indian Government had shown its distrust of capable men. Referring to the fable of the tall poppies, and likening the Indian Government to the ancient tyrant of Rome, he declared that "Governments have always hated and discouraged independent and original talent, and they have always loved and promoted docile mediocrity. This is not a new [illegible]. It is as old as Tarquinius Superbus." K[illegible]g strong and independent men at a distance, a[illegible]ing for their information on spies and traitors, our political officers in these frontier posts become the dupes and tools of local intriguers. Seated on volcanoes they preach Peace, Peace, when there is no peace, and write despatches to Simla that they are lords of all they survey, and that contentment reigns supreme among the tribes, with a diffused feeling of admiration for British wisdom and goodness—when (Oh, what a surprise!) the explosion takes place, and they are hoisted into the air with all their belongings. These are the "experts" upon whom the Government of India depends for guidance in frontier matters; and we in the House of Commons are asked to surrender our judgment and accept their schemes as gospel, however absurd and disastrous the results may be.

W. Wedderburn.

A RETROSPECT AND A MORAL.

By J. Dacosta.

I.

On the 3rd September Sir Henry Fowler, the late Secretary of State for India, called the attention of Parliament to the determination arrived at by the Government as to the occupation of Chitral. In reviewing our relations with that State, he narrated how in 1876 Lord Lytton entered into negotiations with the Máhárája of Kashmir, which resulted in a treaty between the British Government and Kashmir and between Kashmir and Chitral, under which Chitral agreed to acknowledge the suzerainty of Kashmir in consideration of receiving a subsidy. In 1877 a British agency was established at Gilghit avowedly for obtaining information on the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier. In 1881 that agency was withdrawn because the experiment had proved unsatisfactory. In 1889 the agency was re-established with an increased subsidy to Chitral and a military force stationed at Gilghit. In the same year the Indian Secretary having inquired about the possibility of opening a road from the Peshawar frontier to Chitral, was informed that the greatest danger in such an undertaking was the deep-rooted and unsurmountable objection of the tribes. In 1892 the subsidy to the Mehtar of Chitral was doubled on condition of his consenting to the construction of the road in question and to the permanent residence of a British officer in his country. In referring to the Indian Government despatch of October 19th, 1892, containing the terms on which the Chitral Residency was formed, Sir H. Fowler said that he was at a disadvantage in quoting from that document, because it had been "freely bowdlerised," and he explained his remark by saying:—

"When the Indian Government considers any question, every member of that Government has a right to record his dissent from the despatch which is sent to England. That right is given by virtue of an Act of Parliament, and that dissent is bound to be submitted to the Secretary of State. It seems to me that when the Secretary of State lays a despatch on the Table of this House, to which despatch there were dissents, those dissents should accompany the despatch, so that the House should be in a position to know whether the despatch was or was not unani-

mous and what were the reasons which induced certain members of the Government to dissent from it. This is not a unanimous despatch; there are very important and serious dissents from it."

In August, 1892, Aman-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral, died after a rule of thirty years, and was succeeded by his son Afzul-ul-Mulk, while his second son Nizam-ul-Mulk fled to Gilghit to seek, as it was said, the protection and support of the British. Soon afterwards Sher Afzul, a brother of the late Mehtar, who had resided abroad, made a descent on Chitral, when Afzul-ul-Mulk was killed and Sher Afzul assumed the Mehtarship. Meanwhile Nizam-ul-Mulk, assisted by the British Agent, marched into Chitral, defeated Sher Afzul and proclaimed himself Mehtar; his accession to the throne is thus described in Dr. Robertson's report of June, 1893:—

"Instead of having to congratulate and form an alliance with a young prince flushed with triumphs over rebellious subjects, we found ourselves called upon to establish on his throne a terror-stricken chief who was conscious that he ruled on sufferance over a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks was due to the fear of the Government of India. That under such circumstances any permanency can be expected for the work accomplished, would be unreasonable. The upper classes have to be won, the Adamzais must be acted upon by the display of the wealth and resources which their ruler possesses as the subsidised ally of Kashmir. That there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a line of policy, it would be idle to deny. The Chitralis, however, are impressionable, and the power of influencing them lies with the man of the most tactful speech and the longest purse."

The above passages need elucidation as the Blue Book contains only extracts of papers relating to the subject, and Dr. Robertson's report of 1895 has been suppressed. The reason of the Chitralis being "thoroughly disaffected" was that Nizam-ul-Mulk had become the creature and the tool of an infidel nation, and disqualified as such to rule over a Muhammadan people. The references to "wealth, the longest purse and the upper classes to be won," obviously suggested the necessity of bribery; although our past dealings with the border tribes had shown that all the money we lavished on their chiefs, in order to overcome their fanatic opposition to our presence, had entirely failed to accomplish our purpose.

On the 1st January of the present year, Nizam-ul-Mulk, the British protégé, was put to death by his tribesmen, and his younger brother Amir-ul-Mulk was proclaimed Mehtar. Dr. Robertson was absent from Chitral at the time, and when he returned on the 1st February, an important occurrence took place, of which Sir H. Fowler made no mention—namely, the new Mehtar peremptorily signified to Dr. Robertson that he, the British envoy, must leave the Chitral territory, and that if the British Government desired to hold diplomatic relations with the State, they might send a Muhammadan agent.

II.

Of the danger in which Dr. Robertson was subsequently placed, Sir H. Fowler was officially informed only on the 8th March, and he then telegraphed to the Indian Government to take such action for securing the safety of our agent and his party as they might deem necessary. The Government of India, availing themselves of the discretion thus vested in them, organised a relief force of no less than 15,000 troops, although it was certain that the movements of so large an army in the region in question would be slow, while rapidity was essential to success in that instance. Subsequent events fully revealed the serious disadvantages inseparable from the march of so cumbrous a force.

Sir H. Fowler, in speaking of the campaign which ensued for the rescue of Dr. Robertson, omitted to mention that we had purchased the aid and co-operation of the ex-Khan of Dir, and that his men compelled the Chitralis to raise the seige of the fort in which Dr. Robertson and the survivors of his escort were hard-pressed, and that the British agent was thus released on the 19th April, when the troops sent for his rescue were still too far away to accomplish their mission.

On April 26 the Secretary of State having asked the Indian Government to state their views on the situation was informed in a despatch dated May 8 that "they attached enormous importance to maintaining our position in Chitral because of the risk of foreign occupation, if abandoned: they maintained moreover that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir." These expressions of opinion appear incongruous and irreconcilable with facts, seeing that the British Cabinet was in a better position to judge of the risk of a Russian advance through Central Asia, than were the officers who compose the Indian Government: and as regards the suzerainty of Kashmir over Chitral, as it had been purchased for purposes entirely our own, it is difficult to imagine why and to whom were given the pledges which are now alleged to interfere with our freedom of action. This mystery cannot be solved with the incomplete information vouchsafed by the Government, seeing that the Blue book contains mere extracts of the despatches of April 26 and May 8. The following passage in the latter document deserves however special attention as having furnished Sir H. Fowler with his chief argument against the retention of Chitral:—

"What must be faced is the consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral valley. The difficulty of sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilghit and the expense of doing so are so great that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempts to occupy Chitral rather than hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communications from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive. We are conscious that it may involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India can ill afford, and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on the North West frontier, which we would fain avoid."

From [illegible] view of the Indian Government it is clear, as [illegible] H. Fowler observed, that if we commit oursel[illegible] the establishment of a permanent

garrison at Chitral, we shall be committed to the maintenance of the road from the Peshawar frontier, and that means the occupation of the Chitral State and of the country lying between Chitral and our frontier. Then, referring to the policy in pursuance of which it is urged that we must hold Chitral, the ex-Indian Secretary said:—

"Is the fortification of Chitral a strategic necessity for the adequate defence of the Indian frontier? The late Government availed themselves of the best military advice on that point that they could command. The advice obtained is not in the State papers now published, and it would, therefore, not be right for me to give names; but the opinions expressed were that the gigantic natural geographic defences of our north-west frontier render the advance of an invading army practically impossible, and our position practically impregnable; that Chitral is not a place of much importance as a base for military reserves, or useful as a base for military operations, defensive or offensive; that to lock up troops in the Chitral valley would be an act of the gravest blundering, and that the construction of a military route to Chitral would, in the event of hostilities, be an advantage to an invading force and a disadvantage to a defending force."

Sir H. Fowler said furthermore:—

"Lord Roberts estimated the fighting force of the border tribes at 200,000 men. Have the Government asked themselves whether it would not be better to have these tribes as independent allies, who would form another line of defence, than to have them as revengeful foes? If we succeed in conquering them, we shall have created a permanent source of discontent and danger, and they will seriously weaken our power to resist the attack of any hostile force. A practical question is whether we are going to extend the frontier of India by 250 miles in order to cover a tract of country from which we can derive no possible advantage and obtain no possible revenue, and in which we may be constantly embroiled with independent tribesmen defending their native soil. Sir James Lyall, the late Governor of the Punjab, who knows something about the country in question, declared that the tribes will certainly not consent to our making the projected road, and that it will, therefore, be impossible to construct it unless there is a military occupation of a line 180 miles long.

"As regards the moral question with regard to the proclamation we issued in March, it is clear that if the Government annex any portion of the territory through which our troops passed in March, April, or May, they will have broken their faith, which was pledged in that proclamation.

"What has been the policy of our successors? On August 1st they enquired of the Indian Government whether it would be possible to arrange with the tribes for the construction of the road from Peshawar, and were answered: 'We have avoided openly negotiating with the tribes. The reports from Low and Deane warrant the expectation that a peaceful arrangement for the road can be made.' With this information the present Secretary of State wrote his despatch of August 16th, in which he sums up the position thus:—'It appears from your letter of May 8th that the Indian Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes, would be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications as to render it of doubtful expediency; but this question depended, in your opinion, on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes.'

"Our judgment should therefore be reserved until we know whether the arrangements with the tribes have been successful: they have not been successful to the present time."

Sir H. Fowler then cited Lord Lawrence's opinion on our Indian frontier policy, and concluded his speech by declaring that, on behalf of that policy, he ventured to enter his protest against embarking on an enterprise which may be, and which he sincerely believed would be, a constant menace and danger to the security and prosperity of India.

III.

Lord George Hamilton, in replying to the late Indian Secretary, twitted him with concluding a speech of considerable length and vigour by merely observing that the House had not sufficient information to form a judgment on the question before it. If this statement were intended to cause merriment it proved successful, for it did raise laughter; but as an argument or a reply, it seems remarkably inaccurate and misleading, since a distinct and most important question had been placed before the House, namely—whether it was expedient to garrison Chitral, before arrangements had been made with the tribes for the construction of the projected road from the Peshawar frontier. It is, perhaps, a matter for regret that a resolution was not moved on the subject, since the omission resulted in the new Indian Secretary leaving that question unanswered, except by an unsupported statement that "the tribes are ready to fall in with our proposed arrangements." Now, considering that the Indian Government have, for six years, strenuously, but unsuccessfully, striven to obtain the consent of the tribes to our opening the road in question; considering, moreover, that every attempt made by us since 1876 to construct roads in Afghan tribal territory met with strong and persistent opposition, the assertion that the tribes are ready to comply with our wishes on the subject is inexplicable, the more so as it has not subsequently been confirmed, while the attitude of the tribes has, on the contrary, been continuously hostile since the relief of Chitral, their hostility being manifested by shots fired into our camps, at our sentries, and our road-makers, and by our telegraph wires being repeatedly cut and partially carried off. These outrages were recorded in telegrams of May 5, 15, 16, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30 and June 8, published in the *Times*. That paper has lately ceased to publish information on the subject, but Indian journals show that the outrages continued unabated—notably the *Pioneer* of May 21, 22, 23, June 8 and August 3, 7, 8, 9, 21, 22 and 28. Under such circumstances to conclude, from tribesmen having accepted our pay for labour, that the tribes and their leaders are no longer opposed to our constructing military roads in their territory, would be irrational and in direct conflict with all the experience gained by us in Waziristan,

the Black Mountain country and other parts of the borderland. For instance, when our negotiations with the Hasanzais, the Akazais and other tribes of the Black Mountain country were unsuccessful, and we sent in 1888 a fully equipped army of 8,000 troops with a transport train of 5,000 mules, under General M'Queen, to coerce the tribes into acquiescence, the General on his return reported that the tribes had tendered their submission and promised that we should in future be free to march through their country and to construct and maintain roads. But as soon as we attempted to avail ourselves of that promise, it was repudiated by Hasan Ali and other tribal chiefs, and our working parties and the troops escorting them, were forthwith expelled from the country. Another large force was sent in 1891 to capture Hasan Ali and subjugate the tribes, but it returned without having accomplished either object. A third expedition sent in 1892 to hunt down and bring in Hasan Ali failed likewise in its mission, and the attempt to make roads in the Black Mountain country has not since been renewed.

Lord G. Hamilton's assertion that the tribes dwelling between the Peshawar frontier and Chitral are now ready to fall in with our proposals for the construction of a road, may have been but an expression of opinion—a conclusion to which we are led on reading an article in the semi-official paper, the *Pioneer* of August 25th, in which a similar opinion is expressed in a statement to the effect that the tribes have willingly taken the pay offered them for labour, and will not be inclined to quarrel with a government which spends its money so freely.

The great strategic value of Chitral has hitherto been pleaded, on the authority of Lord Roberts, as a fact rendering it important that the valley should be occupied by British troops; but the fallacy of that plea has of late been entirely exposed, and Lord G. Hamilton now says:—"I do not think that Chitral is of so great stategic importance as some eminent military men consider; but considerations of a moral character force us to remain; our retiring would be to admit to the whole world that we were unable to perform the task we had undertaken." Can the Indian Secretary really believe that our inability in that respect is not already patent to the world, and that it can be concealed by irrational persistence in an impossible task?

In another part of his speech Lord G. Hamilton attempted to vindicate the "Forward policy" by saying: "The great mass of the modern school with regard to frontier questions are upon this side of the House, and those of the old-fashioned view sit opposite." Instead of partisans had authorities and their opinions been cited, some facility might have been afforded for forming a correct judgment on the merits of the two policies. I believe that I am right when I say that the bugbear of a Russian invasion has long been exploded, and that the Parliamentary majority who support the Government in its frontier policy, are actuated, not by any serious fear of a Russian attack upon northern India, but by the hope that their support will enable the Government to pass certain measures which they consider favourable to their and their constituents' interests.

Another passage again in Lord G. Hamilton's speech deserves attention. He said: "In my judgment no external policy however bold and no frontier performance however heroic can compensate for the permanent annual deficiency of the Indian Exchequer. I believe that the constantly increasing taxation is a serious danger to the stability of the Indian Government, and therefore I looked with apprehension on the words that the Indian Government used in admitting that their proposals might be prohibitive by reason of the expenditure involved."

Well might the reader ask whether these words were uttered in derision, seeing how flagrantly the sentiments which they profess have been violated by the Government; how taxation has been constantly increased to defray an external policy of astounding rashness and folly—a policy requiring British garrisons to be isolated in mountainous and hostile regions, where our soldiers have been driven to heroic performances in defending or in losing their lives; how the troops commanded by the late Captain Ross, those led by Colonel Kelly and the garrison of the Chitral fort were driven to such action without being able to fulfil their respective missions, these having proved to be tasks virtually impossible to accomplish. The courage the energy and the endurance of our soldiers have awakened universal admiration and sympathy, but have resulted in no advantage to their nation, unless it be a satisfaction to narrate their deeds. The policy responsible for this waste of blood and treasure, was already accountable for the cruel isolation and massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his escort, and for the many disasters and humiliations which have, since 1878, lowered British prestige among our Indian fellow-subjects and among the tribal neighbours whom we vainly and without provocation, attempted to subjugate. A most regrettable feature of that policy is its constant and growing need of bribery for accomplishing what it professes to accomplish by force of arms and superiority in the science of war. The subsidies to princes and tribal chiefs, added to the cost of actual warfare, constitute a heavy and increasing drain on the revenues of India which Parliament intrusted to a principal Secretary of State with the distinct stipulation, in the Act of 1858, *for the better government of India*, that no portion of those revenues was to be diverted for military operations beyond the Indian frontier. The violation of that Act amounts to a violation of the British Constitution which it is the first duty of the representatives of the nation, sitting in Parliament, to defend and to support.

J. DACOSTA.

SIR H. FOWLER'S SPEECH.

BY AN ANGLO-INDIAN.

Sir Henry Fowler, on Tuesday afternoon, September 3rd, appeared in the character which the gods are said to regard with respect—mingled with pity which is not altogether respectful—that of a good man struggling against adverse fate. And he did struggle manfully for the space of wellnigh two hours, thereby filling nearly six columns of the *Times*. Only six months previously, he, as wielder,

for the time, of the virtually unlimited military forces of our Indian empire and guardian of its very limited financial resources, had sanctioned the launching of a whole army corps far beyond the Indian boundary amidst the mountain peaks and grim défiles of the Hindu Kush. By this time he had already found that it was ten times easier to project a large army into these perilous regions than to recall any considerable portion of it. His successors, with a promptitude worthy of a wiser and honester cause, had set themselves to contrive that as small a portion as possible of that force should be withdrawn from the foreign and inhospitable territory in which it had been deliberately entangled. So, now, the ex-Secretary of State for India, only yesterday the "Great Mogul," had, as a mere humble member of Parliament, to set himself to combat and expose the long course of meddling and aggressive policy of which that new invasion of High Asia was only one incident, and one long prepared for by those Simla authorities whom he had found himself unable to restrain. It has been said that not even genius can extricate a statesman from a false position. Hence Sir Henry Fowler, personally, was entitled to sympathy in the efforts that he put forth with all his talent and energy to cover his honourable, though too tardy retreat from the malign policy in which he had found himself, a few months before, helplessly enmeshed. The member for Cardiff (who followed in the debate) went so far as to say: "Surely nothing could be more immoral than his (the late Secretary's) conduct in sanctioning invasion and then trying to wash his hands of responsibility in face of the general election." But one must not endorse that debating gibe. Mr. Maclean is nothing if not combative.

Sir Henry Fowler's difficulty arose from his being, until quite recently, wholly unacquainted with the secret, but only real history in the long drawn out and cunningly devised scheme of which the muddle with Umra Khan and the catastrophe at Chitral were but inevitable incidents. His great speech is the record of his valorous efforts, at the eleventh hour, to overcome his own disabilities. As such it is worthy of commendation; but that deficiency of previous information underlies all his narrative and detracts seriously from its political and historical value. The great Pitt told a gossiping news hunter that for his part he "could not find time to read the papers;" and Sir Henry has not found time to con the pages of India, or he would have learned, so long since as 1892, much essential information regarding the origins of the perversely provoked troubles in the Hindu Kush, which, at this late date, he has had to make such desperate attempts to unravel. Had Mr. Fowler followed up, for instance, the clue afforded by Mr. Seymour Keay's well-founded interpellation early in May, and had he given more serious attention to the weighty series of questions put in April by the member for Banffshire, he would have been ready, at the proper time in the debate on the Address, to deal with the whole subject from its roots, instead of then making the poor excuse of "waiting for papers," which, in the shape of this Chitral Blue Book, prove to be little better than a deceptive concoction. No doubt Sir H. Fowler begins now to appreciate this retrospective aspect of the skilfully veiled revolution in Indian policy that has been going on since 1876—much more so than, for instance, does Sir William Harcourt. That sinister document on the first page of the disingenuous Blue Book on Chitral (dated so long since as 1877) must have opened his eyes in this direction.

In an early portion of his speech he ventured on the mild criticism that "our connexion with Chitral arose through our connexion with the ruler of Kashmir. It is a very shadowy connexion, which it is very difficult to trace until we get within very recent times." There is no difficulty about it, for those who will go the right way to look into the matter. Sir H. Fowler's passing reference to the creation of the Kashmir kingdom—as one incident in Lord Dalhousie's nefariously contrived conquest of the Punjab—was quite beside the mark. It is these "recent times," since 1876, that we have to do with in dealing with the present disorders. That specious and misleading phrase in the Simla letter of June, 1877, about "the anxiety of the Chitral chief to become the vassal of Kashmir" affords a pertinent clue to this mystery of political iniquity, which might have been followed up long since in the pages of the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* and elsewhere.

There are two threads of sophistry running through this story of the twenty years' official conspiracy that the ex-Indian Secretary struggled against, but which all his quotations failed to unravel. One of his own sentences seems conveniently, though only too vaguely, to indicate these delusions. Thus: "The result amounts to this—that a treaty was concluded between the British Government [by the Secret Political Department at Simla] and Kashmir; and that a treaty was also concluded between Kashmir and Chitral under which Chitral submitted to the suzerainty of Kashmir in exchange for a subsidy." This, of course, is the audacious plea of the defendants—the irresponsible departmental authorities at Simla and the India Office. Were there in these days any independent jurists worthy of the high calling of their predecessors, such men could show Sir H. Fowler that these international transactions so plausibly stated are but the "result" of chicanery and *force majeure*—illegal from beginning to end. And yet these have been used as a sort of stalking horse, all through, in every presentation of the defendants' case, both in official statements and through the two "inspired" dailies. In March last, when the long incubated scheme of the big expedition had to be justified somehow, the confiding Lord Elgin was put up in the Legislative Council at Calcutta to recite a manifesto, carefully prepared for him by the Political Department. The text and key-note of that was the ingenious fudge about the Mehtar of Chitral being under the suzerainty of Kashmir, for which, in turn, the Indian Government was held out as responsible. And so it is, but in a very different sense from that implied by international law. The Mehtar whom we had allowed to be despatched was only a pawn created by the Simla schemers—see No. 12 of the Blue Book, "the voluntary decision (!) of the elder son, Nizur-ul-Mulk, to place himself in the hands of the British Agent;" in whose hands, indeed, he had been from the first. This "suzerainty"

had been, as already intimated, invented long before. But it will be found that there never was any real treaty of allegiance from the old Mehtar Aman to Kashmir. At most it was only an expression of good-will and a polite form of demand for cash. It was, in fact, the levying of blackmail on Kashmir on condition of Aman consenting to refrain from raids on Gilghit and the adjacent valleys. Subsequently, the shrewd old Mehtar seems to have revoked his submission; and, finding that the British were behind Kashmir, he stirred up, or tried to stir up, a *jehad* against the "Feringhis." Of course, this and many more weighty matters are not to be found in the "bowdlerised" Blue Book. Since the death of Aman, the British Resident in Kashmir and the Simla Political Department, have set up their own puppets one after the other, and wantonly destroyed the independence of Chitral as also of Chilas, Hunza, and Nagar. The latest transaction of the sort is the farce of Dr. Robertson's installation of the little boy as Mehtar the other day. Ever since the death of the old Mehtar had there been any honest desire to save Chitral from "the kind of trouble which at any moment may arise" (a Blue Book phrase) there was at least the rightful successor, the strong and capable Sher Afzul, who would have secured the independence of the State and served as a national defender against the Muscovite bogey. But Sher Afzul is one of that order of "tall poppies" whom the Simla Tarquins have always sought to cut down, from H.H. Shere Ali in 1878 to the present. So the puppet Mehtar, set up the other day, serves as a pawn to be brought forward at each turn of the scheme for our continued and persistent aggressions in High Asia, far beyond the boundaries of India.[1]

But the master key, to the more recent phases (that is since 1884) of the revolutionary proceedings beyond the Indian frontier, is that which Sir Henry Fowler utterly failed to turn; though he did get hold of the handle in that phrase of his, "Proposals made to (not by) Lord Lytton with reference to the reconstruction of the arrangements then (1877) existing between the Indian Government and the Government of Kashmir." In this connexion the term "reconstruction" is, indeed, a blessed word! Also, to speak of "negotiations with the Máhárája of Kashmir" sounds like bitter irony when applied to the disgraceful story of his undoing, and of that wholesale absorption of his kingdom, with its resources, in pursuance of the reckless and rapacious schemes in High Asia of which India is now reaping the bitter fruit. Because of his failure to master the history of the "arrangements" furtively set on foot under Lord Lytton, weakly consented to by Lord Ripon, more actively promoted under the Marquis of Dufferin, and finally carried through, as above, under the Marquis of Lansdowne and Lord Cross, Sir Henry Fowler's review of the present situation is defective all through. But, except for his pre-occupation with domestic politics, Sir Henry need not have been ignorant. He was a member of the House when in July, 1890, Mr. Bradlaugh brought forward his unanswerable indictment against the Government of India in regard to its politically unjustifiable deposition of the Máhárája and the supersession of his State.

Here it is desirable just to refer back to these former incidents of violence (in 1890-1) when, by dint of utilising the resources and in the name of Kashmir, that ugly rush was made on Gilghit, when its forts were stormed, and the States of Hunza and Nagyr were also destroyed politically, as well as Chilas and Yassin on the eastern side of the Chitral State. Sir Henry Fowler seems to have forgotten and skips over that episode of rapine and bloodshed, which was involved in what is euphoniously described as the "re-establishment of the Gilghit Agency." He had, indeed, the excuse that one of the artifices by which this Blue Book has been concocted is the entire omission of all record of that ruthless invasion, though there are repeated enumerations of the several troops, mainly those of Kashmir, employed on these operations. But it is well enough known that the intrigues and Pigottism which led up to the supersession of Kashmir had for their objective the seizure of Gilghit as a new centre for the aggressive Simla schemes that have since been followed up with disastrous results, of which we do not yet see an end. To use again our chess comparison, Kashmir was made to serve for the knight-piece's "slantingdicular" move in the ever grasping game of the Simla Political Department. Kashmir was the helpless but useful tool of that clique; and the history of the disorders beyond the northern frontiers of India during the past ten years can only be understood when it is recognised that the pivot of these aggressions was the *coup d'état* by which Kashmir itself was destroyed as an independent kingdom.

But seeing that such official documents as record the steps in the revolutionary policy, of which Sir Henry Fowler could only touch the later fringe in his great oration, have been systematically kept back from Parliament, one would require a volume to supply the omissions. Here I have only indicated the directions in which independent investigation should be pursued. And now that this belated Blue Book has appeared, no words are strong enough to describe the disingenuousness with which it has been compiled since the new Secretary of State came into office. Though not so violently mutilated as were the notorious despatches on the first Afghan war in the Palmerston-Hobhouse laboratory — of which we have been recently reminded by Captain

[1] For the right understanding of incidents in the western Hindu Kush towards the close of 1894, of which the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk was the turning point, those who desire first-hand information may be referred to (*a*) "The True Story of Chitral," published in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore, May 16th, 1895, and (*b*) to a paper published (unacknowledged) in the *Bombay Gazette* Summary of June 28th, "The Unpublished Story of the Chitral Imbroglio." This embodies the "Narrative of a Synd with Sher Afzul" (this probably taken from the *Pioneer*). The former of these communications opens with the remark that "it will be seen how absolutely in the dark the Government (of India) were as to the real meaning of events in Chitral." This conviction is emphatically confirmed by the second paper; and this comprises several particulars which would not come within the knowledge of Mr. H. C. Thomson and other "eye-witnesses" of the campaign. As to the more extended history of the proceedings at Gilghit, Hunza, Chilas, etc., of which Chitral is only a subordinate incident, the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* for 1890 forward contains much that is useful.

Trotter's biography of Lord Auckland—this Chitral Blue Book is equally misleading in a political sense.

As to the huge imposture regarding the boundaries of India to which Mr. Balfour seems to have become a victim, Sir Henry Fowler found himself unable to deal with that vital question. It is one that will have to be enquired into, so that exposure may show who can be made responsible for the wholesale falsification of maps of the Indian frontier, published, even by the best firms, during the last three or four years under the authority of the India Office.

On two points, one of permanent and retrospective importance, the other of present emergency, Sir Henry Fowler, in course of his speech, did his duty fairly well. The former is that of the systematic and illegal suppression of "Dissents," both of the Viceroy's and the Secretary of State's Councils, which has obtained so frequently during the revolutionary period of Indian policy since 1876. These "Dissents" are intended to provide one of the few safeguards that exist in the constitution of the British Indian Empire. The other and urgent point to which I refer was Sir Henry's eloquent protest against that violation of Lord Elgin's Proclamation to the tribes of Swat and Bajaur, which appears to be intended, and which Lord George Hamilton, with unseemly haste, showed himself anxious to excuse beforehand. Let us trust that this crowning disgrace may yet be averted.

AN ANGLO INDIAN.

LORD G. HAMILTON'S BUDGET SPEECH.

BY H. MORGAN-BROWNE, LL.B.

The experience which the new Secretary of State for India might reasonably have been supposed to acquire when he was formerly Under Secretary of State does not seem to have stood him in good stead in the recent debate on the Indian Budget. The figures which he gave in Committee of Supply will not bear the test of examination in several important particulars, while apart from occasional discrepancies between his statements and those contained in the accounts of the Government of India, the fallacy of comparing unlike things vitiates most of his conclusions. It is proposed to examine some of these official utterances of the Secretary of State for India, as reported in the *Times* of September 5th, 1895.

Dealing with the financial year 1894-5 (Revised Estimate), Lord G. Hamilton said that the expenditure on military works had been reduced by Rx.1,000,000. The net expenditure on military works as disclosed by the Financial Statement of the Government of India for 1895-6 was as follows for the period covered by that statement:—1893-4 (Accounts) Rx.1,134,714; 1894-5 (Revised Estimate) Rx.951,700; 1895-6 (Budget Estimate) Rx.1,120,500. This shows a reduction in 1894-5 as compared with the previous year of Rx.183,014 instead of the Rx.1,000,000 claimed by Lord G. Hamilton. This discrepancy of about Rx.817,000 is rather a large one. It is impossible to escape the conclusion either that the statement of the Secretary of State is inaccurate, or that the Accounts of the Government of India do not truly represent the facts of the case, or that the Secretary of State was dealing with figures made up specially for the occasion and not conforming to the ordinary divisions in the official accounts of the Indian Government. Either alternative seems to indicate a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs.

Lord G. Hamilton, for the purpose of showing how much more economical is the bureaucratic Indian Government than the elective and representative Government of the United Kingdom, makes certain comparisons between the growth of the expenditure of the two Governments during the decade 1884-5 to 1894-5. Here is the comparison which he makes, put into tabular form:—

England.	1884-5.	1894-5.	Increase.
Army and Navy	£30,561,000	£35,143,563	£9,390,000
Civil Services and Education	£11,000,000	£15,810,000	
India.			
Total Net Expenditure	Rx.41,907,813	Rx.52,747,800	Rx.10,839,987

Against this increase of Rx.10,839,987 in Indian Expenditure Lord G. Hamilton claims to set off an increase due to Exchange ("not under the control of the Indian Government") of Rx.11,156,304, and then triumphantly points out that but for Exchange there was an actual decrease of expenditure during the decade of Rx.316,317. Now these comparisons are absolutely misleading. The English figures are true net and are taken from a Parliamentary Return (No. 398 of 1895). The Indian figures are prepared on an old and different system. There was no need to use figures prepared according to two different methods, as there is in existence a Parliamentary paper (No. 319 of 1895) showing the Indian Accounts for 1884-5 presented according to the same principles as those adopted in the Return of net Income and Expenditure for the United Kingdom, while the figures for 1894-5 upon the same system are given in the current Financial Statement for British India at p. 89. But the chief fallacy of Lord G. Hamilton's comparison (apart from the futility of comparing English and Indian expenditure) consists in comparing the increased expenditure under particular heads in the English Accounts, with the increased expenditure under all heads in the Indian Accounts. As there have been large decreases of expenditure under certain heads in India (such as Famine Insurance), the increase of total net expenditure is considerably less than the increase in those items of expenditure in which alone the increase is given for the United Kingdom. Again, the Naval expenditure of the United Kingdom is on account of a world-wide empire and has no parallel in India; while the large increase in England for Civil Services and Education is chiefly made up of an increase of about £4,400,000 (out of £4,800,000) for Education, as compared with an increase for Education in India of about Rx.250,000.

It is obvious that if comparisons are to be made like must be compared with like, as nearly as possible, or the comparisons will be absolutely misleading. Assuming the utility of making any

comparisons between the expenditure of the richest country in the world and that of the poorest, the following figures show how the matter really stands:—

I.—*Army* (Ordinary).

	1884-5.	1894-5.	Increase.
England ..	£16,253,338	£17,973,133	£1,719,795
India ..	Rx.15,989,714	Rx.22,897,200	Rx.6,907,486

II.—*Total Military Expenditure.*

	1884-5.	1894-5.	Increase or Decrease.
England ..	£18,600,338	£17,973,133	—£627,205
India ..	Rx.17,057,865	Rx.24,091,400	+Rx.7,033,535

III.—*Civil Administration.*

	1884-5.	1894-5.	Increase.
England ..	£6,615,152	£7,063,488	£448,336
India ..	Rx.13,281,908	Rx.17,645,200	Rx.4,363,292

IV.—*Public Education.*

	1884-5.	1894-5.	Increase.
England ..	£4,374,751	£8,746,492	£4,371,741
India ..	Rx.1,035,496	Rx.1,283,700	Rx.248,204

V.—*Military and Civil Services.* (Total of I. and III.)

	1884-5.	1894-5.	Increase.
England ..	£22,868,490	£25,036,621	£2,168,131
India ..	Rx.29,271,622	Rx.40,542,400	Rx.11,270,778

Now all these figures can be found, or easily traced, in the official publications already referred to, namely, the Parliamentary Returns Nos. 319 and 398 of 1895 and the Financial Statement of the Government of India for 1895-6. The contrast between the growth of expenditure in England and India respectively upon Education on the one hand and the Military and Civil Services on the other is especially striking. With regard to Education, England, starting with an expenditure far more than four times as great for a population only one-sixth as large, increased that expenditure during the decade by 100 per cent. as against an increase in India of only 25 per cent. on an amount miserably inadequate to begin with. Taking the rupee as spent in India at very nearly its nominal rate of Rs. 10 = £1, we find that the State expenditure on Education per head of the population is nearly fifty times as great in England as it is in India. On the other hand, with regard to Military and Civil expenditure we find that India's poverty has been no bar to a rate of increase more than four times as great as that in England. Here is the contrast:—

Increase per cent. during the Decade.

	England.	India.
Military and Civil Services	9 per cent.	38 per cent.
Education	100 ,, ,,	25 ,, ,,

But the official apologist will retort that all this is the work of Exchange. This brings us to Lord G. Hamilton's claim to set off as "not under the control of the Government of India" the sum of Rx.11,156,204—increased cost of Exchange. In the last number of India the composition and incidence of this increased burden of Exchange are fully dealt with at pp. 285-6, from which it will be seen that this claim of the Secretary of State's is founded on the same fallacious manipulation of the Indian accounts that runs through the whole of his speech. It is enough here to point out that Exchange has practically no effect on the expenditure upon education, while of the total increase of Rx. 11,270,778 upon the Military and Civil Services in India during the last decade only about Rx. 4,400,000 is properly due to the fall in Exchange, *i.e.*, is an automatic increase of expenditure "not under the control of the Government of India." Deducting the increase automatically due to the fall in Exchange (including the increased Rupee pay of British soldiers) we find an increase in the cost of the Army and Civil Administration in India of about Rx. 6,870,000 during the last ten years, representing an increase of over 23 per cent. as against 9 per cent. in England; and in this comparison Exchange has properly speaking been entirely eliminated.

Lord G. Hamilton states that the increase in Indian Revenues from 1884-5 to 1894-5 is Rx. 12,216,933. This figure is an approximation to the increase in Net Revenue shown under the old system of presenting Net Revenue (*i.e.*, Rx.12,490,791), though it is not easy to understand how he arrived at that particular sum. The true increase in Net Revenue from 1884-5 to 1894-5 is considerably more than this according to the new and better method of calculating Income and Expenditure. According to this system as shown in the Parliamentary Papers already cited the increase in Indian Revenues for the last decade is Rx. 13,907,397. Lord G. Hamilton by going outside the period he has himself chosen for comparison and making some abstruse calculations about remissions of taxation in 1882 (unfortunately of very short duration) asserts that only about Rx. 3,000,000 of this increase is due to increased taxation. This is preposterous. The following figures show approximately the present annual product of the chief additional taxation imposed since 1884-5:—

	Rx.
Income-tax (1886)	1,000,000
Enhancement of salt-tax (1888) ..	2,000,000
Customs duties (1888, 1893, 1894)	3,000,000
Patwari cess	250,000
	Rx.6,250,000

In 1895-6 a full year's receipts from the cotton duties will add another Rx. 1,000,000 to the amount raised by additional taxation since 1884-5. The following figures show approximately the distribution of the increase in the Net Revenues from 1884-5 to 1894-5, according to the papers already cited.

	1884-5.	1894-5.	Increase or Decrease.
	Rx.	Rx.	Rx.
Land Revenue, etc.	22,600,000	26,800,000	+4,200,000
Opium	5,800,000	5,700,000	—100,000
Taxation	18,200,000	27,700,000	+9,500,000
Other Receipts ..	200,000	500,000	+300,000
	Rx.46,800,000	Rx.60,700,000	Rx.13,900,000

Now it must be remembered that the large increase in the Land Revenue is chiefly due to revision and enhancement of Land Assessments all over India, which has meant a very considerable tightening of the tax-collector's screw. Of the Rx. 9,500,000 increased receipts from taxation, it has just been shown that no less than Rx. 6,250,000 is the present product of new taxes imposed since 1884-5. To put

it in another way: new taxation has been imposed in the last ten years which brings in about a third of the total yield of the taxes in 1884-5. Under these circumstances, to say that there has been practically no additional taxation in the last decade is an extraordinary perversion of the facts.

H. MORGAN-BROWNE.

ROADS, RAILWAYS AND CANALS AND THE HEALTH OF INDIA.

BY PARBATI C. ROY, B.A.
Sametime Member of the Bengal Uncovenanted Civil Service.

England has in her laudable zeal for developing the resources of India constructed roads, railways, and canals, the advantages of which have been, like those of her law courts, not without their disadvantages. India is a vast country, and her requirements are consequently also vast. But her resources are very poor, while the difficulties presented by climatic and physical conditions are very great. In the case of roads and railways those difficulties are increased by the periodical fall of rains, and in some provinces by the overflow of the banks of rivers in consequence thereof. In order that the drainage of the tracts of country intersected by roads and railways should continue unobstructed, it is necessary to build an enormously large number of bridges and culverts, adding to the expenses of construction in a prohibitive manner. As a consequence of this only such openings are left in the roads and railways as are necessary for their safe preservation, though the not very infrequent breaches made therein by floods show that sufficient provisions even for the attainment of that object are wanting. But it is not always that obstructed drainage asserts right of way in this manner. Often the country suffers all the evils consequent on water-logging. The consequence of this is that districts once proverbially healthy have, of late, grown notoriously unhealthy from malaria. A few instances will now be adduced in support of this statement.

One of the healthiest districts in Bengal in the pre-railway time was the district of Burdowan. This district has of late been simply decimated by malarial fever. This fever was pronounced in 1864-65 by a committee appointed to investigate the matter to arise mainly from miasma.[1] At first the Government laid the blame on the people who, it was said, "do not trouble themselves to build houses of bamboo, well raised from the ground, or to sleep on raised beds or platforms of bamboo. They appear to believe that it is the duty of Government to undertake house drainage and the construction of sleeping platforms in all the houses of many of the largest villages of Bengal."[2] A portion of the blame was also laid to the account of the "natural drainage channels of the country,"[3] which it seems had conspired to silt up with the introduction of the railway. Subsequently there was a change in the tone of the Government reports, and it was admitted "that this fever was owing to obstructed drainage, partly through roads, railways, and embankments."[1] It will be seen that Government is not disposed to admit that the roads, railways, and embankments were the only or the chief causes of obstructed drainage. But it is sufficient for the present discussion that Government admits their partial casual influence. The other causes, such as the silting up of the "natural drainage channels of the country" and the neglect of the people to "build houses of bamboo well raised from the ground, or to sleep on raised beds or platforms of bamboo," or "to undertake house drainage," are universal in Bengal, specially in districts situated further from the mouth of the principal rivers. If, therefore, two districts similarly circumstanced in all respects except in respect of railways, show different rates of mortality from malarial fever, that difference must be attributed in the case of the one showing greater mortality to obstructed drainage caused by roads, railways, and embankments. Two such districts are Burdowan and Midnapur. The East India railway line intersects Burdowan but does not pass through Midnapur. The population of Burdowan at the census of 1872 was 1,484,007.[2] Twenty years after, at the census of 1891, it came down to 1,391,880, showing a decrease of 92,127; but as the statement of "Moral and Material Progress of India for 1864-65," mentions this fever as having "ravaged for several years," and as the "Statement" for 1871-72 refers also to the ravages from the malarial fever in Burdowan, the number of persons who have actually died from this cause from the commencement down to 1891 must be very appalling. But those that have not succumbed to the disease are far from being healthy. In the Burdowan district, says Mr. Collector Oldham, "they (the agriculturists forming about 75 per cent. of the population) all bear traces of disease. They may all be said to be enfeebled by disease—that is by fever and its consequences."[3]

The population of the district of Midnapur, adjoining Burdowan, was 2,545,179 in 1872;[4] at the census of 1891 it rose to 2,631,516, showing an increase of 86,337.[5] This increase is, however, not as great as it should have been had not Midnapur suffered from obstructed drainage from roads and embankments, though it escaped the evils of the introduction of railways. The truth of the statement that the increase of malarial fever in railway-intersected districts is not owing to the silting up of the natural drainage channels of the country will be further proved by the cases of Naddea and Jessur. The former district is intersected by the Eastern Bengal Railway, while the latter until lately, was without a

[1] "Statement of Moral and Material Progress of India," 1864-65, p. 66.
[2] "Statement of Moral and Material Progress of India," for 1876-77, p. 78.
[3] "Statement of Moral and Material Progress of India," for 1871-72, p. 102.

[1] "Statement of Moral and Material Progress of India," for 1877-78, p. 82.
[2] "Statistical Abstract Relating to British India," 1871-72 to 1880-81, p. 8.
[3] Report No. 87 T.-R. dated 30th June, 1888, of the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India, para. 7.
[4] "Statistical Abstract Relating to British India," No. 22, p. 8.
[5] *Ibid* No. 27, p. 3.

railway. The population of Naddea after it had suffered for several years from the same malarial fever as Burdowan was 1,812,795 at the census of 1872, but fell off to 1,644,108 in 1891, showing a decrease of 168,687. The population of Jessur was 1,451,507[1] at the census of 1872. It rose to 1,888,827[1] in 1891 showing an increase of 437,320. As the physical conditions were not materially different in the case of Burdowan and Midnapur in the first instance, and of Naddea and Jessore in the second, the decrease in the population of Burdowan and Naddea must be held as owing to ravages caused by malarial fever, generated by obstructed drainage through railways.

Since the introduction of the Road-cess Act of 1872, an additional cause for the obstruction of drainage has been introduced into every district. According to the admission of Government, quoted in a previous part of this article, "roads" also play an important part in water-logging the country. The gradually increasing unhealthiness of Bengal is proved by the increasing ratios of mortality from fever. In 1883 the ratio of death from fever was 13·78 per thousand of the population. It successively rose to 14·16, 15·70, 15·91, 16·38, 16·44, 16·59, 17·41, 18·88[1] in the following eight years.

But the case of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh is worse than that of Bengal. In addition to the evils of obstructed drainage through roads and railways those unfortunate provinces suffer from the action of a new cause of disease introduced by canals. "As long ago as 1847 it was found that an extensive epidemic influence had pervaded a large portion of the N.-W. Provinces of late years, and that disease was more prevalent in the canal-irrigated districts. . . . It was found that the percolation of water caused an efflorescence of soda to rise upon the surface of the land, causing not only destruction of fertility of the soil, but sterility of women and cattle; in certain localities all the inhabitants of villages were found to have enlarged spleen from the continuance of fever."[2]

Nearly half a century has elapsed since the above discovery regarding the unhealthiness caused by canals was made. Owing to the action of both canals and railways the North-West Provinces and Oudh, which at one time were proverbially healthy, are now notoriously unhealthy. The ratio of mortality from fever, which was 18·82 in 1883 per thousand of the population, rose to 24·35 in 1884, 25·48 in 1885, 27·58 in 1886, and though it fell off to a certain extent in the three following years, rose again in 1890 to 28·21.[3] Districts such as Aligur, Muttra, Agra and Farekabad, which in 1872 contained 1,073,333, 887,689, 1,096,367 and 918,850[4] populations respectively, showed decreases of 30,159, 56,928, 92,565 and 50,163, respectively at the census of 1891.[5] In 1391 the deaths from fever in the following districts intersected by the East India Railway and canals were:—Saharanpur 31·25, Muzaffernegur 30·38, Meerat 27·21, Bulandshahar 23·93, Cawnpur 27·26, Futthapur 31·54 and Allahabad 25·25 per thousand of the population respectively.[1]

It would be tedious to enter into an examination of the deaths from malarial fever in the other provinces of India. But it might be mentioned in passing that while the ratios of deaths from fever per thousand of the population in 1883 were 16·25, 6·60 and 16·21 in Punjab, Madras and Bombay respectively, they rose up to 21·52, 8·6 and 19·60 in 1891.[2]

The over-energetic Government of Sir Charles Elliott, in its zeal for the improvement of the sanitary condition of Bengal, has recently passed an Act for securing improved drainage. The Government and the Railway Companies—to whom, as has been shown above, the present unhealthiness of the climate of most districts is chiefly to be attributed—do not come in for any share of the burden of costs, which is to be entirely borne by the people. The real culprits are thus allowed to go untaxed. The advantages of the drainage works contemplated by the Act are, moreover, of a most doubtful nature. These works will not touch a village which is not within their immediate vicinity. The sanitary conditions of each village depend on circumstances which are peculiar to it; besides, the rivers of Bengal are of a most erratic disposition. The soil is so loose and sandy that sometimes by letting in a stream you open the flood-gates to a destructive current, which sweeps away fields and villages, and after a time silts up again. At other times the silting up is so rapid and persistent that no amount of excavation will keep the channel open. The Government has for many years tried to keep the Bhagirati river open throughout the year, but has failed in its endeavours. Often a stream silts up owing to the silting up of another from which it receives its water. An example of this is furnished by the Buriganga river that flows past by the town of Dacca. In former days this river was navigable throughout the year for big boats and steamers. It is now a kind of lagoon, except during the rainy season. The removal of the silts at its source will not be sufficient to keep it open, as the Dhalleshwari, from which it receives its supply of water, has also dried up at its source. Several instances of a similar nature can easily be supplied. Where a river in Bengal dies out in the usual course of nature, no amount of human skill and exertion can keep it alive. The remedy in such cases lies in resorting to other means for the supply of good drinking water and for facilities of communication.

It is a great pity that the elected members of the Bengal Council failed to do their duty by their countrymen in not entering a strong protest against the Drainage Bill. This must be owing to their ignorance of the real state of things. Nevertheless the blame rests on them. The only hope of escape from the impending danger lies in the members of the district and local boards doing their duty pro-

[1] "Statistical Abstract," No. 27, p. 265.
[2] "Statement of Moral and Material Progress of India," for 1871-72, p. 102.
[3] "Statistical Abstract," No. 27, p. 265.
[4] *Ibid.*, No. 10, p. 6.
[5] *Ibid* No. 27, p. 10.

[1] "North-West Provinces and Oudh Administration Report for 1891-92," p. 172 (Statistics of life.)
[2] "Statistical Abstract," No. 27, pp. 265-67.

perly. Let them exercise their independence, and weigh well all the circumstances of each case before giving their consent to any drainage scheme started by the Government. Let them also discontinue the practice of constructing new roads, and content themselves with removing the obstructions caused to the drainage by the roads already built. Let the income realised from the Road Cess be spent in furnishing the villages with good drinking-water by excavating tanks and sinking wells. When all the villages have been supplied with good drinking-water, and the obstructions caused by the present roads have been removed, then they should take up experimentally the village drainage question.

Most of the evils of the silting up of river beds arise from the dried-up beds being used by the villagers for certain sanitary purposes. The effect of this practice is the pollution of the air of a large and extended tract of country. The hot sun, acting on the exposed filth and rubbish, spreads the germs of disease all around. This can easily be prevented by prohibitory orders under the Criminal Procedure Code, and by making the offence of committing such nuisances cognisable by the police.

I have already dwelt on the unhealthy, sterilizing, and destructive effects of the canals of the Upper Provinces of India, and have shown how Government stands convicted out of its own mouth of the evils caused by its irrigation works. If further evidence were wanted it is furnished by Sir William Hunter, according to whom the rivers, "in the upper part of their course, where their water is carried by canals to the fields, the rich irrigated lands breed fever, and in places destroy and render sterile by a saline crust called *reh*."[1] This knowledge has come upon Government after the construction of the canals; but that does not justify its present apathy and indifference. If it is a crime to do an act which breeds fever and renders sterile, not only the fields, but even "women and cattle," surely the Government stands convicted of it.

The unhealthiness caused by canal irrigation is also visible in Behar, where districts such as Shahabad, which were proverbially healthy before the introduction of canal irrigation, are now hotbeds of malarial fever, owing to the excessive dampness of the soil. There is no hope for the return of the healthiness in the climate of Upper India and Behar so long as canal irrigation continues. The subject is of the greatest possible importance to the health of the people. It is to be hoped that both Indians and their English friends will employ their best efforts in awakening the conscience of Government in the matter. PARBATI C. ROY.

THE COST OF AGGRESSION.

Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P., contributed to the *Saturday Review* of August 24th an article entitled "Chitral, its possible cost—in money and reputation," in the course of which he wrote:—

If the Government will take the trouble to enquire I think they will find that Indian public opinion is solid against this policy of aggression, which has borne bitter fruit for India in the past, and will do the same in the future. And when we consider the arguments put forward by Mr. Balfour for embarking upon these hazardous enterprises, we do not find that they are of a convincing kind; nor do they seem to be based on any high or broad grounds of political justice or experience. The reasons he gives are twofold. First, he considers that the retention of Chitral will maintain, and even increase, our prestige. He says it would be "a serious blow to our prestige if, having once gone to these territories, we were to abandon them," and that our withdrawal would teach a lesson to the tribesmen "which in the future may make them very reluctant to depend upon the British throne." His second reason is that to advance our frontier some 200 miles into these mountainous wilds will cost us little or nothing, and that it will not involve an increase either in the Indian army or in Indian taxation. To both these propositions I demur most emphatically. Surely a good reason for withdrawing is to be found in the fact that we promised to do so; that our good faith is pledged to withdraw as soon as the special objects of the expedition are accomplished. . . . . I have served the Indian Government for about a quarter of a century, a great part of the time in the political department, and I assert that our sheet-anchor, by which we hold India, is our reputation for good faith, for scrupulous fulfilment of our pledges. . . . . Then as regards the second reason, the financial one. We are told that the cost of these enterprises will be something quite small; that there will be no addition to the army, and no addition to the taxation. Mr. Balfour tells us that he has received "most "reassuring information" from the Government of India on this head, and he is quite satisfied. This is being quite too confiding. I should have been very much surprised if under the circumstances this reassuring information had not been forthcoming. Does the right honourable gentleman not recollect the circumstances attending the estimates for the last Afghan War? In December 1878, Parliament was called together to give its sanction to the invasion of Afghanistan, and the House of Commons was then (officially) informed that India could well bear the cost of the expedition as she had a surplus of $1\frac{3}{4}$ millions, and the expenses would not exceed that amount. This was most reassuring information, and the sanction was accordingly obtained; but unfortunately ten days later it was ascertained (also officially) that the supposed surplus was a myth: there was in fact a large deficit; and instead of costing $1\frac{3}{4}$ millions that Afghan War cost twenty-one millions. Then the Abyssinian War: Mr. Disraeli assured the House of Commons that it would not cost more than three millions, but ten millions were actually spent. And to come to more recent times, the right honourable gentleman will remember the expectations held out by the Government of India of financial profit (ruby mines, and what not) from the annexation of Upper Burma. . . . If through all this expenditure any benefit was to arise either to India or to this country, there would be some excuse for the extravagance; but this forward policy, this embarking in wild enterprises beyond our natural frontier

[1] "History of the Indian People," p. 12.

this abandonment of Lord Lawrence's wise and humane policy, is purely mischievous, and may lead to our ruin. It is not a policy of safety but of danger. And it cannot be too often repeated that our only safe policy is that which has for its basis a full treasury, friendly neighbours beyond the frontier, and a contented people throughout India.

PREHISTORIC RACES.

The Ruling Races of Prehistoric Times in India, South-Western Asia, and Southern Europe. By J. F. HEWITT, Late Commissioner of Chutia Nagpur. Vol. II. (Westminster: Archibald Constable, and Co.)

At no long distance of time Mr. Hewitt follows up his first volume with a second, in which he pursues the same lines of investigation and speculation. The present volume contains only three essays, but they are extremely comprehensive, and the last two deal with subjects that offer a large amount of interest to the Western world, and especially to the Northern regions of it. Mr. Hewitt is quite as well aware of the difficulties and dangers of his method as any of his critics can be, and although he works out his speculations in positive terms enough, he knows better than to claim finality or infallibility for his results. The decisive estimate of both must be left to the judgment of professed experts capable of bringing to the trial an adequate scientific equipment as well as a sufficient knowledge of the multifarious details. It is hardly worth while to dwell upon isolated points of vulnerability. The essential value of Mr. Hewitt's studies seems to us to lie, less in the utmost details with which he supports his theories, and mainly in the sustained attempt to give body and consistency to vaporous elements of folklore conceptions and national and racial traditions. Regarded in this light, his work must be admitted to be of substantial importance, whatever may be the ultimate fate of any of his particular contentions.

In his seventh essay, the first in the present volume, Mr. Hewitt deals with the astronomy of the Veda, and endeavours to extract from it historical lessons. By a series of extremely ingenious interpretations he reaches the following conclusions:

> "The ancient Hindus first divided the year into two seasons of six months each, beginning in November and marked by the movements of the Pleiades. This year was followed by that of three seasons, the earliest year of the barley-growing races, consecrated to Orion, and beginning at the winter solstice, and in this age time was also measured by the lunar months of gestation. This was followed by the year of five seasons of the mother-bird, the constellation of the polar star Vega, beginning with the summer-solstice and the Indian rainy season, ushered in by the star Sirius. This was the year of Bhishma and of the sons of Yayati. Then came the year of Yudishthira of thirteen lunar months, in which the young sun-god emerged from his yearly bath of death and re-birth in November, was nursed by the moon for three months till February, when he was married to the moon-goddess, as Zeus was wedded to Hera in Gamælion (February). The series of Vedic and Hindu ritualistic measurements closes with the year of twelve months or 360 days, in which the sun-god was born at the winter solstice and wedded to the moon at vernal equinox. This was the year of the bull, and it was to reconcile the discrepancies between this and the lunar year, and to secure a correct measurement of time always available for use that the Nakshatras and five years' cycle was invented."

Further, in discussing the relation of the history of Buddha to the lunar-solar year of the Akkadians, Mr. Hewitt finds that the Buddhist theology is based on ancient astronomical speculations; and he goes on to trace such speculations through every phase of their religious history, discovering in them "the origin of the Buddhist belief in rebirths, and the reproduction in each of these successive births of the condition of the reborn soul, considered by eternal justice to be the fit outcome of the Karma, or sum of the deeds of each individual in his former states of existence."

The eighth essay examines in some detail the mythology of the Northern races. This mythology became interfused with the creeds of the Southern races, and Mr. Hewitt concerns himself particularly with the questions raised by an inquiry into the interaction of the individualizing tendencies of the northern temperaments and the communistic organisation of Southern society. Prominent is the legend of the master-smith, Völundr, Wieland, or Weyland, the father-god of the inventive and self-reliant workers in metal, whose theology superseded the beliefs of the totemistic hunting races of the North. Mr. Hewitt traces the mythic history of Weyland: how he hammered out the year-rings; how he was defeated by Nidung, king of the nether-earth, who made him the maimed or one-legged turner of the pole, which made the stars revolve; how he killed the sons of Nidung, made himself wings, and became the bird-king who brings rain to the mother-mountain whence it is to descend in fertilising rivers. "The whole story of Wieland tells us of the union of the northern hunters and smiths with the Southern races, the farmers of the South, whose supreme god was the rain-god of the heavenly bow." "It is to the mythology of the North that we must look for the history of the birth of the idea of the perpetual struggle between the authors of law and the powers of nature, deemed to be lawless, which developed into the conception of the personal god, the judge, father, and divine ruler of the sons of Danu the judge;" and the supremacy of the father-god of the North, the divine creating will, is asserted decisively in the mythology of the Edda, as well as in the Weyland myth. In the Edda also the process of intermixture of Northern, Eastern, and Southern ideas is still more clearly defined. In the Nibelungen Lied Mr. Hewitt finds that the flying sun-horse is represented by the steed ridden by the sun-knight Sigurd; and in this connection he brings together a vast quantity of curiously interwoven lore. Still more interesting is his reconstruction and exposition of the Stonehenge remains. It was the white horse, "the sun-god of the limestone, flint, and chalk country which was the god of Stonehenge, the temple whose ruins still remain to set before us, with absolute certainty of the correctness of the deduction in its main details, the complete ritual of this primeval worship." The builders, Mr. Hewitt says, belonged to the Bronze Age. The latter part of the following extract indicates noteworthy relations:

> "The inner shrine of the temple is formed by an outer circle of 30 Wiltshire Sarsen stones topped by coping-stones joining their summits. As I shall show presently that the temple certainly depicts the annual course of the sun, there can be no doubt that those 30 stones mark the 30 days of the month of

the lunar-solar year of 360 days, the wheel-year of the chronometry of the Rigveda. Within this circle of 30 stones there was, before the temple had been allowed to fall into ruin, an inner circle of 40 smaller stones, all but four being made of syenite, which must have been brought from Dartmoor. This must have been the original circle of Ia, the god of the house of waters, the god Yah of the Jews, and the Ya-du or holy Ya of the Hindus, whose sacred number is 40. While the 36 syenite stones in this circle reproduce the 36 steps of the Hindu Vishnu, the year-god of the royal race of the Ikshvaku, the sons of the sugar-cane (*iksha*), who are represented in the prastara or rain-wand of the Asha-vala, or horse-tail grass, used in their Soma festival as the sons of the horse."

Additional confirmation of the age of the Stonehenge mythology is discerned by Mr. Hewitt in "the hippodrome which can still be traced about half a mile north of the temple, with which it is connected by an avenue about forty cubits wide." "There can be no doubt whatsoever," Mr. Hewitt affirms, "that this racecourse represents the ancient site of the national games, instituted by the sons of the horse, which are said in Greek tradition to have been founded by Akastus, king of Iolcus, after he had driven out Jason and Medea the sorceress." In connection with the worship of the sun-horse is the varied mythology of the holy wells. For the rest of the chapter let us take Mr. Hewitt's own summary:—

"I next proceed to show how the Northern Knight, riding on the sun-horse, became in Greece and Asia Minor the physician, Jason, sailing round the heavens in the southern star ship, the constellation Argo; and have traced, by an examination of the Argo story, that of Perseus, the fish-god, and of Herakles, the history they tell of the rise of experimental and scientific knowledge. Towards the end of the essay, I have proved that the myths of Sir Galahad and the Holy Grail, and of the Arthurian cycle, are a reproduction, in a variant and greatly embellished form, of the myth of Sigurd in the Nibelungen Lied, with the addition of the belief of the Eastern sons of the barley and the eight-rayed star in the sanctity of the water of life, the heaven-sent rain, the life-giving blood of god, borne to earth in its cloud-casket to sustain and reproduce life on earth."

For the co-ordination of such varied and complicated masses of material in illustration of the main thesis, it is absolutely necessary to refer the reader to the pages of the Essay.

Equally formidable is the final Essay, which is devoted to the "history of the worship of Ia or Yah, the all-wise fish-sun-god, as told in the mythology of the American-Indians, Scandinavians, Finns, Akkadians, Arabian Assyrian and Syrian Semites, Iranians, Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese." It is impossible for us to indicate, even in the summary of the Preface, which Mr. Hewitt has mercifully provided as a sort of *leitfaden* to the neophyte in these mysteries, the notes of identity between the American - Indian beliefs and those of Asia and Europe. Nor can we attempt to outline the analysis of the Arabian stories of Bulukiya and Janshah, and of Gharib, the poor (*gharib*) sun-god, and his brother Ajib, in order to show "the identity of the Arabian mythic history with other Asiatic and European world-stories of the evolution of religious beliefs which led to the bloodless sacrifices of Soma worship, and of the Zend Haoma ritual, and the rigidly moral creed of Zarathustra, and of the attendant changes in year-reckoning." We will passively take it from Mr. Hewitt that—

"It is shown how the converging proofs, thence derived, together with others taken from Chinese and Japanese mythology, prove that the age of the worship of the fish-sun-god, and of his father, the god of light, dwelling unseen in his eight-sided temple of the heavens, the home of the eight winds, crowned with the central stone of the heavenly dome, called Solomon's Seal, the symbol of the Masonic Royal Arch, and of the nine gods of heaven, was one of great maritime activity and trade, extending from China on the east to the Atlantic Ocean on the west. It was this age which preceded the war-like period introduced by the invasion and conquests of the Aryans, who have been the creators of modern society in Europe, and have in Asia left the old world to die slowly through the disintegration and stagnation of the living force which once made South-western Asia the ruler of the world. But this slow death, or death-like sleep, is a torpor which will cease with the arrival of the ruler, or ruling race, who can, like the knight of the Holy Ghost in Heine's *Berg-Idyll*, speak the word of power which is to awaken the people of the East from the sleep of ages; who can assume and retain command over the patient and industrious races who laid the foundations of our modern civilisation; who can stimulate their intellects, arouse their aspirations, and make them once more active agents in the regeneration of the world."

The Northern beliefs in the divine creator, according to Mr. Hewitt, started from the totems of the hunting tribes, and this totemistic faith culminated in the worship of the fish-god. The fish, the eel, "showed by his migrations that he knew the secrets of the changes of the seasons, and thus became the symbol of the Il-ja, or El, ultimate source of all life on earth, the all-wise god who gave creating and regenerating power to the waters of the rivers, whence it was distributed through the universe. Hence the fish-god, whose heavenly messenger and prophet was the fish-descended sun rising from the waters of the ocean, became the great Buddha, that is, he who knows (*budh*), the teacher of the world." Now, each Buddha was born under the national Sal-tree, the tree of life before the life-giving grain. "He was thus the god Sāl-manu, the fish-god, who knew all sciences, and brought wisdom to mankind." The Sumerian Sāl-manu, the divine fish worshipped by the Shus of India and of the Euphratean Delta, "was the god of the maritime races dwelling on the coasts of the Indian Ocean, the Napūt Apām, or son of the waters, in the Rigveda, who became the Latin sea-god Neptunus. He was the Jewish Solomon, son of Bathsheba, she of the seven (*sheba*) measures (*bath*), the god of the fifty-two weeks completing the lunar year, who was also the god Ia of the Akkadians, the Yah of the Hindus, and the Yahveh of the Jews." The whole field of speculation is keenly slippery, and Mr. Hewitt is certainly a very adventurous pioneer of discovery.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES IN MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY MAGAZINES ON INDIAN SUBJECTS.

SEPTEMBER, 1895.

BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE. "Why we Went to Chitral."

FORTNIGHTY REVIEW. Robinson, E. Kay, "India and the Vice-Royalty."

INDIAN MAGAZINE AND REVIEW (A. Constable and Co., 14, Parliament Street, S.W.). Pope, Rev. G. U., D.D., "Leaves from an Old Indian's Note Book." R. C., "On a Threshing Floor." Mozoomdar, P. C., "Social Relations between Indians and Englishmen."

INVESTOR'S REVIEW. "Indian Finance."

NATIONAL REVIEW. Ward, Col. H., "My Residence in Bhopal."

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS ON INDIAN SUBJECTS.

SEPTEMBER, 1895.

HANNA, COL. H. B. .... "Indian Problems, II. India's Scientific Frontier: Where is it? What is it?" (Archibald Constable.) ...... 2s. 6d.

KARKARIA, R. P. .... "The late K. T. Telang and the Present Political Movement in India." (T. G. Johnson, 121, Fleet Street.) .... — —

RAMSAY, COL. H. M. .... "Anthropometry in Bengal." (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co.) .... — —

The Imposition of the Indian Import Duties on Cotton Goods and Yarns. (Manchester: Marsden and Co., Mercury Works.) .... — —

The Indian Import Duties on Cotton Goods. (Manchester: The United Cotton Manufacturers' Association.) .... — —

"COROLUS." .... "The Money of India. New Silver Coinage for the Orient." (Simpkin, Marshall.) .... 0s. 6d.

JAMES, LIONEL. .... "With the Chitral Relief Force." (Calcutta: The *Englishman* Press.) .... — —

THOMSON, H. C. .... "The Chitral Campaign." (Heinemann.) .... — —

The Lakh Bribery Case of Hyderabad, Deccan. (Bangalore: The Caxton Press.) .... — —

RECENT PARLIAMENTARY PAPER.

[7864.] EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER)—Correspondence relating to Chitral .... 0s. $6\frac{1}{2}$d.

THIRD AND CHEAP EDITION. NOW READY.

2 *vols.*, 866 *pp.*, *Demy* 8*vo.* *Price* 7*s.*, *post free.*

CHARLES BRADLAUGH:

A RECORD OF HIS LIFE.

BY HIS DAUGHTER,

HYPATIA BRADLAUGH BONNER.

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF

His Parliamentary Struggle, Politics, and Teachings,

BY JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

ALSO,

Second and Superior Edition, with 10 Portraits, etc. 21s., post free.

LONDON:

A. & H. BRADLAUGH BONNER, 1 & 2 TOOK'S COURT, E.C.

CELEBRATED ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF TULSIKRIT RAMAYAN. By Mr F. S. GROWSE, M.A., C.I.E. Complete in 3 volumes. Fifth Edition. Highly spoken of both by English and Native Press. Also Second-hand books on sale. Price Rs. 3-6 by V.P. Post in India, and 4s. 6d. in England. Apply to Babu HARPRASAD, Municipal Commissioner, Fatehgarh, N.W.P., India.



INDIAN SCENTS.

Rare, Jasmine, Thalamboo, and other Attars, R.1 per tola. Sandal Attar, as.10 per tola. Pudukota Billais, each as.10.

NOVELTIES IN INDIAN JEWELLERY, ETC. MADRAS FASHIONS.

ORNAMENTS SET WITH RUBIES.	Rs. Rs.	GOLD HEAD ORNAMENTS.	Rs. Rs.
Kammals ...	100 to 350	Gajjulu Nagar ...	35 to 70
Thodus	30—200	Nagar	12—70
Pathakum ...	35—350	Parrot	9—70
Kathiri Bavalies	70—300	Thirugupoo ...	4—7
Kurudu Bavalies	15— 70	Half-size do. ...	2-8—7
Bullaku	35—250	Sowri Kottai ...	4-8—6-8
Nose Screw ...	10— 70	Thalamboo ...	2-4—2-8
Ear Rings ...	50—300		
GOLD ORNAMENTS.		SILVER JEWELS.	
Kasimalai ...	550—700	Golusu (leg chain)	70-120
Kollikal Addigai	60—150	Chain for watches	7—10
Kappu (bangle)	150—200	Victor buttons, set	5—6
Thodas (chains)	150—200	Locket	3—5
Jaya Rings ...	15— 25	Penholder	3—8
Vallam Pebbles	3 — 25	Snuff-box	8—10

All sorts of Silver Vessels, Rs.10 to Rs.100.
Bellmetal Kujah, Rs.5 to Rs.10.
Beneres Laced and Silk Cloths, each Rs.6 to Rs.100.
Kornadu, Female Cloth, Rs.8 to Rs.100.
Terms Cash or V.P.P. All other Jewels, etc., will be supplied. Illustrated "Trade Revealer" on application with half-anna postage stamp.

A. V. CHIDAMBARA IYER Bros.
Mayavaram, Madras Presidency, INDIA.

WANTED.

5,000 MEMBERS TO

THE HINDU FAMILY PROVISION FUND.

Those who subscribe to "*Arya Vartha*," an English Weekly Journal (Annual Subscriptions for India—Burma Rs. 5, Ceylon, Penang and Straits Rs. 6, Europe 12/-), will be enlisted as a member to the said Fund. Rupees 900 for every paid subscriber to the "*Arya Vartha*" will be equally divided amongst the nominee of the paid subscribers who die within the 31st March of every year. Agreement duly registered.

☞ You need not remit your subscription now. Please register your names. The Journal will be out at Madras as soon as 1,000 members are registered. Rules on application, with ½ anna postage stamp.

MANAGER,
"ARYA VARTHA,"
MAYAVARAM (S. INDIA).

TRADE MARK.

Is what its name implies, **FEVER DESTROYER,**

and Cures Malarious, Intermittent and Remittent types of Fevers, Colds, etc.

North Raglan Barracks, Devonport.
I beg to enclose a cheque for the "Jvara-Hari." Both in India and Africa I have found it the BEST REMEDY FOR FEVER I know.
C. E. WOOD, Captain 22nd North Staffs. Regt.

"Jvara-Hari" is so efficacious on all fevers, that I now indent upon you for 4 dozen, per value-payable parcel. I think there is more than magic in it.
G. L. NARSINGA ROW

For INDIGESTION, DIARRHŒA, CHOLERA, etc., etc.

Omum-Carpoor TRADE MARK

Cuddalore Municipal Councillors' Office,
I have much pleasure in stating that your "Omum-Carpoor" was found very useful for Cholera if taken in the early stage.
C. S. SRINIVASA, Chairman.

Prices of "JVARA-HARI" and "OMUM CARPOOR" 8 ans., 1 Rs., 1/8 Rs., 2/12 Rs., and 11 Rs. per bottle. N.B.—1 doz. sent post free.

To be had of all Chemists and Dealers, or of the Proprietors,

HENRY'S GREAT INDIAN REMEDIES COMPANY.

43, KING WILLIAM STREET, LONDON, E.C. AND 27, SECOND LINE BEACH, MADRAS.

Printed by A. BONNER, 1 & 2, Took's Court, E.C., and Published for the Proprietors (the Indian National Congress), at 84 and 85, Palace Chambers, London, S.W.

INDIA.

EDITED BY GORDON HEWART, M.A.
FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.

ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.] [OFFICES: 84 AND 85, PALACE CHAMBERS, LONDON, S.W.

VOL. VI. **Supplement No. 7.** OCTOBER, 1895.

This Supplement consists of a VERBATIM Report, specially drawn up for "India," of the Debates on Indian subjects in both Houses of Parliament, and questions put on such subjects and the answers given to them, arranged chronologically, from August 23rd to September 4th.

Imperial Parliament.

August 23rd.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE INDIAN COTTON DUTIES.

Mr. C. E. SCHWANN asked the Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the opposition to the continuance of the Indian Cotton Duties expressed in Lancashire during the recent electoral contest, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to suggest to the Government of India, or whether the Indian Government was itself prepared, to abolish those duties, and to find alternative methods of taxation or economies in official salaries and expenditure generally to meet the deficit at present existing in the finances of our great Eastern dependency, and to meet the probable increased deficit which would arise when the outlay on the Chitral Expedition had to be paid for, and would be further increased by an annual charge for the maintenance of a military station in the Chitral district?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: The hon. Member raises a series of controversial questions as to the Ways and Means of the Indian Government, to which it is impossible to reply adequately within the compass of an answer to a Parliamentary Question. If he will be good enough to raise them on the Indian Budget, I shall then be able to deal fully with them.

August 26th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE INDIAN COTTON DUTIES.

Mr. PHILIP STANHOPE, rising amid cheers, asked the Secretary of State whether, in view of the statement made by him in the House of Commons on the 21st of February last, and which he then announced was also acquiesced in by Lord Salisbury, as to the impolicy of imposing cotton duties upon English goods in India, the Government proposed to take steps for the repeal of those duties; and whether the Government, as a preliminary to their repeal, would call upon the Government of India to impose a general and equivalent Excise Duty upon all qualities of cotton cloth manufactured in India, in order to render those Duties absolutely non-protective in their character?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: I have received a Memorial from the representatives of the various cotton industries in Lancashire stating fully and clearly their objections to the present Excise Duty levied on cotton yarns in India, and pointing out that in their opinion such a duty does not remove or counterbalance the protective character of the Customs Duty to which all imported cotton goods are subject. This Memorial will be sent to India, and the Indian Government requested to state their side of the case. I may add that I adhere to the speech I made on the 21st of February last, and have nothing to retract in connexion with it. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. STANHOPE: May I ask the noble Lord whether, as he adheres to his speech of the 21st February, the Government of which he is so important a Member will take steps to repeal these duties? (Hear, hear.)

Lord G. HAMILTON: I think that my hon. friend had better read my speech first. What I then stated was that the objection to the imposition of the duties was much more serious than the majority of the House believed; and I further stated that there was great difficulty in framing a satisfactory Excise Duty to counterbalance a Customs Duty. To both those opinions I adhere.

Mr. STANHOPE asked whether the noble Lord would be able to give any more definite answer to the inquiry than he now afforded to the House on the occasion of the Debate to be raised on this subject on the Indian Budget?

Lord G. HAMILTON: My hon. friend will see that this is a matter of some difficulty and of great delicacy, and I certainly ought not to be expected to give any opinion on the question until the Indian Government have had an opportunity of fully stating their views on the subject. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. FLYNN asked whether it was not the fact that a large number of Lancashire Conservative members were returned at the last Election on the strength of pledges that the Cotton Duties would be repealed? (Opposition cheers.)

The SPEAKER: Order, order. That is a matter of opinion. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. GIBSON BOWLES asked whether the opinion of the Indian Government had not been previously stated on this question, and whether the opinion now asked for was to be based upon any new facts?

Lord G. HAMILTON: The whole statement is new, because the Excise Duty only recently came into operation, and until some time has elapsed it will be impossible to say exactly what the effect of that Duty will be.

Sir W. WEDDERBURN: Is the noble Lord now able to tell us more precisely the date on which the Indian Budget will be taken?

Lord G. HAMILTON: I am afraid that that does not depend upon me, but upon the hon. gentleman and his friends. (Ministerial cheers.) The Indian Budget will be taken when we get through Supply.

August 27th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE INDIAN COTTON DUTIES.

Mr. T. R. BUCHANAN asked the Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the decided expression of opinion of the House of Commons on 21st February on the subject of the

Indian Cotton Duties, he would promise that the Duties should not be repealed until the House had again had an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the subject?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: The hon. gentleman may rest assured that nothing in connexion with these Duties will be done hastily or surreptitiously. The vote given on the 21st of February last may fairly be interpreted as giving a sanction to the imposition of these Duties; but that approval was obtained on a distinct undertaking from the then Secretary of State for India that the Duties should in no sense whatever be of a protective character. Since that Debate the Duties in Burma on yarns of 20 and under have been reduced by the executive action of the Government of India from 5 per cent. to ½ per cent., as they were found to be protective in their operation.

Mr. W. E. M. TOMLINSON asked whether it was not a fact that the expression of the House of Commons would not, in practice, preclude the Indian Government from making the change if they found that the Exchequer required it?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: The Indian Government unquestionably have power to deal with it.

INDIAN PRISON-MADE GOODS.

Mr. T. LOUGH asked the Secretary of State for India whether a remonstrance had been addressed by the Government to Foreign Powers against the practice of sending brushes and other articles made in prisons to this country; whether there was a considerable manufacture of carpets in prisons in India, and whether this manufacture was fostered and encouraged by the Government, and what the annual value of the carpets so made was; whether these carpets were freely exported to European countries; and whether it was the intention of the Government to suppress this competition with free labour in this important Trade?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: The manufacture of carpets in prisons in India has for some years past been sanctioned by the Government of India, but there are no statistics to show to what extent the manufacture is now carried on, what the value of the carpets so made is, or the number exported to European countries. An inquiry can be made of the Government of India on these points if the hon. gentleman wishes it. In 1885 the Secretary of State sent instructions to the Government of India that gaol manufactures should, as far as possible, be confined to articles adapted for use by other public departments; but he added—"It is not, of course, intended to preclude gaols from special industries, such as carpet-making, which have been found suitable as a means of employing convict labour, but for which there is practically no market in the department of Government." (Hear, hear.)

Mr. LOUGH asked whether the noble Lord would kindly mention one or two of the other articles still made in Indian gaols and exported to foreign countries, and would furnish a return on the subject?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON said that, if the hon. gentleman would specify the articles with respect to which he desired information, he would make inquiries and see whether he could furnish the return asked for. (Hear, hear.)

SIMULTANEOUS EXAMINATIONS.

Petitions praying that effect might be given to the resolution of the House of Commons in favour of holding open competitive examinations to the Indian Civil Service simultaneously in India and in England were presented by Sir W. Wedderburn from the inhabitants of Cocanada (two), Hospet, Jaganadhapuram, and Madura (three).

August 30th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE INDIAN BUDGET.

Mr. J. H. DALZIEL asked the First Lord of the Treasury, assuming that the Report of Supply was finished on Monday (Sept. 2nd), when the Indian Budget would be taken?

Mr. A. J. BALFOUR: If the Report of Supply is finished on Monday (Sept. 2nd), the discussion on the Indian Budget will be taken after the Second Reading of the Appropriation Bill, which will be on Tuesday (Sept. 3rd).

September 2nd.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

INDIAN RAILWAYS.

Mr. R. G. WEBSTER asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether it was a fact that guaranteed and assisted railways in India had been constructed at a less cost than those built by the State; and if the Government would consider the question whether, in the event of future railway construction in Africa, it would be desirable to give a guarantee to such lines of railway as they might deem desirable to develop British territory in Africa and British commerce?

Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I learn, on enquiry, that, speaking generally, from the results of recent experience, there is no substantial difference in the cost of construction of State railways in India and of those built by guaranteed or assisted companies. As regards questions which will have to be dealt with in my Department of future railway construction in Africa, I can only say that each scheme will be considered on its merits, and settled according to the particular circumstances of the case.

September 3rd.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

EXCHANGE COMPENSATION ALLOWANCE.

Mr. E. J. C. MORTON asked the Secretary of State for India, whether he would lay upon the Table of the House a copy of the original orders pursuant to which what was known as exchange compensation allowance had been granted to Indian officers, civil and military; whether he would lay upon the Table of the House a statement of all sums disbursed and estimated under the head up to the present time; whether he was aware that such disbursements and estimates had been made avowedly for expenditure in England; and, whether the cost of them would be borne in whole or in part by the British Treasury?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: The original orders, which were contained in a published Resolution of the Government of India, dated 18th of August, 1893, will be given if the hon. member will move for them. I may refer to page 216 of the Finance Accounts for 1893-4, and paragraphs 108 and 145 of the Financial Statement for 1895-6, both of which are on the Table of the House. The allowance is not given "avowedly for expenditure in England," but to enable officers to meet such expenditure if they think fit. No part of the cost will be borne by the British Treasury.

THE INDIAN BUDGET.

THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IN CHITRAL.

SPEECH BY SIR H. FOWLER.

On the motion for going into Committee on the East India Revenue Accounts,

Sir HENRY FOWLER rose to call attention to the decision recently arrived at by Her Majesty's Government as to the occupation of Chitral. He said: I am sorry that I have to intervene at the present period of the Session with reference to the policy of the late Government and of the present Government in connection with recent events at Chitral. But it would not have been practicable to discuss this question at an earlier date. It would not have been practicable on the Address, for the obvious reason that, in the absence of the papers which have only been laid on the Table in the course of the last few days, I neither could have defended the policy of the late Government nor ventured upon any criticism of the action of the present Government. Although we must regret that so important a Debate as this should take place at so late a period of the Session, yet, owing to no fault of the late or the present Government, the Debate could not have taken place at an earlier date. It will be necessary for me to state very briefly the past relations of Chitral and of British India, not only to cor-

rect certain misconceptions which have found expression in this House and in the Press—I refer specially to a statement of the First Lord of the Treasury, who said at the commencement of the Session that Chitral was within and not without the boundaries of the Indian Empire, an allegation which I shall have to traverse in a very few minutes—but it is also necessary to state the history of those relations in order that we may understand the position of affairs that led to the recent expedition, and the reasons which induced the late Government to adopt the policy to which the Government objects. In the first place, I must remind the House that the word "Chitral" is used in two senses. There is Chitral the State and there is Chitral the capital of that State, and that causes some confusion from time to time, both in reading the papers which have been presented and in discussing these affairs. The State of Chitral is, speaking roughly, considerably larger than Wales. It occupies something like 9,000 square miles. It lies in the midst of a vast mountainous region, which is closed in for six or eight months in the year by inaccessible and impassable passes. It contains a population of between 80,000 and 100,000, and its extreme length at one point is upwards of 200 miles. Now the capital of this State, the fort of Chitral, which was the scene of the splendid defence which caused the admiration of all Englishmen—(Cheers)—is situated, together with some half-a-dozen scattered villages, in a narrow valley about one mile and a-half broad and six miles long, containing a population, all told, of about 4,000. Our connection with the State arose through our connection with the State of Kashmir. It is a very shadowy connection, which is very difficult to trace till we get within very recent times. At all events, in 1846, the State of Kashmir passed into British hands. Part of the arrangements then made—and they are arrangements which I deeply regret—was the sale by the British Government, to the Maharaja of Kashmir, of Kashmir and all its adjacent territory, and a sum was paid by him to the East India Company of £750,000. For 30 years there was very little intercourse between this country and Kashmir, and certainly very little intercourse between Kashmir and Chitral. The old ruler of Chitral, who ruled it for 30 years, and whose death was the commencement of much of the recent trouble, was always fighting for his independence against the Amír of Afghanistan on the one side and against the Maharaja of Kashmir on the other. But in 1876, as the House will see from the despatches in the Blue Book, proposals were made to Lord Lytton with reference to the reconstruction of the arrangements then existing between the Indian Government and the Government of Kashmir, and also with reference to the relations between Kashmir and Chitral. In the correspondence it will be found that Lord Lytton, in reporting to the Secretary of State the interviews which had taken place with reference to these transactions, stated that one of the terms of the negotiations between himself and the Maharaja of Kashmir was that an English officer should be appointed to reside permanently in Gilghit for the purpose of obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier. The House has before it the various stages of these negotiations. The result amounts to this—that a Treaty was concluded between the British Government and Kashmir, and that a Treaty was also concluded between Kashmir and Chitral, under which Chitral submitted to the suzerainty of Kashmir in exchange for a subsidy. That is the beginning of the influence that Kashmir had over Chitral. The experiment was tried of the presence of a resident in Gilghit. That is the extreme outpost of our frontier in Western India, and it lies on the north-eastern frontier of Kashmir. It is inaccessible for a great portion of the year, and was selected as the most convenient outpost on our western frontier in that part of India. Major Biddulph was the first agent who went to Gilghit, and I think he went either in 1877 or 1878. The arrangement was very unsatisfactory, and in December, 1880, the Government of India submitted to the notice of the then Secretary of State (Lord Hartington) the very unfortunate state of things which had arisen in that neighbourhood. In July, 1881, the Government of India determined to discontinue this agent at Gilghit. In their despatch to the Home Government they explained the difficulties that had arisen, and that there had been an attempt to take Gilghit by force, and they said:—"Under these circumstances it appeared to us that the British Agency at Gilghit could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages which could be expected to result from its maintenance. We therefore decided to withdraw it." In the correspondence attention was also drawn to the request which the Mehtar or ruler of Chitral had made that he might enter into direct alliance with the British Government. Lord Hartington approved of the decision at which the Indian Government had arrived, pointing out that the appointment of an agent at Gilghit appeared from the first to have been distasteful to the Maharaja of Kashmir, and had failed to realise the expectations with which it was made in 1877. He added, however, that he realised the importance of keeping a watch upon events on that part of the frontier, and it was clearly understood, both by the English Government and the Indian Government, that the action taken was liable to reconsideration if either Government should think fit to reverse it. From that time until 1885 there was no question of a British Resident at Gilghit, but in that year Sir William Lockhart was sent on a general mission to the north-west of Kashmir, and he made a very elaborate and interesting report upon the results of that mission. That report could easily have been condensed, and its most interesting features might have been embodied in this Blue-book with great advantage. I cannot but regret the meagreness of the information supplied in the Blue-book, for the insufficiency of the information places the House at a disadvantage in approaching the consideration of the action of the late Government and of the present Government. It would have been well to have had before us the actual reports and opinions of the various distinguished officers of the Indian Government who have been mixed up from time to time in these affairs. Well, Colonel Lockhart, as he was then, after he had described the physical aspects both of Gilghit and Chitral, stated that in his opinion the acquisition of Gilghit would insure the safety of the Hindu-kush. He said the only danger to be anticipated on the Hindu-kush frontier could be met if the Indian Government were to acquire Gilghit. The House will see that, in the whole course of this matter, the prime danger has always been the danger which might arise on the Hindu-kush. That danger, no doubt, was present to Lord Lytton's mind in 1876, and was present to Lord Dufferin's mind in 1885. It was in reference to that a special mission was sent, and the result of that inquiry was the deliberate opinion expressed by Colonel Lockhart that that danger would be met if the British Government acquired Gilghit, and he suggested the establishment of an agency there. The particulars of his proposals are to be found on page 7 of the Blue-book:—"Having very fully considered the matter, we decided in the autumn of 1887 that some measures ought to be taken to effect our object without much further delay. Colonel Lockhart, who visited the country in 1885, had submitted, in 1886, proposals for holding it, but these proposals seems to us to involve unnecessarily large expenditure. We therefore sent up an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department, Captain Durand, with orders to work out a plan on a more moderate scale. The idea was to establish in Gilghit an English agency backed by a sufficient number of the reorganised troops which Kashmir would furnish under the scheme for the utilisation of the native armies. The number of English officers was to be as small as possible, and the expenditure to be cut down to the lowest limit. The objects in view were the watching and control of the country lying to the south of the Hindu-kush, and the organisation of a force which would be able in time of trouble to prevent any *coup de main* by a small body of troops acting across the passes. Captain Durand spent the summer in visiting Chitral and other points of interest and was very well received. His proposals were briefly that the British Agency at Gilghit should consist of four officers, namely, the officer in charge, two junior officers of infantry and artillery and a doctor. The force would consist of 1,200 regular infantry, 100 garrison artillery, a battery of screw guns and 500 irregular troops. This force would be under the control of the English officer in charge, not of the Kashmir Governor. The telegraph line would be completed to Gilghit and roads opened. Certain increased subsidies would be granted to the neighbouring chiefs; the Mehtar of Chitral would be presented with a battery of guns and 1,000 sniders, and in course of time a considerable force of Chitralis would be organised and armed." The Indian Government, however, were of opinion that these proposals might be somewhat modified, but I need not trouble the House with the modifications suggested by them. In the dispatch from which I am quoting we have the first mention in any official paper of what has now become a very vital question

in the consideration of our situation in that part of the world. "It is not easy to overcome the fears and prejudices of the Swat and Bajaur with regard to this point, but we have some reason to hope that, in the course of time, we may succeed in doing so. The Khans of Dir and Jandol, who command the greater part of the road, both seem likely in the end to prove tractable, and even now a regular postal road could be established." The proposals thus made were approved of by Lord Cross in 1889. He added that the opening of a direct route to Chitral was an important feature in connection with the scheme, and that he trusted that the tribes whose country would be traversed would be induced to co-operate in the execution of the work. The scheme was carried out and an Agency was established. The first Agent was Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, and he seems to have gone there somewhere in the middle of 1889. The Indian Government gave him very full instructions. The general lines on which he was to proceed were fully set out. He was instructed to go to Chitral and set on foot the new arrangement. Lieutenant-Colonel Durand went, and in 1889 we have his Report, to which I draw the attention of the House. The House will remember that one of the conditions to which the Government attached importance was the opening up of this road from Peshawar to Chitral. Captain Durand says:—"As to the first stipulation, it is more than doubtful if he is sincere in his professions. He has undoubtedly written to the Chiefs whose territories lie between our borders and those of Chitral, urging them to comply with the wishes of the Government, but, at the same time, he has sent verbal messages advising them to object to the road being open to the passage of troops." That, I believe, has been the policy all the way through, that, I believe, will be the policy in the future, and I believe that one of the sources of the greatest danger in reference to this route is the deep-rooted and insurmountable objections of the tribes and people who live in that locality to the construction of this road—not only the residents of Chitral, but the residents in the country through which the road would have to pass if ever it was made. Well, the Mehtar expressed his willingness to do everything that the Government asked him to do in connection with the construction of this road, while privately he was using his influence, and very successfully, with the Chiefs to prevent it. The House will remember that there was no proposal at that time for any Resident in Chitral, and no proposal for a Resident outside Gilghit. The Resident at Gilghit was to visit Chitral from time to time, but I repeat that up to that time there was no proposal to put any one in residence at Chitral. In 1891 the old Mehtar applied for an increased subsidy. He wanted his Rx. 6,000 turned into Rx. 12,000. The Government of India recommended that the subsidy should be doubled, and they also made certain other recommendations in his favour, and in accordance with his demands; but they said that the allowance should be made contingent on good behaviour and on the condition that the Mehtar and his son accepted the advice of the British Agent or his deputy on all matters. It was also a condition of the grant that he should consent to the permanent residence of a British officer in his country. Now, if that country was inside the British frontier, there would have been no necessity to apply to the Mehtar for his consent, and no necessity to make any bargain whatever with him. At that moment Chitral was absolutely independent, and we have no right to put a Resident there without the consent of the Mehtar. These terms were agreed upon, and he agreed, of course, to this Resident, and now we come to the conditions under which this Residency was formed. The first important document on this point is dated October 19, 1892, which is a very important Dispatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State. I am again at a disadvantage in quoting this Dispatch, because it has been very freely "Bowdlerised." There is one omission from it to which I should like to call the attention of the noble Lord the Secretary of State. I do not expect him to answer me now, but it is a question on which he should consult the permanent authorities at the India Office and have some well-understood rule laid down. As the House knows, when the Indian Government considers any question every member of that Government has a right to record his dissent from the Dispatch which is sent to England. That right is given by virtue of an Act of Parliament, and that dissent is bound to be submitted to the Secretary of State. It seems to me that when the Secretary of State lays a Dispatch on the Table of this House to which Dispatch there were dissents, those dissents should accompany the Dispatch, so that the House should be in a position to know whether the Dispatch was or was not unanimous, and what were the reasons which induced certain Members of the Indian Government to dissent from it? (Hear, hear.) My right hon. friend the member for the Forest of Dean attached some importance to the apparent unanimity on the Indian Council on this question, but I am not making a statement which will be disputed—in fact, I shall prove it by subsequent statements in a later Dispatch—when I say that this is not a unanimous Dispatch and that there were very important and very serious dissents from it. The House has got to take Dispatches as they find them. We have lately had occasion——

MR. RADCLIFFE COOKE interrupting, said: I rise to order, Sir. I observe an hon. member below the Gangway reading his correspondence in the House. I desire to ask whether such a proceeding is in order?

MR. SPEAKER: It is against the Rules of the House to open and read private correspondence in the House.

SIR H. FOWLER, continuing, proceeded to read from the Dispatch as follows: "We have lately had occasion to consider further the question of our future policy in Gilghit and the surrounding States and the strength at which it would be necessary to maintain the British Agency in order to carry out that policy effectively. The proposals of Colonel Durand and the Resident in Kashmir on these points have been before us for some months, and we have had the advantage of discussing them with Colonel Durand. The conclusion to which we have come is that it will not be necessary to make any increase in the number of troops in the Gilghit Agency, either British or Kashmir. We have relieved the 200 Goorkhas by 205 Sikhs, and we have sent up a small detachment of sappers, but on the other hand, we have withdrawn the mountain guns sent up last year." I quote that as showing that the Government of India—that was at the time when Lord Lansdowne was Viceroy—were of opinion that the object was to watch any proceedings on the Hindu Kush. The difficulty of supplying the troops at Gilghit was so great that it was necessary to keep the force down to the lowest possible point. The Government of India also proposed an increase of two additional political officers, an addition to the number of military officers, and, no doubt, although it does not appear, I think, in these extracts, one was placed at Chitral. It was their duty, it was stated, to avoid as far as possible entangling themselves in the disputes of the natives. The Secretary of State approved of this proposal; but there is a letter addressed by the Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Kashmir which, I think, more fully explains the policy of the Government than that developed in their Dispatch. That Dispatch is as follows:—"I am directed to address you on the subject of our future policy in Gilghit and the surrounding States. You were informed that the Government of India had no intention of pushing the project for the construction of a road through the territory occupied by the Indus Valley tribes. It was also pointed out to you that no action should be taken likely to lead to a collision with the Chilasi tribes, and that their headmen should be treated in a conciliatory manner. It will be your duty to inform the British Agent in Gilghit of the instructions you have thus received, and to impress upon him and the officers of the Agency the necessity of acting strictly in accordance with them. The Government of India have now had under their consideration the strength of the force which should be maintained for the future in the neighbourhood of Gilghit. The force in question is obviously intended for a twofold purpose. It is intended, in the first place, as an obstacle in the way of a Russian advance against Gilghit through the passes of the Hindu Kush; and, in the second, to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining States. In regard to the second object, it is to be hoped that the effect produced upon the surrounding tribes by the successful operations against Hunza and Nagar will for some time to come render them unlikely to cause trouble. I am to impress upon you strongly that it is the desire of the Government of India that the officers of the Agency should carefully avoid any action which might have the effect of bringing about hostilities. Their efforts should, on the contrary, be directed to endeavouring by means of conciliatory measures, to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes. Apart from the political objections which the Government of India entertain to a policy which might have

the effect of involving us in further military operations on this part of the frontier, numerous proofs have lately been afforded of the costliness of maintaining a large force in the neighbourhood of Gilghit. It will, moreover, be obvious to you that, upon general grounds, there are serious objections to keeping considerable portions of the native army in so distant and isolated a position. Under these circumstances, and assuming that the policy which has thus been laid down will be rigorously adhered to, the Government of India see no occasion for adding to the strength of the Gilghit garrison. Considering the great difficulty of transporting supplies across the passes by which Gilghit is divided from Kashmir, there would be obviously great advantages in fixing the strength of the garrison at a number which the country itself would be able to support. That number would, it is understood, not exceed about 1,600 men. Upon this point and upon the distribution of the troops in the neighbourhood of Gilghit and throughout the line of communication no decision will be come to until Colonel Durand's arrival in Simla. The Governor General in Council gathers from your telegram of the 18th inst. that you and Colonel Durand are both of opinion that the garrison of Gilghit itself might be safely reduced to the strength of one regiment and a battery, the remainder of the Imperial Service Troops being stationed along the line between Bunji and Astor. I may observe that the Government of India, while admitting that it will always be necessary to maintain a small body of British troops as an escort to the Resident, are not without hope that it may eventually be found possible to hold Gilghit with a force consisting mainly of local levies raised from amongst the neighbouring tribes, and entirely dependent upon local supplies. In this view it is desirable that the utmost encouragement should be given to the spread of cultivation in the neighbourhood. The Government of India are satisfied that the re-establishment of the Gilghit Agency was undoubtedly necessary, and that the operations against Hunza and Nagar were inevitable. Now that these have been brought to a successful conclusion, it is hoped that it may in the future be found possible to secure the passes and to maintain peace in the Dand States without adding materially to the burdens of the Empire." That brings us down to the summer of 1892. In August, 1892, the Mehtar died, after a rule of something like 30 years. He was a man of great ability and firmness, and after his death there followed what our officer described as a period of "dynastic murders and civil war." The eldest son was 31 and the second 24. The latter, Nizam ul Mulk, succeeded, and the elder, Afzal ul Mulk, fled to British protection at Gilghit. Nizam murdered all the brothers he could get hold of. The Government of India at once acknowledged the man in possession, and he at once asked for a British officer to be sent to him at Chitral. Immediately before this the uncle of Nizam, brother of the old Mehtar, made a sudden descent in the night, slaughtered Nizam, and took possession of the throne. He ruled about two months. Afzal, then at Gilghit, had no doubt of the support of the British Resident. I am not justified in saying that Afzal was encouraged, but he was permitted to advance into the territory of Chitral, and he became Mehtar. I deeply regret the interference of the British Agent in the internal affairs of Chitral. He had been expressly prohibited from doing so, but the Government of India, after further investigation, came to the conclusion that under the circumstances his action was justifiable, and approved of what he had done. Up to three years ago there was no Resident in Chitral; therefore we are perfectly free from complications in considering this question. We are free from what is called "abandonment"—running away. The Agent appointed was Dr. Robertson, and in a despatch dated April 3, 1893, he said that "the atmosphere was one of conspiracy and intrigue." We never intended that his mission should be more than temporary, and we considered that after he had recognised the new Mehtar it was undesirable that he should remain any longer in Chitral. Dr. Robertson left, but he deemed it desirable to leave Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Gurdon behind him. In June, 1893, he presented a very interesting Report, which showed what was his opinion then. I thank the Government for giving us that despatch, but we have not Sir George Robertson's Report in 1895. (Hear, hear.) It is much more important to be in possession of his views in 1895 than in 1893, particularly as the Government attached great importance to Dr. Robertson's views in 1893. When he arrived at Chitral, he says:—"Instead of finding ourselves in the position of envoys sent to congratulate and form an alliance with a young prince flushed with recent triumphs over rebellious subjects and powerful outside foes, we found ourselves called upon to firmly establish on his throne, and infuse with hope and verile energy, an unnerved, terror-stricken chief who was conscious that he ruled on the merest sufferance a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks of violence was entirely due to a doubt and fear lest the Government of India might have the will and also the power to avenge any injury to its nominee. That under such peculiar circumstances any permanence can be expected for the work already successfully accomplished would be unreasonable, unless the same plans which have worked so well in the immediate past be steadily persevered with in the immediate future. Military force other than that which the Mehtar himself can organise and direct it would be impolitic to use in Chitral, even if it were possible to employ it at such an enormous distance from its base of reinforcements and supplies in Kashmir or India. The upper classes have to be won over and conciliated by friendly overtures, apparently emanating from men absolutely secure and confident in their strength and position, while at the same time the imagination of the Adamzadas must be acted upon by the spectacle of their ruler being securely protected from all outside enemies and gradually making himself feared and respected by the firmness, combined with justice, of his rule, and by the display of the wealth and resources he possesses as the subsidised ally of his acknowledged suzerain, his Highness the Maharajah of Kashmir. That there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a line of policy it would be idle to deny, but there are also two factors, the value of which cannot be over-estimated, as favouring influences in any attempts we may make to mould the Chitralis to our interest, especially if these favouring influences be employed discreetly and with dexterity. They are, first, the absence of any real fanatical feeling in Chitral; and, secondly, the extreme impressionability of the people. The absence of all sentiments of religious intolerance in Chitral amounts to a national peculiarity. The impressionability of Chitralis, again, is something extraordinary. It undoubtedly makes them terribly fickle. But fickleness tells both ways. If you cannot rely upon unswerving supporters in changeable people, you can at least be happy in the thought that they can rarely become inveterate opponents. When great impressionability is combined with extreme cupidity, for which Chitralis are also remarkable, the power of influencing them lies with the man of most tactful speech, especially if he also possesses the longest purse. Polite attentions, complimentary speeches, have a great, if ephemeral, effect on most Chitralis. When accompanied by a small douceur they not unfrequently have the effect of starting the recipient to his feet with his eyes dimmed by grateful tears, his mouth full of fervid protestations of devotion. It is true his gratitude rapidly cools, but it can be excited again as often as is desirable by a re-employment of the means described. It follows, therefore, that a political officer in Chitral has a wonderful power always at hand of influencing for a time all those brought into direct contact with him. All manner of apparently determined enemies of the Mehtar, Adamzadas, Moghli Pirs, Sayads, as well as intriguers of other classes, succumbed at once to the not very subtle influences employed against them, while, as soon as it became generally known that I preferred expressions of loyalty to their Mehtar to hearing speeches of personal devotion to myself, the alteration I desired was made almost invariably." I think the Chitralis have something in common with western races when pleasant speeches are accompanied by long purses. Sir George Robertson wrote that—"An Englishman may now travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort, unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night, no suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country." This was written in June, 1893, and if only shows how the greatest men may be deceived. In 18 months all was altered. The Indian Government, however, came to the conclusion that Captain Younghusband should remain for the present, though not at the capital. Colonel Durand proposed to make his quarters 63 miles away. That Dispatch was replied to by Lord Kimberley, and Lord Kimberley's Dispatch again is not given in full; but I am able to supply a very

serious omission in it out of the Blue Book itself. Lord Kimberley, after referring to Dr. Robertson's Report and to the Dispatch of the Government of India, says:—"I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as Political Agent in Chitral renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilghit and Gizr river, and it is partly on this account and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilghit Agency that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilghit Agency. But in determining our future policy towards Chitral a wider view must be taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed." That was what Lord Kimberley wrote. But it would be altogether an unintelligible sentence where he speaks of "the general aspect of affairs" if, in the editing of these dispatches, they had not edited other letters which contained the pith of that portion of Lord Kimberley's dispatches. The Secretary to the Government of India, writing to the Resident in Kashmir, stated what was the general aspect of affairs in that region which Lord Kimberley thought might be changed, and which would seriously affect the whole question. He says:—"When a review of the position on this frontier was placed before the Secretary of State for India nearly a year ago, Lord Kimberley sanctioned the retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral as a temporary measure only, and pointed to three possible contingencies which would materially affect the general aspect of affairs in that region. Those contingencies were (1) the abandonment by the Amír of all idea of bringing Chitral under his control; (2) the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract; and (3) the mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes." The Amír, at the close of 1893, bound himself not to interfere with Chitral by the Agreement concluded with Sir Mortimer Durand. In June, 1894, the Government of India appear to have addressed the Resident in Kashmir, pointing out to him that the first of the conditions to which Lord Kimberley had attached importance had been attained by the Durand Agreement; that there were indications that a Pamir settlement might before long be arrived at; and that the attitude of the tribes was fairly satisfactory. "In these circumstances, you were informed that, if no new complications arose, the political officer in Chitral should be withdrawn when the winter was over." At the time of that letter—in June—the Pamir Agreement was still unsigned; there was still suspicion among the tribes; and the Government of India came to the conclusion that—"For another year our position in and towards Chitral must remain upon the present footing. It appears that Colonel Bruce and Captain Younghusband advocate a policy of activity and extension, which is not in accord with the views of the Government of India." This is not from London; this letter is written from Calcutta to the Resident in Kashmir, and expresses the view of the Government of India; and the hon. member for the Forest of Dean will, no doubt, attach much importance to that. The Dispatch continues:—"I am to request that this policy may be impressed on the British Agent, and that he may be clearly informed that it is not intended to maintain permanently a resident officer in Chitral. It will suffice to retain the unquestioned right of sending a political officer into Chitral at all times." That Dispatch was submitted to me—I had then succeeded to office—and I then stated, on August 3rd, 1894:—"The reasons which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be 'premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier' are still of weight. It is true that the Amír of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications, while on the north the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was perhaps premature, in these circumstances, to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or continuing those arrangements) within the fixed period such as is indicated." In other words, the view that Lord Kimberley, the Governor of India, and that I myself ventured to take was that, so long as the boundary of the Amír was unfixed and the boundary with Russia unsettled, it was wise and prudent to make no change in the position of the resident officer at Chitral, but that when those questions were settled—and the House knows they have been now settled for a considerable time—he should be withdrawn. I now come to another extraordinary illustration of the editing of these papers. In the Dispatch from the Government of India, to which my Dispatch was a reply, there is not a word about the road to Peshawar. But in my reply this passage is given:—"I approve also of your decided rejection of the proposals for establishing a political officer and an escort in Yasin and for opening up the road between Peshawar and Chitral." The House will see from that, that it had been proposed to the Government of India to make this road, that they declined to make it, and that the late Government concurred with them in their opinion. That brings us down to the end of 1894. In 1895, on January 1, the Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered by a follower of his brother, Amir-ul-Mulk. I am not going to trouble the House with the history of that occurrence, but my own opinion is that the whole of those transactions formed part of one conspiracy between Umra Khan, Sher Afzal, and Amir-ul-Mulk. Lieutenant Gurdon was in Chitral when the murder took place, with eight or ten Sikhs. Dr. Robertson was at once sent to Chitral to report on the situation, where he arrived on February 1, and then commenced the difficulties of the situation. The Government of India very soon advised us at home of the serious position of affairs, and our Government felt that their first duty was to rescue Dr. Robertson. I did not hesitate myself; on March 8 I received for the first time an official intimation that Robertson was in danger in Chitral, and on the same day I telegraphed:—"I am prepared to approve such action for securing safety of Robertson and party as you may deem necessary." In other words, the Government of India had a free hand in order to rescue Robertson. (Hear, hear.) The House remembers what took place—the prompt action of the Government of India, the magnificent preparations of Sir Robert Low, and the wonderful mobilisation of that force of men in less than three weeks. On March 14 the Government issued a Proclamation to all the people of Swat, the people in Bajaur who did not side with Umra Khan, and all other persons concerned, which, after stating that Umra Khan had invaded the district and had had warning that he was to retire from the district by April 1, and if he did not the Government would send a force into Chitral to the rescue of Robertson, proceeded:—"The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present and prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes, and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops." Within a fortnight of the receipt of the telegram announcing that Proclamation I telegraphed:—"As soon as present trouble is over, policy with regard to Chitral and neighbourhood will have to be fully and carefully considered in light of recent events. Meantime our hands should be kept perfectly free. I hope, therefore, that you will take care that nothing is said or done to commit Government either way with regard to making new roads or retention of posts now occupied, or occupation of new posts." The House will remember the brilliant advance that was made, the brilliant relief from Gilghit under Colonel Kelly, and the successful termination on about April 18 or 20, when the siege was raised and Robertson relieved. On April 26, I addressed a Dispatch to the Government of India on the whole question of future policy. I said:—"Since that Dispatch was written the protracted discussion as to the limit of Russian influence in the region of the Upper Oxus has been brought to a close, and an agreement has been arrived at by which the southern boundary of Russia's possessions in these regions will be the Panja and the Pamir rivers, and a line drawn eastward from Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier. The effect of this will be, while bringing her in one direction within a very short dis-

tance of the Chitral frontier, to maintain in the other an intervening belt of country between her southern outposts and the eastern end of the Hindu-kush. Moreover, the demarcation of the Afghan boundary under the Durand agreement, in which the Amír undertakes to abstain from interference in Chitral and the transfer to Afghanistan of the whole of the Kafir country up to Chitral, introduces a new element into the problem. The delimitation of these boundaries would, apart from recent events in Chitral, have introduced changes indicating that the time had arrived for some general survey of the existing situation, in order that the policy which had been provisionally adopted might now be settled on some permanent basis; but these events themselves have brought into strong relief the risk involved in maintaining a British officer in Chitral under existing conditions, a risk not unforeseen by your predecessor, but one which, owing to the peculiar combination of a popular claimant to the Chitral throne with the Pathan invaders, has taken a more acute form than was probably present to the minds of the Marquis of Lansdowne and his advisers. On the one hand, it has been made clear that, so long as a British Agent and his escort in Chitral can be supported only from Gilghit, he may for months be cut off from any support at all, and at best can only be supplied from a small and inaccessible frontier station by means of a road 200 miles in length, and of the worst possible description for military purposes; while to maintain a garrison at Gilghit, adequate for such military responsibilities as the existing combination has thrown upon you, would involve an intolerable financial burden, both upon the Kashmir Government and on your own. On the other hand, the shorter and more direct line of communication between Peshawar and Chitral involves the gravest responsibilities, both military and financial. The establishment and maintenance of this line of communication has been recognised as an important element in the policy of your Government in Chitral, but it was at first hoped that, by the influence of Umra Khan, an arrangement might be come to with the Pathan tribes, through whose territory the route runs, for affecting this object. As it became clear that the assistance of Umra Khan was not likely to be obtained, the project was laid by; but it has always been urged by the local authorities as essential to the security of the agency of Chitral. The question whether such a road running 150 miles through the territory of the Pathan tribes, notorious for their fanaticism and hostility to foreigners, can be maintained at all without constant military pressure or even military occupation, is one which is open to discussion; but in any case it is certain that it cannot be maintained without heavy expenditure from year to year, and it is possible that if maintained by arrangement with the tribes it might at the most critical time be closed against us, and the whole work of opening it up by military force would in that case have to be undertaken again from the beginning." I then asked the Government of India for their views, and on May 8, 1895, they sent their views to me. In fact, this is the last Dispatch we had from the Government of India on this question. I need not go through that Dispatch in detail. The Government of India attaches enormous importance to maintaining our position in Chitral, because of the risk of foreign occupation if it were abandoned, and they maintained that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir. I am not aware that anything has transpired in Chitral to jeopardise the suzerainty of Kashmir. But when the Indian Government came to the means by which their policy is to be carried out, then their Dispatch becomes very misty. They say:—"What must be faced is a consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral valley. The length of time occupied and the difficulty incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilghit, and the expense of doing so, are so great that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempt to occupy Chitral rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communication from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive." They then set out other objections, and say that the course which we recommend may involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India can ill afford, and an increase of responsibilities with the tribes of our north-west frontier, which we would fain avoid. It may be possible to lessen these objections." And they concluded by saying that, at all events, the interests involved were so large that they considered it their plain duty to lay before me the conclusions at which, after full consideration, they had arrived. That is the history down to the date of the last despatch which I received from the Government of India. Before considering the question of future policy, I think there is one point upon which we are all agreed, and that is if a British officer with an escort is to be maintained at Chitral, it will be impossible to secure his safety so long as he relies alone upon Gilghit for his transport and his supplies. Gilghit is itself an outpost cut off for half the year. From there to Chitral is 225 miles, the road being across a pass 12,000ft. high and running through that dangerous defile in which Captain Rose and his party were destroyed. If Chitral is to be held by British troops, it can only be by opening up and maintaining a road from Peshawar, through Dir, to Swat. I say that because it is impossible to separate the policy of retaining Chitral from that of making and maintaining this road. If we are committed to the establishment of a permanent garrison in Chitral, we are committed to the maintaining of this road, and that means the occupation of the whole State of Chitral and the whole of the country lying between the frontier and Chitral. So far as the military aspect of the matter is concerned, the question is simply this: Is the fortification of Chitral a strategic necessity for the adequate defence of the Indian frontier in the event of an attack upon its north-west? The natural fortification of that district is the vast range of the Hindu-kush, which is so picturesquely and forcibly described by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Curzon). But, Sir, no Government can act upon geographical possibilities or upon an opinion which it has formed upon them. This was a purely military question, and I, as Secretary of State for India, was incapable of deciding such a question. My colleagues were under the same incapacity, and the present Government must be guided also by military consideration and also by military experts. The House is aware that there is a very considerable difference of opinion upon this question. The House is aware, from publication in the *Times* newspaper, that Lord Roberts, an authority for whom I entertain very great respect, entertains one opinion; we know from the despatch of the Government of India that the two eminent soldiers who advise that Government—Sir George White and Sir Henry Brackenbury—also agree in that view, and if I understand the view put forward by them, it is that Chitral is of the greatest strategical importance so far as the heads of the passes of the Hindu-Kush are concerned; that the invasion of India from the north-west could be attempted through those passes, and that Chitral, being a weak Power, would fall under the power of its strongest neighbour. But, Sir, the British Government and the Government of India at home have also military advisers. They have as a military adviser that distinguished Field-Marshal who commanded the Indian army for a considerable number of years, and who served for upwards of 40 years in India, and whom Lord Rosebery described as the highest living Indian military authority—I mean Sir Donald Stewart. As the House knows, there are also Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Adye, Sir Charles Gough, and Lord Chelmsford, all of whom have served in India, and all of whom have served in this district, and these distinguished officers entertain opinions differing from those of Lord Roberts. But the late Goverement went further, and availed themselves of the best further military advice that they could command. The advice thus given is not part of the State papers which have been published, and it would not be right, therefore, to quote that advice or to give names. But this I may say, that, so far as our military policy was settled, it was guided and settled, so far as military considerations were involved, by and upon the advice of the most eminent military authorities of the day. I sum up their opinions, so far as the results which they produced upon my mind and the minds of my colleagues, to this effect, that the gigantic natural geographical defences of the north-west frontier render the advance of an invading army practically impossible, and that, having regard to these and other considerations, our position is at the present moment practically impregnable; that Chitral is not a place of considerable importance as a base for military reserves, and that it is not useful as a base for military operations, defensive or offensive; that to lock up troops in Chitral or in the Chitral Valley would be an act of the gravest blundering, and that the construction of a military route to Chitral would in the event of hostilities, be an advantage to an invading force and a disadvantage to a defending force.

The late Government also came to the conclusion that Gilghit was sufficient, as it always has been sufficient, as a point of observation, and that to leave our main line of defence and to establish outposts and form depots of supplies in distant mountain deserts and among these mountain tribes, would sadly weaken the strength of our frontier. (Cheers). There were other considerations of a detailed and technical character brought before them, which, with other reasons, convinced the late Government, who looked at the question solely from a military point of view, that they would not be justified in adopting the proposals of the Indian Government. But the late Government had also to consider the political, administrative, and financial questions affecting the occupation of Chitral, accompanied by the occupation of a military road. The length of the road proposed to be occupied is 180 miles, or the distance from London to Manchester. The Malakand Pass is over 4,000 feet high, and there is another pass 11,000 feet high. The road, if made, will have to be garrisoned in four places, and there must be cantonments, forts, and bridges made, while tunnels will have to be made for the protection of the road from the snows of winter. In fact, the road would be an isthmus between two large tracts of territory extending on the one side to the Afghan frontier, and on the other to the present frontier of Kashmir. The late Government were were advised by experts that the formation of such a road meant the practical subjection of the tribes, and the annexation of the country between Peshawar and Chitral. Only 36 miles of this road will be in Chitral territory, and the rest will have to be constructed through a country inhabited by hostile tribes, who are distinguished by the fierceness of their fanaticism, their love of independence, and their fear of annexation. We have no more right, legally, in the committing of nations in the district than we should have in Switzerland. Lord Roberts has stated that the whole fighting force of these tribesmen is about 200,000 men. Have Government asked themselves whether it would not be better to have these tribes as independent allies, who would form another line of defence, rather than to have them as revengeful foes? (Cheers). When we have conquered them we shall have created a permanent source of discontent and danger, and they will seriously weaken our power to resist the attack of any hostile force. The practical question, which will sooner or later have to be determined by this House, is, whether we are going to extend the frontier of India by at least 200 or 250 miles on the western side, in order to cover a large tract of country from which we can derive no possible advantage, and from which we can obtain no possible revenue, and in which we may be constantly embroiled with independent tribesmen, patriotically defending their native soil? (Cheers.) Sir J. Lyall, the late Governor of the Punjab, who knows something about the country in question, said that he was assured that the initial cost of making such a road, and guarding it during construction, would be no less than half-a-million sterling, and that it would take three years to construct. Sir J. Lyall further stated that the tribes would certainly not assent to the making of such a road, and that, therefore, unless there was a military occupation of a line 180 miles long, it would be impossible to construct the road. According to the present computation, 5,000 or even 10,000 men would have to be interned in almost inaccessible districts, to whom supplies must be carried by pack animals, under enormous difficulties and at great cost. I am aware that the Government of India have said that they are not going to increase the Indian Army, but in that case the present Indian Army must be too large. (Hear, hear.) I do not believe that that Army is too large, and, therefore, I hold that to lock up any part of it in a place from which it cannot be withdrawn if troubles arise would be most unwise. (Hear, hear.) There then remains what I may call the moral question to be determined. The Government of India, by their proclamation, declared that they had no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which our troops might pass. When that proclamation was issued, there were two witnesses that I may quote as to the impression that it conveyed. In the first place, the *Times* correspondent said that it was manifest that the Indian Government did not intend to annex any territories through which our troops might march. But the more important testimony with reference to the meaning of that declaration of the Indian Government was given by the present Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who wrote as follows with regard to it:—"I see that the Indian Government say that as soon as they have attained their object in Chitral the British force will be withdrawn, and that there is no intention of occupying the intervening territory. Of course that may be technically true—no one wants to add to our responsibilities, which are already sufficiently heavy; but if this proclamation means, as it may undoubtedly be interpreted to mean, that, having opened up the essential and inevitable route to Chitral we are going to allow it again to be closed, it will be difficult to find words to describe the melancholy fatuity of such a course. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. Curzon said the sentence in his letter in the *Times* was based on an imperfect telegraphic summary of the Viceroy's Proclamation in that paper. He presumed that was correct, but when they read the proclamation itself they found it contained a distinct limitation, in the first sentence of the proclamation, to the people of Swat and Bajaur. (Ministerial cheers.)

Sir H. Fowler: It is confined to Swat and Bajaur and to any other persons concerned. (Opposition cheers). I am talking about the people of Swat and Bajaur, of their thousands and tens of thousands of tribes. But that is a new interpretation of what is technically true. What did the Government of India mean by it? Let me turn to their Dispatch of April 26th, page 39:—"At the same time a proclamation was issued to the people of Swat and others beyond the Peshawar frontier announcing the intention and object of the Government, assuring them that we did not intend to permanently occupy any territority through which the force might pass, or interfere with the independence of the tribes, and promising friendly treatment to all who did not oppose the march of the troops." That was how the Government of India interpreted their own Proclamation. In the interpretation of human affairs you not only deal with men's words but actions. How did they interpret these actions? "Major Deane at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them. The assistant British Agent at Gilghit, having reported that all the men of Tangir and Darel had been recalled to their homes, which possibly indicated some excitement there, he was authorised to explain to the people the purport of the Proclamation issued to the Swatis and the Bajauris." What did the tribes understand us to mean; what did everybody understand us to mean? You may go through 70 or 80 miles. You are bound by your Proclamation that far, but not in other districts, because they are not included in "all other persons concerned." Practically, the Government of India prevented opposition on the faith of this, and the noble Lord, in his own Despatch of the 16th of last month, recapitulating the whole case, says:—"It is probable that this Proclamation was not without effect, at all events on the tribes in immediate contact with us." The native tribes did not combine against us. What was our danger? It was a holy war of religious fanaticism aroused, and the whole case proves there was no combination against us among the tribes, because they believed in British honour—(cheers)—and that the British Government would fulfil that to which they were pledged. You talk to the Indian Government of "prestige!" That word has been used frequently with reference to the advance on the north-western frontier. It was a word with which we were familiar in the great debate on the evacuation of Kandahar in this House 14 or 15 years ago. We we told our prestige required that we should not abandon the position we had acquired by splendid daring and splendid endurance, and that we could not afford to break our plighted faith. Loss of prestige! Do you think these tribes do not understand and do not appreciate the brilliancy of the attack and the defence? But they will understand if you recede from your word, when, having conquered their country, you were allowed to pass over these terrific passes unopposed on the faith of the Proclamation. Since you have conquered that country, the prestige and honour of the British name will be still greater if you have the courage to keep your word. (Cheers).

Lord George Hamilton: Do I understand the right hon. gentleman to say that Lord Elgin cannot be trusted to keep his word? (Cheers).

Sir H. Fowler: The noble lord will be quite at liberty to reply when I have finished. I have said nothing about Lord Elgin. But I say that if the British or Indian Government annex any portion of the territory through which they passed last March, April, or May, that Government, whether Indian or British, will have broken its faith with the tribes to whom

the Proclamation was issued. My right hon. friend the member for the Forest of Dean says his conscience was satisfied when he knew that the Indian Government unanimously recommended this policy of annexation. I am old enough a member of the House to remember the speech the right hon. baronet made on the evacuation of Kandahar, and the Indian Government unanimously objected. (Sir Charles Dilke: "No, no!") I beg my right hon friend's pardon, but I say they did. (Laughter).

Sir C. DILKE: No, no. It was four to three. I will read the names presently. ("Hear, hear!")

Sir H. FOWLER: The majority of the Indian Government.

Sir C. DILKE: You said unanimously.

Sir H. FOWLER: I say that the majority of the Indian Government of 1879-80 were unanimous against the evacuation of Kandahar. The right hon. baronet spoke in this House in favour of the evacuation of Kandahar, and the Duke of Devonshire (then the Marquis of Hartington) dealt, name by name, with the members of the Indian Government, and denounced the proposition then attempted to be laid down by the Tory Party that we were bound by the action of the Indian Government.

Sir C. DILKE: Sir Donald Stewart and the present Lord Cromer.

Sir H. FOWLER: That can be settled hereafter. At all events, the right hon. baronet did not feel bound in 1881 by the opinion of the Indian Government with reference to the evacuation of Kandahar. But, as he is so keen about the Indian Government, why does he not ask the opinion of the great Indian officials and the Governor of the Punjab, who is no mean authority on the question? We know what the opinion of Sir James Lyall and the preceding Governor of the Punjab was. What is the opinion of the present Governor of the Punjab —a man who, perhaps, is the greatest living authority in that district, who knows the country and is responsible for the peace of the frontier? What has been the advice of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick on the evacuation of Kandahar? I am sorry to weary the House—(Cries of "No.")—with this long defence of the policy of the late Government, but I have said enough, and I will not repeat myself. Under all these circumstances the late Government came to the conclusion that we could not accept the proposition of the Indian Government; and beyond that we had received no reply to our despatch when we went out of office. We came to the conclusion that we could not, on military, political, administrative, or financial grounds, and above all, in the teeth of our own proclamation, advise the taking of any step which would mean the annexation of the Chitral valley. What has been the policy of our successors? The noble Lord immediately on accepting office very properly stated that the present Government would reconsider the question, and on August 1 he asked whether there was no further information as to the possibility of arranging with the tribes for the road between Peshawar and Chitral and the strength of the garrison there. The only information the noble Lord has received is contained in a telegram dated August 4, which says:—"The Commander-in-Chief has been consulted on points in your telegram. First, we have avoided open negotiations with the tribes. The reports received from Low and Deane warrant the confident expectation that a peaceful arrangement for the road can be made." (Cheers.) I am quite willing to wait and see what the peaceful arrangements were, and our judgment should be reserved until we know whether these arrangements have been successful. But they have not been successful to the present time. I have worked out what the force would be, and I make out that there would be about 5,145 soldiers. Taking the present strength of the regiment (and from that the pioneer regiment at Gilghit, which is to be withdrawn, would have to be deducted), the number of soldiers would be between 4,000 and 5,000. The Secretary of State, having received this information, wrote an able dispatch, dated August 16, and in that he reviews the whole situation from the commencement. In reference to the question of cost, he says: "Time evidently was necessary for the investigation and decision of the question of cost." He calls attention to the views expressed by Lord Kimberley and myself as to keeping control over the external affairs of Chitral. Lord Kimberley has been somewhat misunderstood on that point, for keeping control over the external affairs of Chitral does not imply annexation or possession of the State. We have absolute control over the external affairs of Afghanistan at this moment. Then towards the end of his Dispatch the noble Lord sums up the position. He says: "It was apparent from your letter of May 8th, that your Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road might, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes and the interference with their independence, be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications as to render it of doubtful expediency; but in your opinion this question, both in its financial and political aspects, depended on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes, and you indicated that, if amicable relations could be secured and they could be persuaded to become responsible for the safety of the road, the cost need not be prohibitive." The noble Lord quotes their allegation "that peaceful arrangements can be made," and adds: "The information now conveyed materially alters the position. It removes, if your officers have rightly estimated the conditions, the doubt which was felt as to the possibility of opening up the road by peaceful means and maintaining it without an intolerable burden of expenditure being imposed on the Indian revenues." I am bound to say the noble Lord is perfectly consistent in his telegrams and his dispatch. He says that he gave a strict caution as to keeping the conditions of the Proclamation. The noble Lord analyses his four "ifs." He says: If the cost is not prohibitive, if you can effect a peaceful arrangement with the tribes, if it is necessary to maintain a permanent force on the Malakand, and if the terms of the Proclamation are rigidly adhered to, then the noble Lord will sanction the proposal of the Government of India. I submit that until these "ifs" are solved he cannot tell what is to be done, and I go further and say we cannot press him. He has had no answer to that dispatch, and until he is in a position to tell the house what the occupation will cost, what the attitude of the tribes is, whether they will recognise a new arrangement, and whether the arrangement will be in harmony with the Proclamation, no intelligible decision as to their policy can be taken by the Government. A few months at this season of the year will not affect their policy. In a question of this magnitude we can afford to wait. I do not ask the House to pronounce a judgment; I think it would be premature to do so. It has been my duty to explain and defend the policy which the late Government thought it wise to adopt after ascertaining the views of those best qualified to advise them, and that has been the main object of my speech. In conclusion, I say that the policy I have endeavoured to defend is no new policy. One of the greatest Viceroys who ever ruled over India—Lord Lawrence—in the memorable dispatch with which he closed his administration, laid down the lines which should guide the action of the Government of India with respect to the north-west frontier of India. I will quote the last three paragraphs of that dispatch:— "We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia if that Power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own frontier and met her half-way in a difficult country, and possibly in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate, and we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control. Should a foreign Power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly equipped and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying

our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesmen should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression, or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt." The history of the last twenty years has afforded many startling illustrations of the wisdom of that policy and, I may add, of the folly of departing from it. That policy has been stamped with the approval of a large majority of the great soldiers and great civilians who have rendered our Eastern Empire a priceless boon to the people of India, and the noblest dependency of the British Crown. It is on behalf of that policy I venture, at this almost the last hour of the Session, and in this exhausted House, to enter my humble protest against embarking on an enterprise which may be, and which in this case I conscientiously believe to be, a constant menance and danger to the security and prosperity of India. (Cheers.)

MR. MACLEAN'S AMENDMENT.
THE BURDENS OF INDIAN TAXPAYERS.
THE COST OF ANNEXATION AND OCCUPATION.

Mr. J. M. Maclean said, he rose to move the Resolution which stood on the paper in his name:—"That this House views with apprehension the continual increase in the burdens of Indian taxpayers, caused by the annexation or military occupation of large areas of unproductive territory on the land frontier of British India." Instead of concluding with a motion, the right hon. gentleman (Sir H. Fowler) seemed to acquiesce in the present policy of Her Majesty's Government, and throughout he appeared to be really conscious of the fatal weakness of his own case. Obliged by the financial necessities of India to impose obnoxious duties, he flung the money away in the invasion of Chitral, and he was the first to invade the territory of the tribes. Surely nothing could be more immoral than his conduct in sanctioning invasion and then trying to wash his hands of responsibility in the face of the general election. He said the right hon. gentleman, with unusual boldness, had come forward to defend his own policy, and he ought to have concluded with a motion, but instead of doing so, he seemed to acquiesce in the policy of the present Government, and by his action he seemed to show that he was really conscious of the weakness of his own case. They admired the right hon. gentleman as a high-minded statesman, but his career at the India Office was peculiarly unfortunate. The right hon. gentleman was obliged by the financial necessities of India to impose obnoxious duties, and the money so raised he flung away on the invasion of Chitral. The right hon. gentleman was very indignant at the idea that the present Government should invade the territory of the Swati, and said we had no right to be there; but it was he who first invaded that territory; it was with his sanction that enormous forces advanced to invade it. The right hon. gentleman had said a good deal about the opinion of Sir Donald Stewart and others; but did Sir Donald Stewart give his sanction to the invasion, to the opening up by violent means of the road from Peshawar to Chitral? The right hon. gentleman did all the mischief, and now he said it was immoral to invade the territory of the tribes. All along he had told them the policy of the Government of India was to throw this road open. When he made no objection to the crossing of the frontier by an army much larger than that with which Lord Roberts marched from Kabul to Kandahar, he must have been aware that the passage of the army would excite the hostility of the people of the country. While he only made some slight inquiry as to the object of concentrating this large force, he must have known of the vehement criticism to which the action of the Government of India was exposed in India itself. Many persons habitually favourable to the action of the Government of India took strong objection to the mobilisation of this vast force for the relief of the beleagued Governor of Chitral. When the Government of India persevered the right hon. gentleman said, "Go on," and took on himself the responsibility of the invasion of the country and of slaughtering hundreds of patriots in the Malakand Pass. Surely nothing could be more immoral than the conduct of the right hon. gentleman, after he had been a party to all this, in view of the General Election, to try to wash his hands of the responsibility he had incurred and to throw upon the new Government the duty of settling this difficult question. In a telegram of March 18th the Viceroy said: "We are agreed that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road to the Peshawar border, is a matter of the first importance." The right hon. gentleman made a temporising reply to that, and then came the further urgent message from the Viceroy of the 25th of April: "Narrative of events indicates withdrawal under present circumstances impossible, and would leave country to complete anarchy, and would render a settlement more difficult. In our opinion, we must also keep open the road from Peshawar for some time, probably three or four months at least, whatever the ultimate decision may be." The right hon. gentleman replied to that: "Pending the final decision of Her Majesty's Government I do not object to the temporary arrangements which you consider necessary." By that telegram the right hon. gentleman did everything he was bound to do at that time. There was no necessity for the great hurry he showed afterwards to come to a definite decision about what should be done at Chitral. The temporary arrangements which the Viceroy said were necessary would have lasted for some months. The Viceroy had said that he had created a state of anarchy in the country, and it was therefore impossible to evacuate it at that time. Within a few weeks the Government was tottering to its fall, and the right hon. gentleman evidently dreaded going to the country without trying to wash his hands of the blood-guiltiness falling upon those who were responsible for the invasion of Chitral. He (Mr. Maclean) acquiesced in the decision of the Government to retain Chitral, because he thought they were bound to accept the statement of the Government of India that it would be impossible to evacuate the country, and he accepted the decision with the more pleasure, because the noble lord in his dispatch pressed for estimates of the exact cost. He had properly guarded himself from taking any hasty action whatever in regard to the opening or permanent occupation of this road by British troops; and he hoped that the noble lord would get trustworthy estimates from the Government of India. A Government which at the end of March could calmly put down £150,000 as the probable cost of the Chitral expedition could not be trusted to give satisfactory estimates unless closely pressed. He also hoped that this was the last of the annexations on the British frontier which would be sanctioned by this or any other Government. The Royal Engineers in India were a most indefatigable body of men, and directly they had obtained possession of and fortified one pass, they found another by which a few stray Cossacks might find their way to British India. Some of them would never be satisfied until Her Majesty's Government had hermetically sealed every mule-track across the immense region of mountain ranges extending from Quetta to the Pamirs. (Laughter.) Then the adventurous traveller came upon the scene, like his right hon. friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who unfortunately was prevented from making any more voyages at present. (Laughter.) These travellers seemed to think that wherever they had once set foot the British flag ought to wave for ever afterwards. (Laughter.) Unless strong pressure were put on the Government of India there would be someone proposing to occupy the territory along the other side of the river, and the road leading from the Hindu-Kush to Jellalabad, and the hospitable columns of the *Times* would be full of eloquent declamation about the noble mission of Great Britain in bringing every barbarian nation under its rule. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) It might be a noble mission, but it could not be called a self-sacrificing one, when it was done at the expense of the Indian taxpayer. If this country desired more responsibility in these directions, let her take it at her own risk and cost. Her conduct was of a piece with that of the Government in connexion with the Shahzada, who received a generous invitation to become the guest of the British nation at the expense of the mild Hindu. (Laughter.) If any one looked at the map of India now, and compared it with what it was 20 years ago, beyond the Indus on one side and the Ganges on the other, he would find that an immense empire had been added to our dominions. Beyond these rivers we had almost as much territory as between them; and nearly all of it had been acquired within the last twenty years. It stretched over a frontier several thousand miles in extent; if Afghanistan, which had been brought within our sphere of influence, were included, the responsibility on the shoulders of the Indian taxpayer would appear appalling. For it was India who paid the whole cost of all these expeditions; and the worst of these annexations was that they had been wholly

unproductive. Even the kingdom of Burma, which was flourishing when we took it over, costs India a million a year—not a very creditable thing to the present generation of Indian officials. Most of the other annexations not only paid nothing at all, but were very largely subsidised by the Indian Government. India now subsidised all Central Asia from the Indus to the Oxus. The Government either enlisted men of these border tribes in our army and continually increased their pay, or else paid them blackmail to keep the peace. (Hear, hear.) The Government of India was becoming more and more dependent on these border tribes for the security of the Empire, although many of them could not be trusted in an emergency. All the taxes were paid by the industrious traders and merchants of the plains; and nearly the whole of the revenue was spent away from them. Of the fifty millions of revenue, fully one-half went to England, and a very large proportion of the remainder was spent upon troops and expeditions on the frontier, so that the money did not go back to the people who paid the taxes at all. (Hear, hear.) This showed the fallacy of such calculations as were given in the explanatory statement issued this year by the late Secretary of State for India. The right hon. gentleman there spoke of the small burden of taxation in India. It might appear small, but there was this difference between the taxation in England and that in India: the former was all spent within the limits of the country to stimulate trade and industry; but as regards India, it was almost to the extent of three-fourths of the whole spent out of the country in which it was raised. This was because, in England, the Treasury was supreme over all departments, while in India the Treasury was practically helpless. The Government of India was really a military despotism, and the Treasury had only one member on the Council. All the other members might be trusted to act together on questions of Imperial policy. There was no representative of the trade and industry, the culture and intelligence of the country; the members lived for the greater part of the year away in the hills at Simla, and were utterly out of touch with public opinion. They were like the Olympian deities, of whom Tennyson wrote:—

"There they live and lie reclined,
On the hills like gods together, careless of mankind."

The possession of India had been of inestimable advantage to us; but how long should we retain India if we did not maintain sound finance there, and see that the people were lightly taxed? The right honourable gentleman the late secretary of State for India several times in his speech made allusion to the agreement made with Russia for the delimitation of territory in the Pamirs. That was signed in March last; it had certainly been concluded before operations in Chitral were sanctioned by the right hon. gentleman, and that alone should have restrained him from taking the action which he had taken. That agreement with Russia altered the whole political situation in India. This policy of occupying the mountain passes was a Chinese-wall policy; it was not the policy meant by Lord Beaconsfield when he sanctioned the "scientific frontier." Then the intention was to push forward to Kandahar, which would have been on the flank of anyone advancing on the principal road to India. But now the policy was not one of pushing forward at all. We were going to lie in wait behind these passes, until the Russians advanced to our frontier. Every military man of repute knew that if ever a Russian invasion of India were to be attempted—and he thought such an event very improbable now—our troops would be obliged to advance to Kandahar or Kabul to meet them; and if we were defeated there, what would be the use of our fortified passes? The enemy would then pour like a torrent into the plains of India, and we should be driven to make a last stand behind the Indies for our Empire in the East. That was a sufficient condemnation of the policy which was now being pursued. But our apprehension in regard to the policy of Russia was removed now that we were going to have the whole frontier fixed from Herat up to the crest of the Pamirs. That would be a blessing to everyone in Central Asia. All the disputes in the past had been occasioned by the acts of frontier officers naturally desirous of distinguishing themselves, who had gone into territories that had not been marked out as belonging to any Power, and so had brought about conflicts which were very much to be regretted. It was to be hoped that that would never again happen after the new arrangement with Russia in regard to the frontier. Our real defence in future would be that, when once the line was fixed, Russia would know that to cross it meant war. Lord Roberts made one sensible remark in a letter to the *Times*. He said that Russia had made no attempt to violate the frontier since it was fixed from near Herat to the Oxus, because she knew that if she did so it would mean war with England, and this would be true as regards the whole line of frontier, now that it was completed to the Pamirs. Lord Beaconsfield in the same spirit, speaking of the evacuation of Kandahar, ridiculed the idea entertained by some fussy people that the possession of one place or another was essential to the security of our Indian Dominion. He said: "The key of India is not Herat or Kandahar. The key of India is London. The majesty and sovereignty, the public spirit, and vigour of our Parliament; the ingenuity and determination of our people—these are the keys of India." He thought that was a profoundly true sentiment. He considered that we might at least lay aside our misgivings as to a Russian invasion of India. He believed Russia would respect our boundaries, and he hoped that, instead of continuing barren conflicts with her, we should enter into an understanding with her for the good of the whole population of Central Asia. Look at what was within our reach if we were to come to a good understanding with Russia. Why should Afghanistan be kept isolated from the commercial world? We had filled the purse, we had pampered the pride of the Amír by the extravagant honours we had paid to his son; we had guaranteed his dominion, and we had got nothing from him in return. Why should not the Amír open his country to trade and commerce? Why should we not join hands with Russia, and bring Afghanistan into the commercial world? It would be an immense boon to India, a great advantage to England, and a benefit to the whole world, to connect the Russian and Indian Railway systems by the construction of a few hundred miles through Afghanistan, and so to complete an overland line to India and introduce railways into the vast regions of Central Asia, which in almost recent times contained populous flourishing empires where stagnation now existed. The record of the past 30 years had been the opening up of Africa. He hoped the next 30 years would see the renaissance of Asia, and would see those vast regions recalled to civilisation. What he asked was, that in order that England might fill an important part in the future of Asia, she should do the work that now lay at her hand. He begged to move his motion.

Mr. M. M. Bhownaggree, in a maiden speech, seconded the motion. He said he did so unhesitatingly, because the burden on the Indian taxpayer had grown in recent years to an enormous extent. But he should disclaim any connection between the motion and recent events in Chitral. The word "annexation" had been used in connection with Chitral in the course of the debate; and it was well to point out that it was not very applicable. It was only recently that Sir George Robertson put upon the throne of Chitral its own proper Mehtar, which showed that Chitral was not completely annexed, in the same sense as Burma was annexed. But, at the same time, it could not be denied that recent events in Chitral, the glorious achievements of our army, British and Indian, and the prudent resolution of the Government to retain its hold on Chitral, were capable of being read by ambitious military officers in a somewhat different light from that in which they were regarded on the floor of the House of Commons. Many of the difficulties of the Government of India could be traced to this cause. Ambitious officers had before now embroiled themselves in matters which had made it impossible for the Government to escape being brought into conflict with tribes on the frontier. In order, therefore, that the resolution of the Government to retain Chitral, and the approval of the feats of our army in that region, might not mislead such officers and induce them to follow the same course in future, and also for the reason that there might not be aroused in India an apprehension that the policy of the present Government was annexation, and that they were determined to advance the frontier of India to the furthest limits, and thereby make the burden of the taxpayer so intolerable that India would be plunged into bankruptcy, he begged to second the motion.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON'S REPLY.

Lord George Hamilton: The motion which my hon. friends have proposed and seconded is so intimately connected

with questions relating to Chitral, that upon it I am able to reply to the speech which the right hon. gentleman has just made. We all welcome back to the House the hon. Member for Cardiff. He always speaks with authority on Indian questions, and, although I cannot agree with all he has said, everything he says is worth listening to. (Hear, hear.) I congratulate my hon. friend the Member for North-East Bethnal Green upon the speech he has just made. He has behind him a record of long and useful public service, and I feel confident both sides of the House will always listen with attention when he speaks on any question connected with our Indian Empire. I now turn to the speech of my predecessor in office. He spoke with great vigour and at very great length. For an hour he made an elaborate historical analysis of the reasons which led us to Chitral. He then proceeded for another hour to attack in the most violent terms, from financial, military, moral, and political points of view, the decision at which we have recently arrived; and, having occupied so much of the time of the House in this denunciation, he concluded by observing that the House was not in possession of sufficient information to enable it to form a judgment. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) I listened with great regret to the right hon. gentleman's speech. These frontier questions are very difficult, whether you go back or go forward. The right hon. gentleman quoted many authorities, but the one authority he did not quote was the Indian Government. (Cheers.) Not once, from beginning to end of his speech, did he allude to the Indian Government, except for the purpose of denouncing it. Our machinery for governing India is of a very complicated and delicate character; and the Secretary of State incurs a grave responsibility if he imposes a policy on the Indian Government contrary to their wishes, and insists upon their trying to carry that policy out through an instrumentality which they consider obsolete and ineffective. It appears that anybody in the street who gave the right hon. gentleman any information of the most extravagant kind whether it was political, financial, or moral, was at once accepted by him as an authority, and the statements made to him were publicly paraded in the House of Commons as reasons why we should refuse the proposal of the Indian Government. "But if," said the right hon. gentleman, "I am wrong, I shall be very glad." Now there is risk, and there always will be risk, attending our Empire in India, and we must face that risk. (Hear, hear.) What we have to consider is whether the decision at which we arrived is a right one. I accept the right hon. gentleman's account of the position which Chitral occupies in connection with the north-west frontier of India and Kashmir; but there is just one point I should like to bring home to the House of Commons. Chitral is at the extreme end of the territory over which Kashmir claims suzerainty, and up to the present moment access to that State has been over some of the most difficult mountain passes in the world. But the difficulty of communication is not all; there is a great length of communication. If anybody will look at the map, he will find that one has to traverse almost a complete circle when going from British India before he arrives at Chitral, and the distance which has to be covered is something like 600 miles, whereas the route from Peshawar is only 180 miles. The important question at present is whether a new road shall be made direct from Peshawar. In dealing with frontier questions it is impossible to lay down one general principle which, under all conditions, must govern our conduct. The right hon. gentleman quoted the opinion of Lord Lawrence. I speak with the utmost respect of that great man. When these frontier questions began to be discussed, in Lord Northbrook's Viceroyalty, I was Under-Secretary for India, and I well remember there were then two schools contending against each other—one led by Sir Bartle Frere, Commissioner of Sind, and the other by Lord Lawrence. Their views were diametrically opposed. Sir Bartle Frere believed that a forward movement was the right movement; he advised advance, and every single advance made from Sind has been attended with good results. Lord Lawrence, as Commissioner of the Punjab, had to deal with a different and more difficult country, and said, "Stay where you are." He was right as regards his own frontier. But every case of this kind which comes up for decision we must look at on its merits. The great mass of the more modern school, with regard to frontier questions, are upon this side of the House, and those of the old-fashioned view sit opposite. We know that at the India Office and amongst retired officers the old-fashioned view prevails; but in India, and it is there where most responsibility rests, opinion is almost invariably opposed to it. The complaint I make against Her Majesty's late advisers is that from the first they made up their minds to get out of Chitral. They forced the Indian Government to send them their policy before they had sufficient information to support it, and they then pounced upon their lack of information to upset the policy associated with it. The right hon. gentleman complains very much of the editing of this Blue-book, and seems to think I have struck out of it papers or minutes which ought to have been given. He must recollect that this correspondence all comes from the Secret Department of the India Office. I have not had one single extract or line of the despatches struck out except in the public interest. These are most confidential documents, and it is impossible to publish them in their entirety. But in every single case where there has been any excision of any kind the fact is noted. The right hon. gentleman thinks I should produce some minutes of Sir Donald Stewart. Sir Donald Stewart is the ex-Commander-in-Chief, and if I were to publish his minutes I must publish the minutes of the present Commander-in-Chief and Sir Henry Brackenbury. The result would be we should publish to the whole world an elaborate analysis of the strong and weak parts of our military system. If the suggestion of the right hon. gentleman were acted upon, we might just as well at once dissolve the Secret Committee of the India Office. Let us see what happened. The right hon. gentleman spent a great deal of time in trying to show that the assent which he and his predecessor, Lord Kimberley, gave to the policy of the Indian Government in Chitral was of a tentative nature. [Sir H. Fowler: Temporary.] Well, temporary. As stated in a despatch of his, there were three objects in view. The first was to control the external affairs of Chitral in a direction friendly to our interests; the second was to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes; the third was to keep watch over what goes on beyond those passes. These were the objects of the policy of successive Governments, both at home and in India. When Dr. Robertson was caught at Chitral, in pursuance of this accepted policy, the right hon. gentleman very properly ordered a large force to his relief; and I entirely agree with the right hon. gentleman that it is a matter of national congratulation that such heroic tenacity was shown by the troops, and that the siege was raised with such dash and daring. (Cheers.) Chitral was relieved on April 20. What correspondence took place between the Secretary of State and the Indian Government? On March 30 the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy impressing upon him the necessity of doing nothing which in any way could commit him to any future policy. He said:—"As soon as present trouble is over, policy with regard to Chitral and neighbourhood will have to be fully and carefully reconsidered in light of recent events. Meantime, our hands should be kept perfectly free. I hope, therefore, that you will take care that nothing is said or done to commit Government either way, with regard to making new roads, or retention of posts now occupied, or occupation of new posts." Later on he telegraphed again. He asked for further information, and the Viceroy very properly replied:—"We have discussed Chitral policy, with reference to your telegram of March 30. Until we have ascertained what has happened in Chitral since Robertson was shut up we cannot arrive at a final conclusion as to policy." That was a very natural conclusion. The Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy on April 19, pressing him again for further information. That was the day before the seige was raised. The Viceroy replied:—"Our views as to the importance of Chitral are expressed in our telegram of 18th, but without entering into negotiations with tribes I cannot answer as to cost of road from Peshawar, or extent of political difficulties." On the 25th the Secretary of State pressed the Viceroy to send his policy, and the Viceroy replied:—"Narrative of events indicates withdrawal under present circumstances impossible, as it would leave country to complete anarchy, and would render a settlement more difficult. In our opinion we must also keep open the road from Peshawar for some time, probably three or four months at least, whatever the ultimate decision may be." On May 8th the Indian Government, in response to the instructions received from the Secretary of State, wrote at length their views. Chitral had only just been relieved, and I doubt whether they had had any direct personal communication with any officials there, so that they were very much in the dark as

to what the consequences of their policy might be, but they were absolutely unanimous in recommending the retention of Chitral. (Cheers.) Indian Finance has passed through a very severe ordeal, and yet the Indian Finance Minister, who is an exceptionally strong Minister, signed that Dispatch. The Indian Government were compelled to represent their views before they had definite information, but they warned the Secretary of State that it was possible the expenditure might be very great. They say: "What must be faced is a consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral Valley. The length of time occupied and the difficulty incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilghit, and the expense of doing so are so great, that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempts to occupy Chitral rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communication from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive." They go on to say: "We are not convinced, however, that these difficulties will occur." In the same despatch they state that this proposal may involve a heavy increase of expenditure, but that it may be possible to lessen these objections. It is clear to anybody who reads the Dispatch by the light of recent telegrams that this was a preliminary statement of policy extracted from the Indian Government by the orders of the Secretary of State. But Her Majesty's then Government immediately pounced upon this, and, after a very few days' consideration, sent a peremptory order to the Indian Government to reverse this policy, and then they added: "As regards Chitral State they request that, in view of the decisions above stated, you will telegraph what are the arrangements which you would recommend for the future." On June 22nd these alternative arrangements which the Home Government directed the Indian Government to send arrived, and on that day the late Ministry resigned. They never considered the alternative proposals in any shape or form, and I contend it is ridiculous for any Government, or any body of responsible men, to pretend that they have settled a difficult question by vetoing the only workmanlike proposal put forward without ever considering the alternatives. (Cheers.) Under these circumstances, we had to reconsider the position. I agree entirely with the right hon. gentleman that financial considerations are of the utmost importance at the present moment. I go so far as to say that, in my judgment, and I dare say the hon. member for Cardiff will agree with me, no external policy however bold, and no frontier performance however heroic, can compensate for the permanent annual deficiency in the Indian Exchequer. I believe that the constantly increasing taxation is a serious danger to the stability of the Indian Government, and, therefore, I looked with great apprehension on the words that the Indian Government used in which they admitted that their proposals might be prohibitive by reason of the expenditure involved. I consequently endeavoured to see whether it was possible in any way to gain time, in order to hit upon any compromise or do something which would prevent us arriving at an irrevocable decision to retire from Chitral and not make the road. The House will see that whatever decision was arrived at, would be more or less binding for years to come. It was difficult to retire from Chitral, although we had only been connected with it for some three years; and if we had decided to remain there we should have to do so for a long time to come. On the other hand, if we retired and did not make this road we should possibly never get so favourable an opportunity again of constructing this line of communication, and our retirement would probably be final. Looking to the issues raised and the grave consideration attached to them, it was essential we should have time. Her Majesty's late advisers also spoke of the unanimous decision of the Cabinet. The word "unanimous" is a new epithet in connection with Cabinet decisions, and I think it is an unfortunate one, because if you state the occasions on which the Cabinet is unanimous you are bound to state those on which the Cabinet is not unanimous. My impression is that the late Prime Minister on more than one occasion alluded to the unanimity of the late Cabinet, I suppose because it was so remarkable an event in their career that it was necessary to mention it. (Laughter.) Time, therefore, was a very essential consideration. In the Cabinet to which I have the honour to belong there are no fewer than three ex-Secretaries of State for India, and we have the advantage of the presence of Lord Lansdowne, the late Viceroy, who, I should say, is the highest living authority in this country on questions of this kind. He has visited Kashmir, is conversant with every detail of this policy, and he was of great assistance to me in examining it. I wonder if the late Government at all realise what the evacuation of Chitral would have meant? In the first place, it is perfectly clear if we abandoned Chitral we should in all probability be obliged to abandon Gilghit. Gilghit is most expensive, since, as the valley in which it is situated cannot sustain the garrison, the cost of bringing supplies from Kashmir is very heavy. If we abandoned Chitral the cost of maintaining Gilghit would be the same as before, although our main object in maintaining it would have gone. The difficulties did not end there. The right hon. gentleman described the condition of Chitral before we went there as one of dynastic murder and civil war. That would be the condition of Chitral if we left. (Hear, hear.) He laid stress on the fact that we had arrived at an arrangement with the Russian Government by which the frontier had been delimited between ourselves and that Power. I look upon that delimitation from a different point of view to the right hon. gentleman. I believe that, wherever these frontier arrangements are made, they can only be satisfactorily maintained on the distinct understanding that within each area allotted to the respective Powers, each Power will do its utmost to prevent anarchy, disorder and disturbance. If anarchy and disorder commence on one side of the frontier, they are not unlikely to extend to the other side. Nobody can deny that if we had left Chitral we should have lighted a fire there which would be unlimited in the extent of the area over which it might spread. The mere fact of our retiring before the face of the whole world and admitting that we were unable to perform the duties we had practically undertaken would have been an invitation to the neighbouring Power to step in and perform the duties we had abandoned. (Hear, hear.) Take an ordinary case in life. If one of the occupiers of two neighbouring houses chooses to go away and leave a fire smouldering which may burn down the premises of his neighbour, that neighbour has a right to come in and extinguish the fire which is the source of danger. Therefore, if we had abandoned Chitral with a certain knowledge of the disturbances which our retirement would cause, we should have been doing our very best to upset the frontier arrangement which had been arrived at. I agree with the right hon. gentleman on one point only. I do not think Chitral is of so great strategical importance as some eminent military men consider. I admit that the honours on that point must be divided. I think that considerations of a moral rather than a strategical character force us to remain. I agree that, where you have a great area to defend and only a limited number of troops to protect your frontier, it is unwise to lock up your men in out-of-the-way places. Mobility and concentration are the two great ideas which should be aimed at. The right hon. gentleman seems to think that our occupation of Chitral would necessitate an enormous strain upon our military resources. The curious thing is that, whilst the right hon. gentleman complains of the want of information, one of the cardinal and vital pieces of information, the telegram of the Indian Government on this point is the one which he shirks. It is very easy to exaggerate the dangers attending any course. The right hon. gentleman seems to think there will be a large number of troops required at Chitral. But the Indian Government point out that they require no addition to the Indian army, and show that there will be practically no troops in the intervening districts. In the same way the right hon. gentleman seemed to think that the occupation of Chitral would necessitate enormous financial outlay. Somebody told Sir Alfred Lyall it would cost half-a-million to make the road, and the right hon. gentleman flourishes half-a-million before the House. The difference between the actual facts and the excited imagination of the right hon. gentleman is shown by a telegram which has just arrived, stating that the total amount would be 20 lakhs of rupees, or, turned into sterling, £13,000, of which one-fifth would go to permanent works. I cannot help thinking that the late Government were so anxious to get out of Chitral that they did not want to be accurately informed on these points.

Hon. Members: Surely your figure is wrong.

Lord George Hamilton: What did I say?

Sir W. Harcourt: You said £13,000.

Lord George Hamilton: Oh! it should be £130,000. (Oh!) There is an enormous disproportion between this

figure and the half-million estimate of the right hon. gentleman, which was for making the road alone, whereas of the £130,000 one fifth is for a permanent building. The most serious part of the speech of the right hon. gentleman was his indictment of the Indian Government with reference to the Proclamation. I cannot understand how anybody holding the views of the right hon. gentleman can be content with simply making a speech and moving no resolution. (Hear, hear.) If Lord Elgin cannot interpret his own Proclamation, if he is going dishonourably to break the terms of it, he is unfit to be Viceroy of India. (Cheers.) I do not think it fair to come forward and talk about honourable adherence to engagements, and not put your charge in such definite shape that the Viceroy can meet it. (Hear, hear.) Lord Elgin framed that Proclamation and the Indian Government have interpreted it, and from first to last they have contended that it is no obstacle whatever to the course they propose. (Cheers.) Then the right hon. gentleman, not content with exaggerating the cost of the road, says that the whole country through which the road passes must be annexed and subjugated to English rule; and he assumes that this will be done at the point of the bayonet, contrary to the wishes of the tribes. The truth rather is that the tribes are ready to fall in with the arrangements proposed. They are glad to get the money, and my belief is that the fruit of the expedition will be to induce the people to adopt more regular habits. I could not help smiling when I heard the right hon. gentleman denounce the construction of roads. Why, 150 years ago he would have used exactly the same arguments against opening up the Highlands. (Laughter.) The position was exactly the same, and if every successive Parliament had taken the view he now advocates the Highlands would have been to this day an isolated and inaccessible part of the United Kingdom. I believe this road, if the negotiations are properly conducted, will place our relations with the tribes on a better footing than before. Now, I think I have answered the main points of the right hon. gentleman's indictment. I have shown that he has enormously overrated the calls upon our resources which the occupation of Chitral will entail; and I have shown that he has systematically disregarded the advice of the Indian Government in this matter. I should like to add just one word on the right hon. gentleman's references to economy. In my judgment, economy does not consist merely in stopping useless expenditure, but it consists also in getting a good return for expenditure already sanctioned and incurred. The right hon. gentleman was forced to sanction this expedition to Chitral. The valour, determination and endurance of our soldiers accomplished great feats, and have immensely raised our prestige in that country. Why then throw away all the fruits of the expedition? (Hear, hear.) It seems just as much the act of a spendthrift to throw away the legitimate consequences of a very large and necessary expenditure as to incur wholly useless and unnecessary expenditure. (Hear, hear.) But whilst I approve strongly of the proposals of the Indian Government, I have no desire whatever to embark on a frontier policy of enterprise, or of annexing all those territories to which the hon. member for Cardiff alluded. On the contrary, I believe we have now arrived at a settlement of our Indian frontier difficulties. We have, I think, by the arrangements sanctioned, utilised the results of the Chitral expedition, and my one wish now is, looking to the condition of Indian finance, to associate with the satisfactory settlement of those frontier questions a period of quietude and economy. (Cheers.)

SPEECH BY SIR W. HARCOURT.

SIR W. HARCOURT: My right hon. friend the member for Wolverhampton, in his powerful speech, had two objects in his plan. First of all, he had to establish that the policy which the late Government pursued was one which, in the circumstances under which they were placed, and with the information in their possession, was a sound and wise policy. I believe his speech established that proposition beyond dispute. They had to come to a determination, and that determination was come to on the information furnished to them by the Indian Government in their despatch of May 8. I do not understand what the noble lord means by the charge that we rather forced the Indian Government to give an opinion upon this subject. Why, the Indian Government, after the success of the expedition to Chitral, had to consider what was next to be done, and they laid their views before the Government at home in the despatch mentioned. Of course there was a question of finance. Everybody knows that in those short weeks there was an expenditure of something like one-and-a-half millions of money, and that every week meant an expenditure of thousands and tens of thousands; and in the present condition of Indian finance it was of the first importance that the Government at home should determine whether or not they were going to continue that expenditure. Therefore it was the duty of the Government of India immediately to report, and it was the duty of the Government at home, without any unnecessary delay, to come to a determination upon such report. If they determined that the expenditure should not continue upon that scale, it was their duty at the earliest moment to inform the Indian Government of their decision. Therefore I must say I entirely dissent from the tone of the observations of the noble lord, in which he seems to assume that the late Government unduly pressed the Government of India in the matter. Now, my right hon. friend has already laid before the House what was the character of the report of the Government of India. I at once accept the proposition that the question of this road is really the deciding question. Therefore the argument does not depend upon the policy of making this road. The Government of India, on May 8, told us they were perfectly conscious that the course they recommended might involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India could ill afford. They were perfectly conscious of that. The noble lord, on the other hand, enters upon this expenditure with a light heart, and that is because he has a peculiar measure of the value of a lakh of rupees. I do not wonder that he thinks the road a very cheap undertaking. We, on the other hand, being under the impression that a lakh at par is £10,000, were not able to understand how 20 lakhs of rupees amount only to £13,000. There are many county councils in England which would be extremely glad to make a road of 180 miles for £13,000. I know that in the county in which I reside roads cost more per mile than the roads over those great passes, according to the estimate of the Secretary of State, who is so careful about financial waste. Such, then, was the plan which was laid before the late Government by the Government of India. Taking that into account, and all the political considerations to which my right hon. friend has referred, the late Government thought they were not justified in countenancing or authorising the plan proposed by the Government of India. It is a remarkable fact that when this question first arose under the present Government the Leader of the House stated that new information had come to the present Government which had altered the whole position from that in which the late Government found themselves. Well, that is an indication that he thought the decision which the late Government arrived at on the information in their possession had not been altogether a wrong one, and he laid as the foundation of his case for altering that policy the subsequent information received. Now, what I desire to do is to examine what that subsequent information was, and how it has really altered the situation. The question is, as I said before, was this road, and is this road, a thing which ought to be made with a view to the occupation of Chitral? It is said that it is a very serious thing to come into conflict with the Government of India upon a subject of that kind. Yes; but English Governments have come into conflict with Indian Governments before now—(hear, hear)—as, for example, on the question of Kandahar. No one who heard it at the time will have forgotten the great speech made by Lord Hartington, defending the evacuation of Kandahar against the opinion of the Government of India; and is there any man connected with the Government of India now who regrets that decision? (Hear, hear.) Would it have been a wise thing in reference to our subsequent Afghan policy to have maintained the occupation of Kandahar? The opinion of every man connected with the Government in England and in India is that the evacuation of Kandahar was a wise and judicious policy. But let us consider the circumstances which Her Majesty's present advisers consider have altered the situation. They telegraphed to the Government of India to give them information as to what they thought could be done in reference to this road, which they regard as the critical part of the question, and they received an answer, I think on August 3, in a despatch to which the noble lord refers, and of which he complains that my right hon. friend did not read it at length. It is not necessary to read it at length, because the whole of this information,

which the noble Lord says changed the policy of the Government, is entirely hypothesis and surmise. The Government of India wished to enter into negotiations with the tribes in reference to the road, and my right hon. friend did not object to that, and gave the Government of India leave to enter into negotiations. But there have been no negotiations; all that is said is that the tribes have been "sounded." I think that is the expression, or, at all events, that is all that has taken place, and it is surmised that the tribes may be friendly in regard to this road. Now, two or three years ago such an opinion would have been expressed in regard to Umra Khan; but what happened? There were wars of succession such as made up so much of the history of Eastern States, and tribes which are friendly to-day become our enemies to-morrow. The extraordinary fickleness of these people is admitted by Dr. Robertson. Therefore, the mere surmise that probably the tribes, or a set of tribes, may be friendly is most unsafe ground to go upon. It is a very curious thing, now that it is assumed that these tribes are friendly, that I read yesterday in the *Times* a telegram as to the attitude of these tribes at this time. It is dated Laram, and is headed, "The Retention of Chitral." It speaks of the withdrawal of a part of the force from Chitral. It says the garrison of Chitral, consisting of the 3rd Goorkhas, the 25th Punjab Infantry, and so forth, and that the 3rd Brigade under General Gatacre is beginning to withdraw; and then it proceeds: "It is apparent that a withdrawal of 10,000 men in the face of tribes who, though at present peaceful, would spring to arms on the smallest pretext, is a problem of no little difficulty, and one which requires great skill, patience and adroit manœuvre." Therefore, at the present time, when the tribes are under the influence of our victories, and while there is a great body of our troops there, the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from the midst of these tribes is beset with danger. They are peaceful to-day, but they may be our enemies to-morrow. Through this country you propose to make a road of 180 miles, and by this means you rely on a peaceful occupation. Then the telegram proceeds: "The evacuation of the Jandol Valley was most skilfully accomplished without a shot being fired, and the successful carrying out of that difficult operation gives reasonable hope that the withdrawal from the line of the Panjkora river will be equally successful." This shows that no reliance can possibly be placed on the permanent peaceableness of these tribes. My right hon. friend has said, and it seems to me to stand to reason, that, if you are to rely on these peaceable tribes for your road, if the tribes cease to be peaceable you will have to subdue them by force and so occupy your road. Now, the noble lord in his despatch uses these words: "It was apparent from your letter of May 8, that your Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road might, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes and the interference with their independence, be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications as to render it of doubtful expediency; but in your opinion this question, both in its financial and political aspects, depended on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes, and you indicated that if amicable arrangements could be secured and they could be persuaded to become responsible for the safety of the road, the cost need not be prohibitive." What, then, is the condition of the occupation of Chitral? That the tribes become guarantee for the security of the road. But how can you rely on these tribes? The noble lord continues:—"But your information is still incomplete as to the exact cost of the scheme, and I felt some doubts as to the absolute necessity of permanently maintaining regular troops on the Malakand Pass, and as to whether the tribes would see in this an infringement of the Proclamation." The Government of India sent proposals that, in addition to the tribes, there should be quartered on the road three regiments and a battery, and, of course, the tribes would see an infringement of the Proclamation in the quartering of these troops in their midst. The noble lord, then, was perfectly right in telling the Government of India he had doubts on the point. But how is this road going to be kept? By native levies? If the road is attacked you must defend it, and this road of 180 miles is in charge of native levies and of tribes not to be depended upon from month to month, or, indeed, from day to day. If the tribes do not choose to defend the road, and regard it as a menace to their independence, what becomes of your Proclamation? This is where the moral consideration to which my right hon. friend referred comes in with enormous force; it deprives you of the power of really defending the road on which the occupation of Chitral must depend, because you cannot use force to defend the road, having given an undertaking. So, then, you go to the expense of making a road, and have no security for the safety of it when made. Chitral, then, will be held under a sort of tenancy at will, a tenancy dependent on the will of the tribes along the road. I cannot conceive a more insecure tenancy. Where in any other part of the frontier do you hold a road on such terms? But this is what you declare in your Proclamation, and that, I suppose, is what the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs meant in his allusion, for he must have seen that the use of the road depends on the goodwill of wild and fickle tribes, and there is no security of occupation. Then the noble lord says:—"The Governmant of India say it will cost nothing, that it will lead to no increase of the Indian army." Has the Government of India never been mistaken on that subject before? Did they not give assurances that the expedition to Afghanistan was to cost one-and-a-half millions? It cost, I believe, 22 millions. I have never known a single case in which the estimates made by the Indian Government have not been proved to be greatly and disastrously below the mark. I was glad to hear the noble Lord express his strong sense of the impolicy of loading India with additional expenditure. I was very glad to hear him say that the discontent which might be produced in India by additional taxation would be a far greater danger to India herself than any she has to fear from attacks upon her frontier by foreign nations. The great thing you have to fear is that you shall create discontent among the people of India. As long as you have the people of India your friends, satisfied with the justice and policy of your rule, your empire there will be safe. You may rely on your army, which has shown upon a recent occasion its vigour, its valour, its indomitable pluck—(cheers)—but if you have that army on the frontier of a people which you are oppressing by taxation which they are unable to bear, you will have behind you and upon your communications a far greater peril than any which you apprehend, and for which you are making advances of this character. I read in this dispatch that the noble Lord is not satisfied with the information he has yet received. He charges us with making up our minds upon information that was incomplete. Well, he cannot have made up his mind, for in the very last paragraph he says the information is still incomplete. How, then, can he have made up his mind as to the course we are pursuing in the circumstances? It is quite plain that he has not accepted the plan laid before him by the Government of India. I do hope that before the country is finally committed to a course which I believe will be highly injurious to the finances of India, and, so far from giving strength to your frontier defence, will only weaken it, the Government at home will require much fuller information as to the cost of this expedition, and as to the situation in which we stand with reference to these tribes. It is upon our situation in reference to these tribes that the matter must be judged, and I do hope that, before the country is committed to a policy of this gravity, we may have much more satisfactory information than any which the Government is thinking of acting upon, and upon which, as it appears to me from the dispatch of the noble lord himself, he has not finally made up his mind.

Sir C. DILKE said he should not have risen to address the House, had it not been for the direct allusion to himself in the speech of the right hon. gentleman who brought the subject before the House. He might express his regret that there should not have been a motion made. The right hon. gentleman had put a motion on the paper, and so excluded other motions, and then did not move it. He thought that was to be regretted, so far as the course of public debate was concerned. The hon. member for Cardiff and his seconder seemed to him to have placed their motion on the paper for the purpose of preventing some other subject coming on. Indeed, the seconder actually spoke against the terms of the motion itself so far as he understood them. The hon. member for Bethnal Green said that he was in favour of the annexation of Chitral, and on the merits of this case he held diametrically opposite views to the proposer of the motion. He should not have alluded to these two hon. members or their speeches but for the fact that the hon. member for Cardiff had introduced into the debate statements which showed so imperfect an acquaintance with the whole subject that he was afraid he had misled the House of Commons. The hon. gentleman repeatedly

alluded to the fortification of the passes leading into India as the particular policy he condemned. There was not a single one of these passes fortified with the exception of the Khyber Pass, which was only slightly fortified against infantry. He thought his right hon. friend had enormously exaggerated the difficulty and danger of making roads between the political and administrative frontier of India. It was quite possible that the road now in question might be a difficult road to make and hold; but it was equally possible that that might not be the case. Roads had been made outside the political frontier of India over hundreds of miles of territory, and the making of them had been absolutely justified by what had followed. He did not wish to express any confident opinion upon the policy of holding this country; all that he wished to argue was that with regard to the road as it stood, it was quite possible, without any actual war or any great military cantonment, to keep it open, for the natives might be willing to do so for their own sake. The position of the Government was that the road was to be held by tribal levies without anything being done to infringe the Proclamation. His right hon. friend had referred to the frontier of India, and he condemned in strong language indeed going beyond the frontier; and he used the term annexation, which was also employed by the Member for Cardiff. His right hon. friend, in giving the history of Chitral, showed that long ago it came under British influence. When in 1881 it was proposed to withdraw the Agency, doubt was expressed as to whether it was safe, but it was laid down that the withdrawal made no change in the policy with regard to Chitral. They had admitted that Chitral became a feudatory State, and they had given money help. Mr. Gladstone's first Government in 1880 endorsed that view. In 1892 the Member for Wolverhampton and the Leader of the Opposition agreed to increase our Chitral subsidy; all through, down to the recent action of the late Government, successive Governments invariably followed the opinion of the Government of India. They never attempted to over-rule it. Then there came a very sudden change, and it was upon that that he justified the interruption which he had made. The late Government acted very rapidly upon the despatch of the 9th of May. They must have received it during the Whitsuntide holidays, and then, after a few days, on the 13th June, they reversed the unanimous opinion of the Government of India—the first time that that opinion had been departed from in Chitral questions. The right hon. gentleman had taken the opinion of great military authorities, no doubt, for there was on the other side the opinion of Sir Donald Stewart. He asked the attention of the House to the very sharp point of controversy between himself and the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton. What was the principle at issue when they reversed or accepted the opinion of the Government of India? The Duke of Argyll, in his famous despatch—twice laid on the Table of the House—had always been taken as a masterpiece on that subject. It expressed the constitutional view on this question. The despatch laid it down:—"Such powers of control as are claimed for the Secretary of State must be used with great deliberation, and on the rarest occasions." The Duke was then in Mr. Gladstone's Administration. These words were taken note of by the Government of India, and accepted. What he wanted to know was whether this principle was applied in the Chitral case. He had not forgotten the Kandahar case, but in that case the Government of India were not unanimous. There were two questions there. There was the question whether we should hold Kandahar and the Pishin Valley, or whether we should hold the Pishin Valley without Kandahar. They had three Members of the Council in India with them on that question, the Viceroy, the Military Member of the Council, and the Finance Member of the Council, such weighty names that they finally very largely overcame the opposition towards them. The Finance Member at that time was Major Baring.

Sir H. FOWLER said the Finance Member of Council was Sir John Strachey.

Sir C. DILKE said, at the time he spoke of, Major Baring, now Lord Cromer, was the Finance Member. Those were very weighty names, and they had against them other less weighty names. But what did they do? They argued with them for months and months, and finally yielded to them on the Pishin portion of the case, and by doing that they carried a not very unwilling dissent from those members of the Council who had been opposed to them with regard to Kandahar. For two years they agreed to stay temporarily in Pishin, and then ended by staying there altogether. That was what he called "great deliberation," a deliberation which had been entirely lacking on the present occasion. He was one of those who believed that it was not by over-ruling the Government of India from time to time upon some question of frontier policy, but by considering larger changes of policy, that they should be able to bring the finances of India into order. The hon. member for Cardiff thought that annexations were the main cause of the difficulties of Indian finance; there were others who ascribed them to the complications with silver which had arisen in modern times. The hon. member for Bethnal Green appeared to share the views of the Government with regard to this particular annexation, as he called it. He, himself, should not call it by that name, but, at all events, there was, common to the mover and seconder of this resolution, and common also to a larger number of members of that House, a very uneasy feeling in regard to the condition of Indian affairs. He believed there was much to be done in the way of civil economy and civil reform in India, but apart from that question, he contended they would never deal adequately with this question of military expenditure of India until they radically revised the whole of their military system. They had an expensive system of white army, and they would have to alter it into a cheaper system of white army before they could make both ends meet.

Sir W. WEDDERBURN regretted that the Papers relating to Chitral had not been published earlier. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton complained that the Blue-book did not contain all the necessary Papers, but the late Government had had it in their power to publish all the Papers and Documents at an earlier stage, and that he thought would have been a right and proper course to take. If the case had been put before the public, the late Government would have received a great deal of support in the decision at which they ultimately arrived. As regarded that decision, he entirely concurred in the views that the late Government took. He thanked the right hon. gentleman for the way in which he had sought to raise this question from one of mere temporary expediency, or financial consideration, to a higher level. He should be prepared to vote with his hon. friend the Member for Cardiff upon the Amendment, because it covered the ground occupied by the Chitral question, as well as many other similar questions. The hon. member for Bethnal Green had seconded the Amendment of the hon. Member for Cardiff, but he regretted that the hon. member's reasons were, as he stated them, opposed to the whole educated opinion of India. He was sorry that Mr. Naoroji had not been returned to the House, as he could speak more authoritatively on behalf of the Indian people. In that discussion the opinion of the people of India was a very important element. He trusted the public opinion of this country would insist that the question should be looked at from a broader and higher point of view, and that they would consider whether this aggression upon our weaker neighbours in India—this forward policy, as it was called—was right and just. We had no quarrel with these people, and we had no right to deprive them of their land and liberty. He thought that a black man was as much entitled to his life, liberty, and property as a white man. To the ordinary man, the terms of our Proclamation to the frontier tribes conveyed the idea that we only intended to enter that country for the purpose of relieving Dr. Robertson, and that we would not interfere with the independence and liberty of any of the tribes there. He did not care who were the people who upheld the present action. It was a clear breach of faith, for which, primarily, Ministers were responsible, and they must take the responsibility, and could not put it off on Lord Elgin or anyone else. Then, as regarded the grounds upon which the present forward movement had been justified, the Leader of the House placed it on two main grounds. One was the question of prestige; the right hon. gentleman said that if we abandoned any territories that we had once occupied we should strike a blow at our prestige. He thought that his right hon. friend the Member for East Wolverhampton (Sir Henry Fowler) very rightly objected to that word as being a governing rule for our action. What did the word "prestige" mean? Dr. Johnson had said that it was the Latin for "a lie." In a dictionary which he had consulted, he found the first meaning to be "illusion," that meant self-deception; and the last meaning given was "imposture," that meant the deceiving of others. He left the Government to choose which of the two meanings they would adopt. The second reason given by the Leader of the House was that,

from a financial point of view, it would cost us little or nothing, and he said that he had had assurance from the Government of India that the expenditure would not be very large. This information which was now represented as justifying the change of policy turned out to be simply a statement of the political officers, to the effect that the tribes would agree to let this road pass through their territories. He did not think that anyone who had studied these matters would be impressed with the correctness of the information obtained by the political officers on the frontier. Really, by far the best way of getting reliable information was the old method of placing a native agent in these border places. He was a Muhammadan, generally of priestly position. He could mingle with the people, and could give exact information upon all border questions, without raising the same suspicion or prejudice that a European officer raised; and he was able to live there without creating disturbances or rivalries among the different claimants for the throne, or those who advocated different policies. The native agents did not get us into the difficulties that Dr. Robertson brought about in the case of Chitral. Anybody reading the Blue-book would see what a humiliating position we were placed in through the interference of the British officer who carried with him all the authority of the British Government. As regarded the cost, the estimates were quite untrustworthy, and this had been the case in the Afghan War of 1877 and the Abyssinian War. It was remarkable that the occupation of Chitral should be advocated on the ground that it continued the policy of Lord Lytton in 1878, which had brought us so much disaster, loss, and disgrace. Lord Lawrence's policy, on the other hand, was based on experience and common sense. He said that Nature had given us a strong rampart of rock, and mountains, and torrents, and that we should maintain those natural boundaries. Nature had also provided volunteers to man those ramparts in the native tribes, who hated foreign interference of any kind. It was just the same as if a farmer had a thick, thorny hedge round his orchard. He would be very foolish if he were to remove those thorns and briars, and still more foolish if he were to spend his substance in cutting a hole through that hedge and let the thieves through to steal his fruit. If we made this road fit for artillery, though he was not an alarmist, he must say that we were just paving the way for a Russian invasion. That was mere common sense, and that was the view which Lord Roberts held in 1880, when he was responsible for the defence of India. The noble Lord then held that, the longer and more difficult the road along which an enemy must approach through the mountain passes was, the better it would be for the defence, and that, so far from shortening such a road by a single mile or rendering it easier, he would prefer to lengthen the road and to increase the difficulties of it. That was the opinion of Lord Roberts at that time, and the noble Lord had not written or said anything since that detracted in any way from the force of that statement. The noble Lord had certainly written a letter to the *Times*, in which he said that the defence of such a road would depend very much upon the friendly feeling of the tribes to our Government. Was it not a curious way of gaining their friendship to rob them of the independence which they valued so highly? Dr. Leitner, a gentleman who was well acquainted with the state of feeling that existed among the mountain tribes on our Indian frontier had well said that they always regarded the first invaders as their enemies, and the second invaders as their deliverers. The proper course for us to take in the matter was to leave the native tribes alone, and to persuade them that we did not want their country because we did not think it worth taking, and then they would regard us as their best friends, and if any pressure were put upon them by either Russia or the Amír, they would at once throw themselves into our arms. That was the policy that had been pursued by Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, Lord Northbrook and Lord Ripon, and it was only set aside by Lord Lytton. They ought to return to the well-tried system, which had been found both effective and economical. By pursuing an opposite policy we should suffer loss of reputation for good faith, we should meet with great financial difficulties, and we should cause great dissatisfaction among the people of India. As regarded the financial question involved in the imposition of the Indian cotton import duties, he hoped that the hon. Members from Lancashire would carefully examine into the matter, because, if a policy of annexation were to be pursued, those duties might, in all probability, have to be raised from five to ten per cent. Such a policy was unjust, because under it the tribes would be deprived of their lands and liberties. Moreover, to follow such a policy would be an act of bad faith, because all those people were deliberately informed that we only intended to remain in their country until our immediate purpose was fulfilled. Such a policy would be ruinous both politically and financially, while the people of India would see money spent in a needless way, and would see no hope of ever getting the taxation which pressed so heavily upon the poor of the country lightened, or applied to those purposes of improvement and advancement which we were so anxious to see carried into effect. He, therefore, fully approved of the policy of the late Government in reference to this question. He believed that the policy which was good then was good now, and that so far from any change in the circumstances of India having occurred which would make the policy less successful, everything tended to show that it would be more effective than ever. The fact that the boundaries of India had been delimited on the frontiers of Russia and of the Amír's country ought to induce us to return to the good, old, and humane policy which had given India a full treasury, and friendly neighbours on the frontiers, and a contented people at home.

Sir ANDREW SCOBLE said, that having been a member of the Government of India at the time when the Gilghit Agency was re-established in 1889, he hoped that the House would permit him to make some observations. The right hon. gentlemen the late Secretary for India had said that in going to Chitral we were going beyond the boundaries of India; but the right hon. gentleman appeared to forget that there was not only a British India, but the India of which Her Majesty was Empress and over which she exercised political control, and that Chitral was certainly within the latter sphere. That was clearly shown by the definition of India in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The Government of India had merely discharged an imperative duty in relieving the British officers who were being besieged in Chitral, and that duty having been discharged, the only question now before the House was as to what was to be done with Chitral. It might be perfectly true that the result of our agreement with Russia as to the delimitation of the Pamir frontier would render it improbable that Russia will give us any trouble in that quarter of the globe, but we must not overlook the fact that no longer ago than 1878 Russia had set troops in motion by the Pamir route with the avowed intention of stirring up the tribes of the Hindu Kush so as to cause trouble on the Peshawar border. The march of these troops was only stopped by the treaty of Berlin. What had happened before might happen again. It therefore appeared to him that the Indian Government were perfectly right in taking steps to secure our frontier in that direction. He submitted that we had good reasons for retaining our hold on Chitral. It had been assumed that the Indian Government intended to annex Chitral; but so far as he could gather it had never entered into the minds of anyone connected with the Government of India to annex that country. It seemed to be thought there could not be a military occupation, temporary or permanent in any part of India unless there was annexation. There were military occupations in various parts of the country, but the native chiefs did not consider themselves annexed because there was a British force cantoned in their territory. It was said we were going to force on the tribes a mountain road to Chitral. The correspondence contained no evidence of any such intention; on the contrary, it appeared that there was every probability of a peaceful arrangement for the road being made. Experience showed that the tribes might be trusted as guarantors for the security of such roads. In Beluchistan there was not only a road, but a railroad, under the protection of the tribes through which it passed. On the facts he failed to see what objection there could be to the course the Government proposed to pursue. It was unfortunate that the question of Chitral should have been mixed up with the wider question raised by the hon. member for Cardiff. In the last Parliament they had sad experiences of the result of academic Resolutions passed by the House, such as those on the system of examinations for the Indian Civil Service and the opium traffic. The latter resulted in the appointment of a Commission which entirely destroyed the case of the anti-opiumists. He hoped the House would not accept the Reso-

lution of the hon. member for Cardiff. So far as its principle went there was no great objection to it, but he feared it would cause embarrassment in time to come. (Cheers.)

Sir H. Fowler: I will not attempt to make another speech, but there are one or two personal explanations due to myself and the Government of India which I wish to make to prevent misconception. The right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean complained of the want of deliberation that the late Government appeared to have shown in coming to a decision on the question. He seemed to be under the impression that the dispatch sent on May 8, and received towards the end of the month, was answered off hand on June 13 by telegram. No one knows better than the right hon. baronet that a large number of communications are being constantly received in London from India. On April 18 I was perfectly aware what the policy of the Government of India was. On May 9—the day after the dispatch—I received a private telegram telling me what the effect of the dispatch was. On May 27 the Government of India pressed me to indicate what the Cabinet intended to do, and on June 5 for the decision of the Cabinet; and whether our decision is right or wrong, no Government ever made a more careful examination of the papers before giving a decision than the late Government, whose decision I sent by telegram. If we had not left office I should have sent a dispatch in a few days fully explaining the question. Another misconception I am perhaps to blame for. The noble Lord opposite thinks I have cast a reflection on the Government of India with reference to the proclamation. I can assure him and the House that it was not my intention to do so. What I did was what the noble Lord said in his telegram of August 9:—"Do nothing to infringe the terms of the proclamation," and at the conclusion of the last dispatch he cautioned the Government to strictly keep to the conditions of the proclamation. I am satisfied that Lord Elgin and his colleagues had no intention to violate the terms of the proclamation. The Indian Government believe—I do not agree with them, but I will not trouble the House with the reasons why—that peaceful arrangements can be made for the construction of this road. If they are made, of course there will be no violation of the terms of the proclamation. The argument I submitted was that it was impossible to make the road by means of peaceful arrangements, and to make it without them would be annexation; but that was a question of argument, and it was not one of imputation upon Lord Elgin, for whom I have profound respect, and I hope that he and his Government will believe I had no intention to cast the slightest reflection on their good faith. I will not pursue the little personal conflict I had with my right hon. friend the Member for the Forest of Dean. He and I were speaking of two different times. I spoke of one part of the transaction and he of another. There is no doubt that in the debate to which I referred, Mr. Gibson, now Lord Ashbourne, twitted my right hon. friend with not having told the House what the opinion of the Government was, and asserted that, with the solitary exception of Major Baring, the Indian Government opposed the evacuation of Kandahar, and Lord Hartington stated at that time that Sir Donald Stewart also opposed that policy. That is a trivial matter; but whether our position is right or wrong, I should like, in justice to my colleagues and myself, to repudiate the suggestion that it was arrived at without full consideration or in a hurried manner. The consideration of the question was going on for several weeks, and we did not arrive at our decision without the most anxious care.

The House then divided on Mr. Maclean's amendment. The numbers were—

For the amendment	28
Against	127
Majority against	109

THE INDIAN IMPORT DUTIES.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON AND LANCASHIRE.

Mr. Philip Stanhope said he was sorry to have to raise, at such a late period of the Session, and in such a small House, the question of the Import Duties on Indian cotton, which was a question of the greatest importance to a large number of people in this country. If there was anything more patent than another in the late appeal to the Constituencies, it was the stern resolve of the people of Lancashire that this matter should not be allowed to sleep, but that it should be pressed again and again on the attention of Parliament if necessary. It would be remembered that, much to the surprise of the House of Commons, and certainly very much to the surprise of the Members for Lancashire, in the beginning of last year, it was announced that the right hon. gentleman the member for Wolverhampton, then Secretary for India, had yielded—he would not say to his better judgment—but to the representations made by the Indian Government, and decided, without carrying with him the sympathies of his colleagues in the Cabinet, to impose Import Duties on cotton sent to India. Unfortunately, owing to the rules of the House, the representatives of those whose interests were affected had little or no opportunity of discussing the question until it was almost, to use the words of the right hon. gentleman, "a closed question;" and the present Lord James, then the representative of an important Lancashire Constituency, had, on the 21st February, to move the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to it. An important and interesting debate followed. He ventured to say that the arguments against the imposition of the duties were not exhausted in that debate, and that the eloquence and the admirable flights of patriotism in which the right hon. gentleman the member for Wolverhampton indulged, did not deal with the commercial aspects of the question. The Motion against the duties was rejected, much to the disappointment of those who hoped the House of Commons would take a reasonable view of the matter. On May 27th following the Debate a deputation from those interested in the cotton trade waited on the right hon. gentleman the member for Wolverhampton, and laid before the right hon. gentleman, as he himself would admit, the objections to the Duties with great force and detail. Before the right hon. gentleman could give his reply to the representatives of the deputation a general election took place, a new Government came into office, and, much to his satisfaction and to the satisfaction of every member for Lancashire, the noble lord the member for Ealing was appointed Secretary for India, because, on this question, the views of the noble lord had been consistent and straightforward since 1876. The right hon. gentleman has declared that the Import Duties on cotton goods was unjust to the consumers of India as well as to the producers of India; and that there was little or no hope of the countervailing Excise Duties fulfilling the purpose for which they were intended. Other members of the present Government also spoke in the debate of February 21st. The right hon. gentleman the member for Preston, whom he was glad to see in his present position as Secretary to the Treasury, then used the argument that while self-governing colonies, if they liked, might adopt the mistaken policy of imposing import duties, in the case of India, for whose finances this country was responsible, for the Indian Government to adopt a protective policy was inimical to the best interests of the people of India. He (Mr. Stanhope) maintained that we ought to adopt and maintain in India the policy we have adopted and maintained at home—namely, that while there might be import duties for revenue purposes upon spirits, tobacco, wines and other such articles, an article of vital necessity to the people of India, like cotton—which was used in enormous quantities by the people of India, and was practically their only attire—should be left absolutely free. Unfortunately that view did not prevail with the right hon. gentleman the member for Wolverhampton. The right hon. gentleman accepted the view of the Government of India that the import duties should be imposed on the understanding that there was an absolutely countervailing excise duty. He maintained that that excise duty was not absolutely countervailing. In the first place, it gave to the native manufacturers of India an absolute monopoly over all the lower qualities of cotton cloth. All kinds under 20 counts being absolutely free, the native manufacturers had an absolute monopoly in that production, and they were able to embark their capital with the knowledge that that monopoly could not be attacked under the present arrangements. But it was said by the Government of India that all counts under 20 were practically already a monopoly of the Indian manufacturers, and that Lancashire was unable to compete with them. That was a mistake. In an able pamphlet drawn up by Mr. Whittaker on behalf of the Joint Employers' and Workers' Committee, it was pointed

out with great force that the low prices, and possibly lower prices of American cotton, made it possible for Lancashire to compete even in these lower counts, and that Lancashire, with the energy she generally shows in such matters, would probably embark on such competition, were it not that the present countervailing cotton duty practically created a monopoly for the Indian manufacturer. The next point was that there should be on the one hand a 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty on imported cloth, and, on the other hand, there should only be a 5 per cent. duty on the yarn in India. It had been pointed out that the yarn was the only cost in the cloth. No doubt it formed by far the greater portion of the cost. Let them assume that the yarn was 70 per cent. of the actual cost of the cloth. That meant that the manufacturer in India practically only paid 70 per cent. of the duty paid by his competitor in Lancashire. It was argued that they had to pay more for machinery and coal, and that consequently they ought to enjoy the advantage. But, on the other hand, the manufacturers in India had an enormous market for free labour, and they had not got Factory Bills, which, though he entirely approved of them, impeded the free working of the manufacturer. On these grounds the countervailing duty was not, and would not be, effective for the purpose which it was intended to serve. It was true that the Secretary of State had received representations sent by the Joint Committee, and that he proposed to await the answer of the Indian Government before giving a decisive reply; but from one quarter at all events he had already had his reply. In the *Times* a few days ago there was a significant telegram, which was a quotation from the *Pioneer*—one of the leading Anglo-Indian papers. These are the words:—"We are not concerned to claim undiluted unselfishness for Calcutta and Bombay, but we know a good deal more about the depth and strength of the agitation over the cotton duties than Lord George Hamilton, and if he imagines that it was the work merely of local coteries of interested merchants, he is totally and lamentably mistaken. Lord George, moreover, has apparently yet to learn the rudimentary lesson that, where questions of Indian finance are concerned, even the shrieking units of society in the Europeanised communities of Bombay and Calcutta have a far better claim to be heard than the shrieking units of Manchester and Oldham. It is a mere waste of power to ask the Government of India to draw up a fresh minute on this subject. Their views have been given in the fullest and clearest manner possible, and it would be wiser for Lord Salisbury's Ministry to make up their minds at once that the cotton duties must remain." If that was the view of Anglo-India, he was at one with that newspaper in saying that any representation we might make, by deputation or otherwise, might be ineffectual for achieving the object in view. It seemed to him that this question had yet to be fought out again and again, perhaps, in the House of Commons. It would have to be constantly debated and pressed on the attention of the House on every convenient occasion. Lancashire had been called selfish and greedy in respect of this agitation. Lancashire was nothing of the sort. Lancashire had a right to have its voice on trade questions that affected its interests so deeply. Lancashire raised this question in the interest of commercial freedom. It regarded import duties as restraints of trade, and it regarded these duties in particular as crippling a great industry. He hoped that in time members of the Government might be inclined to take a more favourable view of the matter. He was aware that in this Government, as in all Governments, there were some skeletons in the cupboard. There was, for instance, the right hon. gentleman the member for St. George's, Hanover Square, who, in the debate of the 21st February, did not share the view of the noble lord, and who made a speech of the character which he did with such adroitness and skill—a speech of a character that might be called sitting on the fence in this matter. However, he hoped the Secretary of State and the Government would understand that in raising this question the opponents of the duty were only keeping the question alive, that they meant to keep the question alive, and they meant on every convenient occasion to push the matter to a division, and to show that in this question of trade, which had so much to do with the success of the Unionist Party at the General Election—that in the question of trade, at all events, there was some interest to be shown by the Unionist Party, that they would be expected to redeem their pledges upon it. He had occasion, in the course of the election, to traverse Lancashire from end to end, and he averred that there was no place in Lancashire, county or borough, the walls of which were not plastered with enormous bills calling upon the electors to vote for So-and-so and the repeal of the cotton duties. (A cry of "No.") He was sorry the hon. member who cried "No," and who represented a seaside constituency, had not a few factory operatives in his constituency to awaken his conscience in the matter. He believed that Lancashire members opposite, returned as they were very largely in consequence of the views they held on this matter, would assist him in keeping the Government up to the level, and in ensuring that the Government should not yield to the interested clique in India who were at the bottom of this agitation. It was said the agitation in India was purely and solely in the interest of the people of India. Towards the end of last Parliament a Report was sent containing the views of the various Chambers of Commerce in India upon the subject. The Upper India Chamber of Commerce at Cawnpur said: "Apart from the inconsistency and invidiousness of the Bill in excluding cotton goods when practically everything else consumed by the community is taxed, a further cogent argument lies in the fact that most of the articles liable to duty under the new Schedule form necessities of life to the classes who already suffer most from low exchange, and who bear the burden of the income tax and the direct and other cesses imposed by the Provincial Government. If, however, cotton goods are freed, the symmetry of the tax is at once destroyed, for these are the only commodities of foreign production used by the masses, and thus a very large section of the population would escape from contributing to the needs of the State." That was to say, the argument on behalf of these duties was that they would fall upon the poorer classes of India, and that it was they who should be taxed to supply the needs of the Exchequer. Then there was the Calcutta Trades Association, which first of all proposed the early abolition of the income tax, and then proceeded warmly to back up the cotton duties. With regard to the income tax this association said:—"Pressing as it does chiefly upon Anglo-Indians, its retention is a perfection of cruelty." Another Chamber of Commerce advocated the cotton duties solely to relieve the official classes from the payment of Indian taxes. Next there were the mill companies, such as the Egerton Mills Company. This is what a Mr. Gilbert said:—"It is a far cry from Bombay to Calcutta, and it seems to me Bombay is being sacrificed. At present we cannot work at a profit. The Government of India had far better say the Bombay mills should be dismantled and be honest. At present our mill interest has completely gone to ruin." From a careful analysis of ten of the largest cotton mills in India he found that, between the beginning of April last year and the beginning of June of this year, the share capital of these companies had appreciated no less than 46 per cent. He did not know why the commercial community should at once have so hurriedly given an increased value of 46 per cent. to their shares if they did not believe that there was going to be established practically protection in the interests of the Indian millowner. Upon this subject at all events the Secretary of India was absolutely sound. He said, on the 21st of February of this year, that:—"He agreed they should listen sympathetically to the voice of India, but if they wanted to hear the view of India, Bombay and Calcutta were not the places to hear it. Those European cities did not represent India, and the peculiarity of modern India was that certain sections of those two capitals, having adopted western ideas, had developed with singular skill the methods of agitation. The result was there was no country in the world where the shrieking units of society could make themselves so well heard, and where the millions were so quiescent, as in India." It was because the millions of India were quiescent that so many of these questions were maltreated in that House. It was because we allowed the Government of India to embark in costly frontier policy, and to spend millions on extravagant military administration, that there was a deficit in the Indian Budget. He denied that this agitation was purely and solely in the interests of the people of India. These duties were not in the interests of India, and certainly they were not in the interest of England. The interest of both these countries was in the most complete commercial freedom, and the exchange of their commodities freely, openly and without restraint. So long as the House of Commons continued, he would not say for interested motives, but under the claim of a forced patriotism, to insist on the imposition of duties inimical to that great principle, so long would he and his friends raise

their voices against them, until this grievous injustice was removed.

Mr. G. Whiteley desired, as a cotton spinner and manufacturer himself, to press home upon the House the all-importance of this subject, for it was a matter the weight and gravity of which could not possibly be exaggerated for the people of Lancashire. He did not abate by one jot or tittle the views he enunciated when this question was last before the House; rather he affirmed them with even more vigour and earnestness than ever. He entirely agreed with the views of the hon. member for Burnley. There was no doubt whatever that in Lancashire this question of the imposition of import duties on cotton goods had a great effect in deciding the course of the elections in that county. It was, in fact, a bread-and-butter question for Lancashire. He should like cursorily to run over one or two of the arguments he advanced in the former debate. He contended that there was protection in the way these duties were levied at the present time. Up to 20's there was absolute protection for the Indian spinner and manufacturer. In many quarters it was supposed that we did not, in this country, ever spin or manufacture goods out of 20's or under; but that opinion was entirely fallacious. At the present time there were in Lancashire three millions of spindles, producing annually 250 million pounds weight of yarn of 20's and under, and this must be compared with a number of spindles in India, producing 274 millions pounds weight of yarn, or 10 per cent. over what we produced in this country. At the present time yarn was being shipped to India 20's and under, capable of manufacturing 25 millions of yards of cloths. It was impossible, therefore, to deny that for 20's and under the duties now imposed were absolutely protective. Over 20's there was partial protection, the duty being levied on the full value of any cloth imported into India, whereas in native goods it was only levied on 60 per cent. of the total value of the cloth. These were plain figures which could not be denied. A good deal of use had been made of the stores argument, that there was a 5 per cent. duty paid by the Indian manufacturer on stores imported. That was an argument in which there was absolutely nothing. Apart from coal and oil, both of which were produced in India, the stores necessary in the manufacture of cloth were in India very small indeed. In India they had cotton at their own doors, wages very much lower, no cost of freight as we have in bringing American cotton to this country and taking the cloth to India, and likewise no Factory Acts—so that if Indian cotton manufacturers could claim any rectification of the duty on the stores question, tenfold could Lancashire claim rectification in consequence of the heavy burdens under which their trade was carried on. This duty amounted to 5 per cent. on the turnover, and, as those acquainted with weaving concerns would know, this was sometimes three or four times the amount of the capital. The duty amounted therefore to an impost of 15 or 20 per cent. against the English manufacturer. A good deal has been made of the fact that a great part of the Indian productions were of yarns of 20's or under, while the English imports were of over 20. It was argued that it was impossible there could be competition between yarns counting under 20 and yarns over 20. But again he declared this to be a fallacious argument. He could understand that trade in boots could not compete with trade in hats, but he could not understand the argument that low-priced boots could not compete with high-priced boots. Neither could he understand the *rationale* of the contention that, because cloth of a coarser texture was woven in India, it did not compete with the sale of finer English imports. As well say that, because New Zealand mutton was coarser and cheaper than the home production, it did not compete with English meat. It did compete with the English produce, and the latter would suffer much more if it had to bear an impost of 5 per cent. There was fierce competition between England and India in cotton manufactures, and while the trade at home was practically stagnant and flagging, in India the cotton industry was developing and progressive. Since these duties were imposed the shares in Indian mills had sprung up to the amount of Rx.1,600,000, and he learnt from a director of two Indian companies that they were paying the one 12 and the other 22 per cent. on the capital. It was a monstrous injustice that a flagging waning industry at home should be taxed to make good a deficiency which appeared in the finances of a country where a thriving trade was carried on scot free. The state of affairs in Lancashire had not improved since this subject was last debated in the House. There was the same stoppage of machinery, the same number, if not more, of operatives vainly seeking employment, and the prospect was equally black, if not blacker than it was then. On this ground he, Unionist Member as he was, did not hesitate to record his opinion, and if this question came up on a vote of confidence, and the all-important issue depended on the vote of one member, he should vote against any Government, Unionist or Liberal, that had for its policy the maintenance of these duties. He believed that the maintenance of these duties struck at the root of the prosperity of the county in which he was engaged, and sitting as he did for a commercial constituency, and believing that to this constituency this trade matter was of primary importance, he would not hesitate to take the action he had described. He regretted that there was not a trade party in the House that would give precedence to trade above all other questions, defending them against the assaults of either party. Lancashire members, however, were not wholly unreasonable. They recognised that the noble lord had been in office only a few weeks, and that it was his bounden duty to hold the scales equally between contending interests. They did not expect the noble lord to perform miracles on behalf of Lancashire, and he had the right to claim time for consideration. They recognised that the task of abolishing these duties was infinitely greater than that of preventing their imposition in the first instance. The noble lord was in a very difficult position. He might issue his fiat and abolish the duties, but then he would disorder the finances of India, or he might allow them to remain as they were, a crying injustice to this country. There were two initial steps the noble lord might take. Initial steps only he called them, because Lancashire would never be contented until the total abolition of these duties was obtained. But two steps the noble lord might take to remove the sting from the present position of affairs. The first would be to treat India and Lancashire exactly alike. There was reason in the claim that Lancashire and India should be put on the same footing. This might be done by putting a duty of 5 per cent. on all yarns imported into or manufactured in India, and on all cloth imported into India, the latter to be taxed on the yarn and not the manufactured value. Such a duty would not disorganise the finances of India, but would bring grist into the Indian mill. The second course which had been suggested by some of his friends was that the Indian Government should take a step Lord Beaconsfield's Government took twenty years ago, when all imported goods manufactured of yarns under 30's were exempted from duty. Failing the adoption of the first expedient, which he preferred, the noble lord might adopt the second. He would not enter into the question of the loss of revenue to India which the abolition of the duties might involve, for that was dealt fully with when the subject was last before the House, when it was pointed out that there were taxes in England which were not raised in India. It was said that the difficulty was a monetary one, arising out of the depreciation of silver, which the marvellously increasing supply of gold would make only temporary in its duration, and it was also suggested that the difficulty might be got over by the Indian Government resorting to the expedient of borrowing. Lancashire, as a community, had a greater stake in the well-being and welfare of India than any other community in Great Britain, and they would be attempting a suicidal policy were they to advocate any policy that would seriously hurt India. They asked the Government to be impartial, and, in the laudable desire not to render injustice to India, to take very great care they did not render injustice to this country. He hoped the Government would soon find a *via media* in this matter, as he believed they would endeavour to do once they fully appreciated the facts which Lancashire members had laid before the House.

Mr. Frederick Cawley believed that the import duties had had a very good educational effect upon the people of this country, and especially of Lancashire. Lancashire people were beginning to see that the question of exchange was not the only, or even the greatest cause of the deficit in the Indian revenue. They were beginning to see that the Indian Empire was administered in an extravagant manner; and that this country did not bear her proper share of the civil and military charges. But, above and beyond all, it was, in his opinion and the opinion of Lancashire, this everlasting policy of the extension of Empire that had brought about the deficit in the Indian revenue. He admitted that this policy had to some

extent been sanctioned by the country at the last General Election, for hon. members opposite were never tired of enlarging upon the merits of the extension of our Empire, and the trade that followed our flag. If, however, the country wished this heroic policy, the country as a whole should pay for it, and the burden should not be cast upon either the poor consumer of India or upon the depressed cotton industry of Lancashire. The hon. member for Hampshire (Mr. Jeffreys), speaking at the commencement of this Session on agricultural depression, talked of relieving the local burdens on agricultural land to the extent of three millions per annum. In Lancashire they wanted no subsidy and no charity; they merely wanted justice. They said that as neither the consumer in India nor the people engaged in the cotton trade in Lancashire were responsible for the ever-increasing expenditure, so neither the producer in Lancashire or the consumer in India should be called upon to make up the deficit in the Indian revenue.

Mr. A. WYLIE said, that when the Indian Tariff Act was passed, imposing duties upon goods imported into India, cotton goods were expressly excluded from the operation of the measure, because it was recognised that there had grown up in India a great and increasing cotton industry, which, if duties were imposed on cotton goods of home manufacture, would be protected against the competition of Lancashire. When recently the Indian Government proposed to include cotton goods within the operation of the Tariff Act, the right hon. member for Wolverhampton, then Secretary for India, laid down the principle, which has been repeatedly affirmed by this House, that. in connection with Indian Import Duties there must be no protection. In his Dispatch of 13th of December to the Indian Government he said:—"It will be understood that Her Majesty's Government are precluded by the pledges quoted from sanctioning the imposition of Import Duties on cotton goods unless under such conditions as will ensure beyond question that the duties thus imposed will have no protective effect." Acting in accordance with those instructions the Government of India devised a scheme of excise duties for the purpose of eliminating the element of protection from the import duties, and the Home Government, misguided by the information which they received, believed that the element of protection had been eliminated and sanctioned the imposition of the cotton duties. He proposed to take first dyed yarns and dyed and printed cloth, as showing in the most direct and aggravated form how serious an amount of protection was still caused by the Indian Import Duties. One special item of information supplied to the Government at home was that there was no competition between India and Lancashire in coarse yarns, viz., 20's and under, because the Lancashire yarns had been driven out of the market by the native manufactures. The Secretary for India, on February 21st, stated clearly that the Lancashire trade in coarse yarns had decreased until it had nearly reached vanishing point. But six days afterwards a deputation representing the dyers of the west of Scotland waited upon the right hon. member and convinced him that instead of there being no competition in coarse yarns between Lancashire and India, the Scotch dyers were importing such goods into British Burma to a large extent. The result of these representations was that an Order in Council was passed reducing the duty on coarse dyed yarns going into British Burma from 5 per cent. to ½ per cent. He would ask the Secretary of State for India why even this ½ per cent. duty, was allowed to remain on those coarse yarns. A clear case of protection having been proved, the duty ought to have been removed altogether. Why, again, was not a rebate granted to the Scotch dyers, who had had to pay the 5 per cent. duty, as is done every other day to the Indian manufacturers in the case of yarns exported to China and elsewhere? He found that a general impression existed that the injustice to the dyers was removed almost completely with the exception of this ½ per cent., but he wished to point out that it was only on a very small part of their production that the injustice was removed. A very large percentage no less than nine-tenths of their production, was still affected by a 5 per cent. duty, which acted almost entirely as protection to the Indian competitors. He would give two instances to prove this. The other portion of their trade with Burma consisted principally of 24's. The Bombay dyers —quite as much an alien race to the Burmese as the British— could send dyed 24's to Burma, paying 5 per cent. on only 7 annas per pound, while the British dyer paid on 15 annas, being over 100 per cent. more. Take the other case. The Bombay dyer imported a bale of 400 lbs. grey 40's from Lancashire, for which he paid duty on a value of only about £11. When the same yarn was dyed here and sent to Bombay, it paid duty on about double that amount; and when it was woven into cloth on this side, dyed and printed, the duty was trebled, quadrupled, and in some cases even quintupled (as compared with their Indian competitors), according to the labour bestowed upon it. This duty was principally on British labour. These two instances showed, in a very clear and accentuated form, the truth of some of the leading objections put forward by the Lancashire manufacturers in their admirable memorial to the Secretary for India, viz.:—"(1.) That the excise duty secures an immunity from competition in the Indian markets by England in counts 20's and below." He had already proved that there was still a considerable trade. With American cotton at 3d. per pound, it would be a large trade if left duty free. "(2.) That the import duty imposed on goods exported from this country, made from 20's and below, without any countervailing excise duty being imposed on goods made from similar counts in India, is absolutely protective in its character." Indian manufacturers were taxed only on spinning costs; British on both spinning and weaving. "(3.) That the 5 per cent. import duty charged on the *ad valorem* value of our manufactured goods is not completely countervailed by the 5 per cent. excise duty charged on the yarn value of goods made in India from counts above 20's, and that, so far as any portion of the value of these goods is not chargeable with excise duty, the import duty becomes protective to that extent." That this was the case he thought he had completely proved in dealing with dyed and printed yarns and cloths. "(4.) That the exemption from excise duty of yarns 20's and below will encourage the manufacture of duty-free cloths, as such exemption enables the Indian manufacturer to avoid the excise duty altogether, by substituting in the manufacture of cloth of non-excisable yarns for excisable yarns." There could be no stronger confirmation of this objection than the fact that, when yarns and goods of no higher numbers than 30's were admitted into India duty free, the exports of yarn above 32's fell from 26¼ per cent. to 18¼ per cent. of our total exports in five years ending 1883, and when the duty was repealed they advanced again to 27 per cent. in the five years ending 1893. "(5.) That it is impossible to place a dividing line between the manufacturers of Lancashire and India, whereby a duty levied on one, unless completely countervailed, will not afford a protective incidence to one to the consequent injury of the other." This would be clearly seen from the previous arguments. "(6.) That the imposition of these duties has inflicted serious injury to our trade, and will continue to do so unless completely countervailed." He thought that strong evidence of the protective character of these Indian cotton duties was to be found, in the first place, in the falling off in British manufactures since the duties were imposed. In the five months which had elapsed since the duties were imposed, there had been a falling off in British manufactures of something like 267,000,000 yards, or 25 per cent. But even a stronger illustration was to be found in the enormous increase in the value of Indian mill stocks. The Indian mill stocks had increased by Rx.1,600,000, which was Rx.250,000 more than the whole of the cotton duties would provide. He thought it had been proved that there was a very strong protective element in these duties, and therefore it was right that the attention of Her Majesty's Government and of the Government of India should be called to the question. They had now in this country a Government which sympathised with the manufacturers, and he hoped that they would be impressed by the strong case that had been made out in their behalf. They were glad to know that the Secretary for India shared the feelings of his Chief in this matter. He thought it was much more necessary to direct the attention of the Indian Government to the real state of the case, as he believed a great deal of their information had been derived from *ex parte* statements. India might say she had as much right to protect her manufactures by import duties as any of our colonies. He hoped the day was not far distant when, by a wise federal system, the trade between the mother country and her colonies would be as free as the winds of heaven. But India was in a different position. India had been called into existence by an enormous expenditure of British blood and treasure. India could not exist for a day if British influ-

ence were withdrawn. Lord Roberts once asked a distinguished native what he thought would be the effect of the withdrawal of the British army from India, and the reply was that it would have the same effect as the opening of the doors of a menagerie—there would be indiscriminate carnage. India must learn that, under these circumstances, she would not be allowed to close her doors against the manufactures of this country. India might say that her financial position was such that it was imperatively necessary that those duties should be imposed, but Lord Kimberley and his successor did not admit that the finances of India were in an unsatisfactory state; and it is doubted whether any European State could show that its finances were in a more satisfactory state than those of India. India might say that she had no other source from which to raise her revenue. The Hon. W. R. Macdonell, on 27th February last, said:—"There is no other civilised country in the world in which the public burdens are so light as in India." And in this most lightly-burdened of all countries the wealthy native classes are pre-eminently the most lightly taxed of all. India may say that after all a 5 per cent. duty is but a light tax on a wealthy country like this; but it would enable the Indian manufacturer to work at a profit of 2½ per cent., whilst his British competitor is working at a loss of 2½ per cent. Finally, India might say that the imposition of these duties was sanctioned by a large majority of the House of Commons. Several causes contributed to that decision, apart from the merits of the question. But the principal reason why there was such a large majority was, because the Indian Secretary had affirmed that the element of protection had been entirely eliminated from these duties. But he had shown that a large amount of direct protection still existed, and also an enormous amount of indirect protection. It was quite evident that the information which overlooked such an important fact as an existing competition of this country with India in coarse yarns, to the extent of two million pounds, entirely had overlooked the more abstruse questions of indirect protection of which the people of Lancashire so justly complained. He thought if the question had come before even the late House of Commons clearly and distinctly on its merits, there would not have been a majority in favour of the Indian Import Duties. But the present House of Commons was of a very different description; the vast majority of the members from Lancashire and the districts surrounding had been returned pledged to oppose the cotton duties. It was true that a great many of these had the disadvantage of being new members, a disadvantage of which some hon. friends on the opposite benches had not failed frequently to remind them. But he might hint to these gentlemen that they had now quite sufficiently impressed them with the enormous superiority which attached to themselves from the fact of their being old members. But even the new members from Lancashire possessed a practical knowledge of this difficult question of the Indian import duties, which was not exceeded by that of the oldest members of the House, and they would be prepared to give a steady and most influential vote in favour of free trade. Not only in Lancashire, but in the West of Scotland also, there had been a change in the representation which had been to a certain extent influenced by this question. He thought he might say that he represented a very large section of the commercial community of Glasgow, and, in conjunction with one of the largest East Indian merchants, Mr. Donald Graham, who had had great experience in India, he had carried a motion unanimously in the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce for the entire repeal of all the import duties. He believed that a measure for their entire repeal would be supported in the House, not only by the members from Lancashire and the surrounding districts, but by those who were in favour of free trade, and those who took an interest in the condition of the unemployed, as well as by the public opinion in the country. There had been great education of public opinion since the time of the last debate on the subject, principally at the time of the general election, and the people of the country now saw that Lancashire, instead of being actuated by a spirit of greed, wished only to have fair play. It was now recognised that, owing to the imposition of these duties, that part of the country had been passing through the gravest crisis in the history of her trade since the great cotton famine, and that the masters and men had borne this infliction with that great heroism which had characterised them at the time of their still greater distress. The Indian Government should take early steps, in conjunction with the Home Government, to abolish these duties. If they were not abolished, as he hoped they would be, during the recess, he believed that, when Parliament met again, motions would be brought forward for their abolition, and that both sides of the House would combine in seeing that all these duties were swept away.

Lord George Hamilton: I think it will be agreeable to the majority of the House that I should reply to the points which have been thus far raised in the discussion. An abstract discussion such as this should not be unduly pressed. Most of the preceding speakers have alluded to a speech I made in February last on the question of the imposition of these cotton duties. I did not make that speech with a view to the elections or to the interests of any section of the community. I spoke of the agitation and disturbance which had been caused by the cotton duties which were in existence some years ago. I believe that I am the only person in the House who has an official experience of what those duties meant. When I spoke in February, I endeavoured to do so from a high national, Imperial standpoint. The views which I then expressed I still hold. I had learnt them when I was at the India Office in 1874, from men like the present Prime Minister, then Secretary of State for India, from Sir Henry Maine, from Sir Louis Mallet, and from others, and, knowing what they thought, I spoke with reluctance and with some trepidation on this question. I think that of all questions which the House of Commons has had to deal with in my experience none requires more delicate handling and none contains more germs of danger. The moment these cotton duties are imposed you array at once the great industries of this country one against another. You have in Lancashire the largest population of any county in the United Kingdom, and they are practically united on this one point, that they consider the cotton duties imposed in India as unjust in principle and injurious to their interests, and, unfortunately, that great cotton industry is not in a flourishing condition. Both masters and mill hands believe that their difficulty and misfortune are in some way connected with these cotton duties. On the other hand, you have in India a most powerful and increasing industry, united together by sentiment and race, who are strongly in favour of these duties. They have control of the English and native Press; and thus, by the very fact of imposing these duties, you have that which every politician would try to avoid; you bring two distant points of the Empire into direct collision one with the other. As these rival interests grow and develop, so does the bitterness and intensity of the controversy between them increase. That is a serious position, and when I spoke in February I spoke entirely from that point of view, and from that point of view alone. I felt at the time that nothing but extreme financial exigency could justify the re-imposition of those cotton duties. But my predecessor persuaded the House that such financial exigencies did exist, and, whatever they were, the military operations since sanctioned have widened the margin between Income and Expenditure for this year. To-morrow I think I shall be able to show my hon. friends that there are fallacies in their arguments so far as the control over expenditure was exercised by the Indian Government and recourse to new taxation are concerned. The Indian Government are not extravagant; on the contrary, no other country in the world is so economically managed. But it is easy to understand that, no matter how ably and how well the Indian Government may perform their work, they have the greatest difficulty in making both ends meet. Year by year the loss on transmitting funds to meet their gold obligations has so increased that this year it shows no less than 27 per cent. of their total net available income. The hon. member for Burnley, by his motion, has invited the Indian Government to pledge itself to the early repeal of the import duties upon goods, but, speaking as Secretary for India, I am bound to see fair play between the contending parties, and to see that justice is done, having regard to the present conditions of Indian finance. Under present conditions it would be impossible in any way to pledge myself, but, even if it were within the bounds of possibility, I doubt whether it would be a proper course to pursue. If I were now to pledge myself to adopt the course suggested by the motion it would naturally render every subsequent act of mine open to suspicion in India: I should be making promises which I might not afterwards be able to perform. (Hear, hear.) The old duties on cotton were imposed originally subject to no conditions as to protection: but after they had

been in operation some time they were objected to on the ground that they were protective, and resolutions were passed by successive Parliaments protesting against the policy of protective duties in India, and finally they were removed. The right hon. gentleman, when the duties were re-imposed last year, undertook, if any duties were imposed which were protective, to submit them to the House of Commons before he assented to them. He was attacked, and it was alleged that he had not complied with his promise. But I think his defence was adequate and straightforward—that the duties he sanctioned were found to be not protective, and that he would prevent them from being protective in their effect. The pledge given by the right hon. gentleman in connection with the duties was agreed to by the Indian Government, and since those duties have been in operation a deputation waited on my predecessor which pointed out that in Burma certain yarns from Scotland, undoubtedly competed with local yarns protected by the duty. The right hon. gentleman wrote to the Indian Government and they at once repealed the duties and reduced them from 5 to ½ per cent. The only reason that the ½ per cent. remains is that by Executive action the Indian Government cannot repeal duties imposed by legislation. Since then—on May 27th last—the right hon. gentleman received a deputation of Lancashire and Scotch mill-owners, who put some important points before him. At the close of his interview with the deputation, he said:—"Now the point is, is that Excise Duty countervailing in the true sense of the word, or is it not? They say it is not only countervailing, but it is so excessively countervailing that you have inflicted —'you' being as somebody called me, 'the Secretary of State for Lancashire,' not for India—'you have inflicted a great injury upon us.' You gentlemen come here to-day and you say, 'On the contrary, we dissent from that *in toto;* you have imposed an Excise Duty which is not a countervailing Excise Duty, but omit a great many points and which exposes us to an unfair competition.' Now, then, what I ask you gentlemen is to send me an argument based upon that, and upon nothing else. Let us have no other issues; that is the issue at stake. I promise you that that shall be not only considered here, but shall be sent to India, and we shall then know what they have got to say to it." That was the position of affairs. A change of Government took place. The memorial which the right hon. gentleman asked them to send to him was sent to me, and it has been sent to the Indian Government. Now, to the position hitherto maintained by those responsible for the Government of India, that the duties are not to be protective, I adhere. It seems to me from the time the re-imposition of the duties was contemplated there has been a common understanding to which, with the exception of a member here and a member there, the whole House are more or less a party, on that side (the Opposition side) as well as this. I will put myself into communication with the Indian Government, and I will do all in my power to eliminate anything savouring of protection from the duties. In the debate that has taken place hon. members have spoken with the greatest moderation. Whether you agreed with Lancashire, or with Indian millowners, hon. members had all spoken with the moderation becoming the treatment of a grave and serious question. Nothing more illustrates the difficulty of the situation than the fact stated by the right hon. gentleman last year, that he had done his best to be just to both sides and he had been equally abused by both sides. It is clear what my attitude is. If trade does revive, and if the Indian revenues permit these duties to be dispensed with, we shall be able once more to leave the English millowners and the Indian millowners in a natural and healthy condition of unbiassed competition in regard to the supply of cotton goods to the people of India.

Mr. R. Ascroft, in addressing the House for the first time, said, there were in Lancashire large mills well equipped with machinery actually closed, and others in which looms were standing idle. For a long time capital had been gradually dwindling away, and at last it had come to be felt that this question of the Indian Import Duties, small as it might appear to be, might be the means of ruining one of the greatest industries in the country. He had listened with satisfaction to what had fallen from the Secretary of State for India, and Lancashire members would feel that the raising of the question would encourage operatives and employers to struggle on till these duties could be dealt with. He congratulated the Secretary for India on the happier position in which he had placed the question of the duties. He did not know whether the noble Lord had seen a speech recently delivered by the President of the Bombay Millowners' Association, one of the bodies whose previous arguments were placed before the late Secretary for India when he decided the course to be taken. The president of that association said: "I think it would be sound policy for the Government of India to remove the slightest shred of complaint by notifying that all 20's yarn and under, and cloth made from 20's yarn and under, imported from Great Britain, should be duty free. A simple notification, as has been done with Glasgow dyed yarn imported into Rangoon, would be sufficient. If there is no import of goods made from 20's yarn, then there can be no loss of revenue. If, on the other hand, there is a limited quantity of such goods imported, it is only just, however small the quantity, that they should come in duty free. My own impression is that no goods made of 20's yarn and under are imported, and certainly no 20's yarn. As your chairman, I would like it to go forth that while we, in common with other citizens, supported the reimposition of the import duties for purposes of revenue, we are as much opposed to protection in any form as the most ardent free trader in England." After such an expression of opinion, it could no longer be said that Lancashire was pursuing a selfish policy. It was not a Lancashire policy, but it was one by which both England and India would be benefited, and a part of the policy promised by the present Government, and which he now asked should be carried out, as it affected the commercial industries of the country. The policy on which the Government came into office was a policy of advancing the national prosperity of the country, of opening new markets, of increasing the field of employment. Lancashire, therefore, made no selfish appeal in her own interest. What she asked for was that the Government should carry out the policy on which they came into office; and it would be a national calamity for the country if one of its chief industries, like the cotton industry of Lancashire, were destroyed.

Mr. H. J. Whiteley, in a maiden speech, said he was afraid the statement of the noble lord the Secretary for India would be read with some disappointment in Lancashire. No member of the House was suffering as he was suffering in his trade relations owing to those import duties, but he did not plead for himself; he pleaded on behalf of the 400 work-people in his employment, who, since the imposition of those duties, had not had two consecutive weeks' full work, with the result that they had to endure much suffering and want, and this was a case illustrative of many other firms in Lancashire. It was said that it was not the manufacturer in Lancashire, but the consumer in India, who would pay this duty. He declared without fear of contradiction that it was the Lancashire manufacturers who would pay the duty, and who would have to continue to pay it so long as the native manufacturers enjoyed their present favoured position as compared with their competitors in England. Lancashire did not desire to be selfish in this matter. If it were proved that owing to the financial difficulties in India this course was inevitable, they would acquiesce; but they asked that they should be put on an equality with India, and that if they were to make this sacrifice they should be assured that it was not for the benefit of manufacturers in India, but for our mighty Empire as a whole. (Cheers.)

The motion for going into Committee was then agreed to.

The motion respecting the finances was then put from the Chair as follows:—"That it appears, by the Accounts laid before this House, that the total Revenue of India for the year ending the 31st day of March 1894, was Rx. 90,565,214; that the total Expenditure in India and in England charged against the Revenue was Rx. 92,112,212; and there was an Excess of of Expenditure over Revenue of Rx. 1,546,988, and that the capital outlay on Railways and Irrigation Works was Rx. 3,621,252."

On this motion being put, Mr. A. J. Balfour said that as it was too late for his noble friend the Secretary for India to make his financial statement, he moved to report progress. The statement would be made by his noble friend at twelve o'clock to-morrow.

The motion to report progress was agreed to, and the House resumed.

September 4th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE INDIAN BUDGET.

LORD G. HAMILTON'S SPEECH.

The House went into Committee on the East India Revenue Accounts, and the formal resolution was submitted as follows:—"That it appears, by the accounts laid before this House, that the total revenue of India for the year ending the 31st day of March, 1894, was Rx.90,565,214; that the total expenditure in India and in England charged against the revenue was Rx.92,112,212; that there was an excess of expenditure over revenue of Rx.1,546,998; and that the capital outlay on railways and irrigation works was Rx.3,621,252."

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON said: Those conversant with Indian finance are aware that the annual statement which the India Office has to make refers to three financial years, and not two. The revenue and expenditure accounts now under the consideration of the Committee relate to the years 1893-4, 1894-5, and 1895-6. The figures of the first year are those of the closed account, those of the second year are in the closing stage, and those of the third year are estimates alone. I propose to take throughout the net revenue and expenditure, and to revert to the old form as contained in the accounts of the Indian Government for some time past. My right hon. friend and predecessor, amongst other great qualities, is a high expert in these questions of accounts. While he was at the the Treasury he introduced great improvements in the annual returns presented to Parliament. While my right hon. friend was at the India Office he endeavoured to classify the revenue and expenditure of India on the same principles. But one or two small alterations have to be made in the accounts of the Indian Government this year, and until these are complete I do not propose to deal with the matter. But I hope we shall settle all these small matters of detail before the close of the financial year. For the present I propose to take the statement of net revenue and expenditure as contained in the accounts before the Committee, which show deductions for cost of collection in respect of all the principal heads of revenue; while on the expenditure side departmental receipts are deducted from gross expenditure. In 1893-4 we find a net revenue of Rx.50,328,000, and a net expenditure of Rx.51,875,000, showing a deficit of Rx.1,547,000. This is better by Rx.245,800 than the deficit as estimated last year of Rx.1,792,800. The revenue is better by Rx.74,900, and the expenditure is less by Rx.170,900. I now come to the revised estimate for the year 1894-5; and the finance of the year is worthy of close attention. The preparations of the estimates of expenditure and revenue took place in a period of great financial depression. The exchange in the preceding year had been taken in the revised estimate at 14·6d. per rupee. The amount realised was 14·5466d. per rupee. But there were indications that the exchange value of the rupee was likely to fall; therefore the Indian Government were compelled to estimate their transactions for the ensuing year at a lower rate than that at which they had taken it in the preceding year. Every variation of one-tenth of a penny in the exchange value of the rupee makes a difference of about 22 lakhs to the Indian revenue or expenditure, as the case may be. Therefore the Indian Government, having to provide a considerable additional sum to meet the further fall in the exchange, were compelled to look around to find how they could balance revenue and expenditure. They had in their judgment almost exhausted the resources of taxation, and so they proposed certain reductions of expenditure. They reduced the Imperial expenditure on civil works by Rx.130,000, and on military works by Rx.150,000. They further obtained assistance from the Provincial Governments to the extent of Rx.405,000 and suspended the operation of the Famine Insurance Fund to the extent of Rx.1,076,200, and they imposed import duties on most articles of trade, estimated to produce Rx.1,140,000 net. In this way they were able to reduce their deficit to Rx.301,900. The revenue for 1894-5 was taken at Rx.50,943,500; and the expenditure at Rx. 51,245,400. But the exchange fell heavily in the earlier months of the financial year, so that the exchange value of the rupee was depreciated from 14d. to 12$\frac{1}{3}\frac{1}{2}$d. There is, therefore, every probability that the surplus for the year will amount to Rx.1,230,000. (Cheers.) I think this result is very satisfactory. Now, the bills sold last year amounted to Rx.30,970,000 and it realised £16,905,102. I am sorry to say that, although this is by far the largest amount of bills which have ever been sold, owing to the great fall in the value of the rupee it has not realised the largest amount in gold, for in 1881-2 Rx.22,211,000 realised £18,412,429. I think there are four distinctive features in connection with the finance of 1894-5, the year with which I am dealing. The deficit has been converted into a considerable surplus under the most depressed conditions yet known in connection with exchange; there has been the largest sale of bills upon India; the credit for borrowing purposes is raised to a higher point than has ever before been attained; and the last, but I am afraid not the least, feature is the imposition of import duties upon cotton goods. I now come to the Budget Estimate for 1895-6. The Indian Government were compelled to look about for some additions to their revenue, the reductions of expenditure being exhausted. They were compelled to have recourse to the only tax available, and the right hon. gentleman, after full consideration, gave his assent to cotton goods being included in the Customs duties, and the inclusion of cotton goods in such duties was estimated to yield Rx. 354,100. The Excise was estimated to yield Rx. 12,500, so that the addition to the revenue, according to the estimate, after allowing for refunds, was Rx. 359,100. But the fall in the value of the rupee had added an expenditure far exceeding that amount, so that, unless there was an improvement in the revenue, there was the prospect of having to face a deficit far in excess of that which was originally estimated. I am glad, however, to be able to give a better account of the revenue than was then anticipated. The revised figures show an increase in the revenue of Rx. 2,794,800. The net expenditure is only increased by Rx. 1,502,400. The revised figures, therefore, are Rx. 1,292,400 better than the estimate of last year, and this improvement has enabled the Indian Government to turn their estimated deficit of Rx. 301,900 into a surplus of Rx. 990,500. (Hear, hear.) I pointed out that the expenditure is increased by Rx. 1,502,400. The charge for exchange on net sterling expenditure, in addition to that originally estimated by the Government for this year, has amounted to Rx. 1,806,700, so that, apart from that, there would have been a reduction of net Imperial expenditure of over Rx. 300,000. I wish the Committee to bear this fact prominently in mind, that right throughout the statement I have to make the one difficulty with which the Indian Government have to contend is the fall in exchange; it has a blighting and withering influence in every direction. (Hear, hear.) The main source of the improvement of which I have spoken will be found in the Railway Revenue Account, which, though on the whole showing an additional charge on Imperial account of Rx. 313,300, was, apart from exchange, better by Rx. 395,500. There was a net reduction on the Army expenditure of Rx. 259,400, and under other heads of expenditure of Rx. 47,400. In the middle of the financial year a most successful conversion of the debt was made, for which I beg to offer my congratulations to my predecessor. The Four per cent. rupee Loan was converted into a debt bearing interest at 3½ per cent., but there was a certain necessary expenditure attending this conversion which increased the estimated expenditure of the year by Rx. 301,000. This increase, however, will bring a more than corresponding gain in subsequent years in the diminution of the interest which hereafter will have to be paid. Turning to the revenue side, part of the large increase is due to opium. The year 1894-5 was the sixth consecutive bad year, and the worst of the six. The price consequently rose, and it ultimately attained the figure in December of Rs.1,480, in January Rs.1,523, and in February Rs.1,540, which is the highest price known since 1871. This rise in the price of opium enabled the Indian Government to raise the duty on the Malwa opium. There was also a reduction in the expenditure, so that the net revenue was better, so far as opium was concerned, by Rx. 1,537,300. The next head of revenue which shows a marked improvement is the Customs. The new Customs Bill was imposed at the close of 1893-4. In the Budget for 1894-5, credit was taken for an addition through the Customs duties of Rx. 1,270,000, including Rx. 100,000 on imports of silver. In the revised estimate the new duties are taken at Rx. 1,733,000, including Rx. 355,000 from silver, a gain over the Budget of Rx. 463,000. The improvement on articles paying the old rates of duty was Rx. 100,600, and the inclusion in the Customs duties of cotton goods brought in

during the last three months of the year a further increase of Rx.354,000. Rx.12,500 was obtained from the Excise on yarns, and the charges for collection were less than had been estimated by Rx.22,000. The final result is an improvement, so far as the net Customs revenue is concerned, of Rx.952,100. In addition to these two great sources of improvement—opium and Customs—the net revenue was enhanced under Excise by Rx.203,600, and under stamps, assessed taxes, forest, and other heads, by Rx.216,100. On the other hand, there was a falling off in the land revenue, owing to the postponement of collection, especially in the North-West Provinces, of Rx.114,300. I am glad, however, to say, that I have received further accounts which indicate what the final results of the year will be, and these accounts show a still further improvement. The net revenue is expected to be Rx.7,000 better than the revised estimate, and the net expenditure is reduced by Rx.232,500. 1895-6, taking as my basis the deficit in the Budget for 1894-5 of Rx.301,900. The additional charge for exchange was estimated at Rx.2,503,700. There was certain exceptional relief obtained, as I have explained, in 1894-5 by the contributions of the Provincial Governments and by cutting down the expenditure on civil and military works, which it was not proposed to renew; it amounted to Rx.685,000. There was an additional charge in connection with the cultivation of opium amounting to Rx.460,000, and there was a certain preliminary expenditure connected with the Chitral expedition which amounted to Rx.150,000. The Indian Government also decided to increase the pay of the Sepoy to Rs.9 a month, adding for 1895-6 Rx.180,000. That will give great satisfaction to a body of men who have, on every occasion on which they have been asked to take part in any military expedition, greatly distinguished themselves. (Hear, hear). Therefore, the excess of expenditure for which the Indian Government had to provide is Rx.4,280,600. Against this they reckoned on the following improvements:—Saving of interest by conversion of debt, Rx.422,000, and by discharge of debt not at present replaced, Rx.102,800; increase from General Customs duties, Rx.427,900; cotton import and excise duties, Rx.1,455,000, making a total improvement from Customs of Rx.1,882,900. There was an estimated improvement in General Revenues of Rx.1,919,100, making a grand total of Rx.4,326,800, which gives the small surplus of Rx.46,200. Since then we have had information as to the estimated expenditure in connection with the Chitral expedition and the occupation of Chitral, and other charges have cropped up in the interval. The increase of expenditure on the Chitral expedition is estimated at Rx.2,210,000; Chitral occupation, Rx.200,000; and other charges connected with other departments, Rx.160,000, making a total estimated increase of expenditure of Rx.2,570,000. On the other hand, there is a saving on opium payments of Rx.800,000, making, therefore, a net increase of expenditure of Rx.1,770,000. There is an increase of revenue of Rx.510,000, showing a net deterioration of Rx.1,260,000. According to these figures, including the previous estimated surplus, the deficit will be Rx.1,213,800. I am glad to say that the exchange has been a less heavy drain upon the Indian Exchequer than was anticipated, and there are various signs of improvement in certain portions of the Indian Revenue. I am, therefore, sanguine that before the year closes we shall arrive at a much closer approximation between income and expenditure than these figures indicate. Taking a view of the last three years, we have these facts brought before us. We started in the first year with a considerable deficit, in the second year we converted that deficit into a surplus, and in the third year, though we have a deficit, it is entirely due to unexpected very large military operations; while there can be very little doubt that a considerable part of the military operations will be paid for out of the revenue of the year. (Hear, hear.) I think the position is distinctly better than it was three years ago, but it is still not free from anxiety, Indian finance requiring close vigilance and supervision. I have dealt with the figures of the last three years. The embarrassments and difficulties with which the Government have had to contend during the last three years have naturally been the subject of much criticism, and they have had many accusations brought against them. There is an impression that the financial embarrassments of the Indian Government are largely due to there being no effective supervision over their expenditure, and that these embarrassments were only natural, inasmuch as the control of Indian expenditure was entirely vested in the official element in the Government. It was assumed that if you could associate with the officials an elective or representative element, the effect of that amalgamation would be to increase the stringency of financial supervision and produce economy where extravagance now reigns. I want to test, by the latest authentic returns, the accuracy of this allegation. Is it true or is it not that the Indian Government are extravagant and do not sufficiently supervise the expenditure under their charge, and is it likely, taking experience afforded by the circumstances of the expenditure of other countries, that you would improve and strengthen the financial control over the expenditure of India by associating an elective or representative element with the Indian Government? I propose, for the purpose of answering these two questions, to take the returns of the last decade and to look first at the return which relates to the Imperial expenditure of Great Britain. Here the elective and representative element have greater control over expenditure than probably in any other country in the world, and if these elements can produce economy and a reduction of expenditure anywhere you would imagine it was in this House. The Army and Navy expenditure of Great Britain in 1884-5 was £30,561,000, and in 1894-5 £35,143,563. The expenditure on Civil Service and education 10 years ago was £11,000,000; it has now risen to £15,810,000, and, therefore, under these two heads alone, the expenditure, which is entirely under the control of this House, has been increased in the last decade by £9,390,000. I contrast this with the expenditure of the Indian Government. The Indian Government are in a position of much greater difficulty than the Government here. During that period they have had an increase of territory. Burma has been annexed, and various other small portions adjacent to the frontier of other parts of the Empire. The increase of population during that period has been no less than 33,000,000, and of this 23,000,000 is contained in territory directly administered by the Indian Government; therefore, one would assume that, having so very large an increase of area to administer, and, having thus had, as a matter of policy, to meet the necessity of adding largely to the army, the increase of expenditure during this decade would naturally be higher in comparison than that of the Imperial Government. The net expenditure for 1884-5 of the Indian Government was Rx.41,907,813, and in 1894-5 Rx.52,747,800, showing an increase of Rx.10,839,987. Now part of the expenditure is under the control of the Indian Government, but there are certain charges which are not. That which is not under their control is the increased expenditure caused by exchange. The increased charge for exchange during the decade was Rx.11,156,304, which is greater than the absolute increase of the whole net expenditure by Rx.316,317. In other words, the Indian Government—although they have had to administer a much larger territory during that period, although 20,000 additional Native soldiers have had to be added to the Native army, and 10,000 Europeans to the British Army—have been able adequately to carry on all these additional duties at a less cost than 10 years ago. (Cheers.) I say that is a very remarkable performance. If any political party in this country were able to discharge their financial duties as adequately the feat would be advertised from one end of the country to the other, and if there was an election it would be the standpoint from which the political party associated with such financial feats would have appealed to the country. And surely, Sir, if performances such as this in our own country would be entitled to praise, ought we to deny our countrymen at the other end of the world a similar meed of praise when they have accomplished such results. (Cheers.) I think I have effectually disproved the allegation that the embarrassments of the Indian Government are due to inefficient control over their expenditure. (Hear, hear.) I now turn to the other side of the account, namely, the revenue account. The increase of revenue in the period with which I am dealing is Rx.12,216,933. Is that due to the heavy, crushing taxation which has been imposed on India? Excluding the customs, the bulk of which is certainly not paid by the native population, there has only been imposed in that period additional taxation to the amount of Rx.2,940,000. In 1882 a large remission of taxation took place. That year is anterior to the decade I have chosen; but if you take the amount of the taxation remitted in 1882 and balance that against all the taxation which has been imposed since, you will find that the two amounts nearly balance one another; and, in fact, the only additional taxation from 1882 which has been im-

posed upon India is that in connection with the customs duty of last year. I have looked through the proceeds of the various taxes which have been imposed, and I am bound to say there is only one tax which does seem to press more heavily on the Indian people. That is the salt tax, which was raised in 1888. The consumption of salt seems to be an unfailing gauge as to the condition of the rayats throughout the country. The increase in the consumption of salt steadily increased up to 1892-3, and then there was a falling-off of 4 per cent. In 1894-5 there was a recovery of 2 per cent., and, so far as statistics are available at the present month, there are symptoms that that recovery is continuous. At the same time I shall watch the salt tax, which certainly seems to have reached the maximum limit, with the view, if possible, of taking an early opportunity of reducing it. Sir James Westland, the present Finance Minister, expressed his opinion before the Select Committee of 1884, that the normal improvement of the financial position of India might be estimated at about 41 lakhs annually. Taking the period with which I have dealt, I think we may fairly say that a large portion of that increase is due to the normal growth of the revenue, and not to increased taxation. The further question has been asked—Does India pay her way? I propose to answer that by again investigating the figures supplied to us by the decade to which I have already alluded. Taking that decade, I find that there are six years of surplus and four years of deficit. The net result of the ten years is a surplus of Rx. 1,000,000. But against that I am bound to say there is a circumstance which must be taken into account. During that time there has been a certain amount of debt raised in this country, and whenever a debt is raised for the purpose of meeting the annual obligations through inability to sell bills, the money so raised does benefit the year of the expenditure, and in a manner which cannot be brought to account, because, by diminishing the number of rupees that would otherwise be sold, it advances the price of those that are sold. The amount of the debt which was incurred in this period through the failure of the sale of bills amounts to £9,386,000, and I expect if we trace the exact effect of that sum in India we should find it probably rather more than counterbalanced the surplus of Rx. 1,000,000 to which I have alluded. Anyhow, during this period of exceptional embarrassment India has practically paid her way. (Cheers.) She has done more. The right hon. gentleman my predecessor in office, on more than one occasion called attention to the fact that probably no civilised country in the world contains so satisfactory a balance-sheet of liabilities and assets. If we take the assets and liabilities, we find that in India, including railways, irrigation works, loans to municipalities, and existing cash balances, India has assets amounting to Rx. 149,542,000. Against that she has only debts and obligations amounting to Rx. 122,951,000, showing an excess of assets over liabilities of Rx. 26,591,000. On the other hand, in England she has a considerable sterling debt. Her liabilities here are £116,006,000 of debt. Against that she has purchased railways which cost £59,236,000, there are advances to railway companies £5,409,000, and a cash balance of £2,446,000, showing an excess of liabilities over assets in this country of £48,915,000. When we think of the size of the continent that the Indian Government administer, I think that is a most satisfactory balance-sheet. (Cheers.) I have dealt with the bright side of Indian finance, and now take the dark side. I come to the question of exchange. I do not know if is known to the general public that for more than 20 years—that is, from 1850 to 1870—the average exchangeable value of the rupee was 2s., and that in 1873-4 the rupee began to fall in value, owing to the breaking down of the Latin Union and the demonetisation of silver by the German Government. Now two decades have elapsed since then. At the commencement of 1876-7 the exchange value of the rupee was 1s. 9½d.; at the close of the decade it was 1s. 7¼d., a considerable decline; but at the commencement of the next decade we commenced with silver at 1s. 6¼d., and we ended with silver at 1s. 1½d. The Committee will, therefore, see that the fall in the price of silver has increased during the last decade in a greater proportion than in the previous decade. I have noticed in certain journals, and among certain individuals, a tendency to maintain that this very heavy fall in silver is beneficial to India. I see it stated in a very able paper, the *Statist*, that on the whole this fall was beneficial even to the Government of India. They sum up the position thus:—"The Government has not been injured, in spite of all the talk about loss by exchange; for if the burden of the foreign obligations of the Government has been increased, the ability of the taxpayers to bear the burden has been correspondingly increased also." That is a broad assertion. I do not think anybody can make that assertion until he knows what the cost to the taxpayer has been. Now, has any hon. gentleman, even the most optimistic, realised what the strain on the Indian revenue is by the constant fall in the price of silver and in the exchange value of the rupee? In 1884-5 the total charge on the revenue of India for meeting its obligations in London was a charge amounting to 8 per cent. of the total net revenue of the country, the amount being Rx.3,535,900. Last year that amount rose to Rx.14,751,600. The revenue has largely increased in the interval, but the increased number of rupees which the Indian Government have to remit to meet their obligations absorbs 27 per cent. of the total net Imperial revenue. (Hear, hear.) The net exports of merchandise in 1884-5 amounted to Rx.27,552,200; in 1894-5 they were Rx.35,412,600. Therefore, there is only an increase in value of net exports of eight million tens of rupees during that period, while the charge for exchange on the Indian Government has increased by upwards of 11 millions. But if it be such a benefit to India, this constant fall in the price of silver, why have all these Committees been appointed to investigate the subject? Why have all these remedies been suggested? A very important Committee sat two or three years ago, and the adoption of their main proposal caused a divergence between the exchange value of the rupee and the current price of silver. Undoubtedly their plan succeeded. From the moment the mints were closed the exchange value of the rupee has separated itself from the current price of silver, the difference at the present time being something like 2d. per rupee. At the same time I cannot quite admit that this is entirely satisfactory, because it must be remembered that by closing the mints in India you diminish the price of silver all over the world. After all, this propsal is at best a makeshift. Simultaneously with the closing of the mints in India certain movements of treasure have taken place which are worthy of notice. The net imports of treasure into India in the year before the mints were closed amounted to Rx. 10,051,000. The amount of silver coined at Calcutta and Bombay in that year was Rx. 12,612,000. In the middle of the next year the mints were closed, but the import of treasure had not then ceased, and it amounted to Rx. 14,361,064, while the amount of silver coined in Calcutta and Bombay was Rx. 4,902,000. In 1894-5 the mints altogether ceased to coin, and for the first time there is a great falling-off in the import of treasure, which only amounts to Rx. 1,355,000. Simultaneously with this there is a movement which shows that more rupees are coming into circulation. There is a curious institution called the rupee census, a subject to which Mr. Harrison has paid special attention, and he came to the conclusion last year that there had been a smaller return of old rupees into circulation than was supposed; but this year there is evidence of a distinct expansion of the circulation of old rupees, and he estimates this at about three crores. Assuming that to be correct, of course its effect on the currency is the same as if the mints during this year had coined that amount. The average coinage of the mints has ranged from 3½ to 13 crores of rupees, the average being 8¼ crores. I have now finished the part of my statement which relates to exchange. I have not ventured to enter into the controversial matter which this subject is calculated to provoke, but I think hon. members will feel that we ought not to be satisfied with the present position of affairs, and that we cannot look upon any policy which is a mere makeshift as a permanent and satisfactory one. There is one branch of Indian finance to which I think sufficient attention in previous statements has not been directed, and to which I believe my right hon. friend opposite (Sir H. Fowler) intended to devote a large portion of his speech, had he remained in office, and that is provincial finance. Now provincial finance does not correspond to anything known in this country as local finance. The Indian may, from this point of view, be described as a federal system, which does not correspond to the financial constitution of this country. Up to 1871 it was the custom for all the Imperial revenue collected to be paid into a central fund, and the local governments drew on that fund for their administrative wants. This arrangement was very unsatisfactory, because the object of every provincial government was to get as much as possible out

of the central fund, and the object of the central Government was to try and check these demands. Lord Mayo, in 1870, acting on the advice of Sir John Strachey, issued a minute, by which he largely decentralised this system, giving to the Provincial Governments a fixed grant, with power to apply it as they wished to the various administrative services. He he handed over to them gaols, registration, police, education, medical services, printing, roads, miscellaneous public improvements, and civil buildings. The experiment answered admirably. In 1877-8 Sir John Strachey was Finance Minister. He was face to face with a very heavy deficit. There had been a series of bad years; the revenue was largely contracted and the expenditure augmented, and he had to suggest ways and means by which to meet the financial embarrassment. He made a very elaborate budget, which was much discussed at the time, and was hotly contested in this House. His proposal was further to develop decentralisation, and give to the various Governments the management of, and responsibility for land revenue, excise, stamps, general administration, and law and justice. He also gave them a further interest in connection with the disbursement of certain revenues, and made up a scheme by which the surplus or deficit over certain specified amounts should be divided between the Provincial Governments and the Imperial Government. In addition, he gave them control over public works and the revenue in connection with canals. This system was further developed in 1882-3. I attach very great importance to this work of decentralisation. I believe it is capable of almost indefinite expansion, and in course of time may solve some of the problems connected with the extension of local government in India. (Hear, hear). I may just mention one incident connected with it which personally affected myself. The last occassion on which I had the honour of introducing the Indian budget was in 1877; and it had reference to these proposals of Sir John Strachey. At that time party feeling ran very high on the Eastern question, and it was announced that Mr. Fawcett would move a series of resolutions condemning the proposals wholesale. I was informed, too, that he had enlisted the services of no less a person than Mr. Gladstone, and I confess I contemplated with considerable alarm the idea of being demolished by that great financier, who had intimated his intention of taking part in the debate. But I was quite sure that the main proposals which underlay Sir John Strachey's budget would appeal to the financial conscience of Mr. Gladstone, and I felt that, if I could do anything like adequate justice to my case, I should be able to make some impression upon him. It has always seemed to me that the right method of meeting the risk of famine in these districts is not by irrigation, but by extending the railroads, and I believe that is the principle which the Indian Government have adopted. Various reports laid before the House show that there is a very wide scope for the employment of capital in India in almost every form of industrial undertaking, and railway extension is, in my judgment, an essential preliminary to the encouragement of such enterprises. Undoubtedly, the original guarantee system under which we began the construction of railways was an extravagant system. But if railways are to be promoted by private enterprise on the present basis of a rebate, the question at once arises of the proportion of through traffic receipts the new lines should have. That is a very complicated question. The Indian Government and the India Office in recent years tried to lay down principles by which there should be an equitable division of this through traffic between existing lines and new branch lines. The result is that the profits or dividends which a new railway under this system are likely to earn are very difficult, in the first instance, to ascertain; and it is still more difficult for the ordinary investor exactly to ascertain the return he will get upon his capital. My belief is that we shall have to go back to some limited form of guarantee, giving these enterprises an interest in developing the railroad which they manage. It seems to me that at the present moment what the investor and the money market like is the certainty of a small return with a prospective increment. If we work in that direction we shall be able to create a stock in which trustees can invest. I attach the greatest importance to the extension and development of railroads, and I know my predecessor did so, too. And certainly, so long as we have the evils of a falling exchange to contend with, the development of the railway system is the best antidote to that evil. I thank the Committee for the attention with which they have listened to my speech. (Hear, hear.) It is a good many years since I last had the honour of laying a statement of this kind before the House, but I am bound to say, having looked into the facts with a perfectly open mind, and having examined most of the statistics which in any way indicate moral or material progress, it seems to me that in the main India has greatly improved during this period of 18 years. We have certain difficulties to deal with; but, after all, the same old difficulties that existed many years back—falling exchange, increased military establishments, frontier complications, and the increasing desire amongst certain classes in India to participate in the government of their own country—still exist. These are difficulties which we have always had, and which, so far as I can see, we are likely to have for a long time to come—difficulties which do not lend themselves to any immediate or any final solution. But I am glad to say that we have during this period contrived to eliminate, to a large extent, from our difficulties the terrible old evil of famine. Whether that be due to the accident of a long series of beneficent harvests, or to the precautions which the Indian Government have taken, I cannot say. But certainly, in the last twelve years neither Indian revenue nor Indian expenditure has largely suffered from famine. But there is always one difficulty—a difficulty quite as great and even more subtle than any I have enumerated—which always will attend Indian administration, and that is the attitude which any new House of Commons may assume upon Indian questions. The position of the Indian Government is truly anomalous. We have established at the other end of the world a great Government, and given it control over something like one-sixth of the human race. We have invested the head of that Government with all the pomp and paraphernalia of an omnipotent and of a final authority. Few monarchs have greater power, or are surrounded with greater pomp. And yet there is not a single detail in the administration of that continent, and not one iota of the policy of the Indian Government, which may not at any moment be called in question and reversed by an elective assembly sitting thousands of miles from the seat of action. The whole fabric of the Indian Government is based on an Act of Parliament. We wish to infuse into the Indian Government what we may call the elements of progress, of stability, and continuity, and yet we are forced by our political institutions to subject that Government to the wishes of any ephemeral majority that the electoral whim of the moment may create. These difficulties have been avoided in the past by the moderation and discretion with which this House individually and collectively has made use of this absolute power; and I have very much mistaken the character of this new House of Commons if I did not believe that the discretion will still continue. (Cheers.) We shall have to discuss some difficult Indian questions. Last night we discussed perhaps the thorniest and most difficult of all, and I noticed with great pleasure the moderation of the speeches and the discretion which every one, no matter from which side he spoke, exercised in the debate. I am confident that the fact that India is not represented will not operate to her disadvantage in this House. The very knowledge that she is so unrepresented will give her a moral claim on the mind of everybody who may speak on Indian questions. We can never forget that the strength of our rule in India consists in this—that we hold and govern India not for our own advantage, but for the benefit of the peoples of India. That consideration will, I am sure, be present to the mind of every member this House in every discussion in which he may take part and in every decision at which he may arrive in relation to India. (Cheers.)

Mr. JAMES KENYON said he was sure that in Lancashire the statement of the noble lord would be received with the greatest satisfaction, and would be regarded as a harbinger of better things for India. He congratulated the noble lord on having saved Rx. 500,000 by the reduction of interest, and he hoped further steps would be taken in the same direction. He, however, rose specially to point out that the figures given in relation to the cotton duties confirmed the view which Lancashire members had taken that, as at present levied these duties gave a most decided protection to India. He had had some experience of deputations to Secretaries for India. He remembered forming one of a deputation from Lancashire which waited upon Lord Kimberley in connection with the extension of railways in India. There was one remark made by Lord Kimberley on that occasion which was particularly impressed upon his mind. The House would probably remem-

ber that those import duties were placed on cotton goods about 20 years ago, and removed by a Conservative Government. The subject of the cotton duties was mentioned at this particular deputation, and Lord Kimberley then said that he viewed with horror the idea of replacing them. Before the duties were levied on the 1st of January last, the then Secretary of State for India (Sir Henry Fowler) was asked to receive a deputation upon the subject from the Lancashire master cotton spinners and the representatives of the operatives, but he replied that there was no necessity for receiving such a deputation. At that time, and, indeed, ever since, they in Lancashire thought that there was very great necessity indeed to receive a deputation, and he was extremely sorry that Sir H. Fowler did not allow them to see him and place these matters fairly before him. When he told hon. members that the decrease in the shipments of cotton cloth to India during the first six months of this year amounted to over 300,000,000 yards, they would be able to form some idea of the extent of the business with India in which Lancashire was concerned.

Sir H. FOWLER: As compared with what period?

Mr. KENYON: As compared with the previous year.

Sir H. FOWLER: How about 1893?

Mr. KENYON: That was the year of the great cotton strike, and I do not think you can very well make any fair comparison with that year.

Sir H. FOWLER: Then 1892?

Mr. KENYON said he would give the right hon. gentleman another reason for taking 1894. In that year the price of cotton was lower than it had ever been in the memory of this generation, and that accounted in a great measure for the large shipments which were made to India and to other parts of the world. He himself had practical experience of this business. He was a small trader, but in his way he sent fair quantities of these goods to India, and in that year he took advantage of the low price of his raw material to ship as much as he could. He noticed that during last night's debate on these duties the right hon. gentleman the member for Wolverhampton shook his head whenever the idea of the Indian manufacturer being protected was mentioned. That was particularly the case, he thought, when the hon. member for Stockport (Mr. G. Whiteley) stated that the Indian manufacturer paid only upon 60 per cent. of the total value of the cloth. He could give the right hon. gentleman figures out of his own business. There was a cloth in which they did a large and regular business—a cloth which was well known in Calcutta, in Delhi, and Rangoon, and, in fact, all over India; and, if the House would bear with him, he would give the exact figures. The cost of the yarn in that cloth was 8s. 4½d.; the cost of the size was 3d.; the cost of weaving (that was for wages alone) was 2s. 6½d., and the other manufacturing expenses were 2s. 4d.; the cost of finishing was 2s. 3d., and cost of shipping was 1s. 2d. The total cost was therefore 16s. 11d. The duty on the cloth at 5 per cent. brought up the amount to 17s. 9d., or, with the exchange at 1s. 1¼d., for half pieces of 40 yards, 8 rupees. The same cloth made in India with the same weight of yarn would have to pay a duty on 9s. 7½d., so that while the Lancashire manufacturer was paying a duty on 16s. 4d., the Indian manufacturer would pay on 9s. 7½d. only. Therefore, the Indian manufacturer got a protective duty in this case of 6½d. a piece. Those were actual statistics taken from a business going on every month. He had himself paid £700 or £800 duty since the 1st of January last. Those were actual facts which were at the disposal either of the Secretary of State for India or of Sir H. Fowler. This was not a picked or an isolated case, and he thought it conclusively proved that the Indian manufacturer was protected, and very well protected. Then there was the matter of the coarse yarns. It was an unfortunate thing for them in Lancashire that those duties were put on on the 1st of January this year, when the price of cotton was lower than anyone could remember in the present generation, because at that time there might have been a fair competition with the Indian millowners on their own ground. He was sorry to say that their business in Lancashire was a declining business. It was not prospering or progressing in the way it ought to do, and he thought that in these circumstances they deserved fair and reasonable consideration at the hands of the Indian Government. Take, on the other hand, the Blue-book which had been published during the last two or three weeks, and which gave the amount of progress in India. From the statement in that Blue-book, they found that in 1888 there were 89 cotton mills in India, and that in 1894 this number had increased to 136. In six years, therefore, they had an increase of 47 mills, or fully 50 per cent. The number of spindles, too, had increased from 2,190,000 to 3,500,000, and the workpeople employed had increased from 72,000 to 130,000. The other day he read an account of one of the mills in India (it was true it was one of the largest concerns), in which they made the magnificent sum of £70,000 in 1894. Lancashire would be wild with delight if they could make a tenth part of that sum at the present time. Another proof of the prosperity of the cotton trade in India was furnished by the statement which had been published by the Joint Committee of the Manchester Association of Spinners and Manufacturers and the trades unions. In that statement they gave a list of 63 Indian cotton mills. They gave the price of the stock twelve months ago and the price of the mill stock now, and the increase in the value of the shares during the last twelve months amounted to a sum of £800,000. This was an enormous increase, and it showed, he thought, conclusively, that the Bombay millowners considered that they had a very good thing. He would like to say that he believed that the right hon. member for Wolverhampton was deceived in the matter of these duties. He thought that right hon. gentleman was led astray by the powerful Bombay Millowners' Association, who, he expected, were looking well after themselves, and by the representations which were made to him from other quarters. In these circumstances, he regretted very much that the right hon. gentleman did not see someone from Lancashire who could have laid a statement before him which might have induced him to change his mind. He had mentioned some facts with regard to the prosperity of India. He now wished to mention a fact as indicating the condition of the Oldham mills and the mills in Lancashire generally. He thought it was a well-known fact to those hon. members who took any interest in business matters, that the Oldham mills for ten years past had not paid 2¾ per cent. or more than 3 per cent., and it was a common saying in that part of the country that a man had much better put his money into the Post Office Savings Bank than invest it in the cotton trade. It was a miserable affair when a great trade like the cotton industry got into such a condition, and he appealed to the noble lord, especially after the encouraging statement he had presented to the House, to take into his serious consideration whether he could not abolish these duties entirely, and let them be as they had been for the last twenty years, a Free Trade country, and able to compete fairly with India without being handicapped by these duties. When he heard the noble lord speak of the surplus, the thought occurred to him, why could not the Indian Government have done without the cotton duties altogether? They hoped they would not have a Chitral every year, and perhaps the noble Lord, when he had paid off his Chitral Bills, would be able to abolish these duties. He certainly hoped he would. He appealed to the Secretary of State, not only on behalf of his own constituents, but on behalf of Lancashire generally, to remove this burden and this obstacle to free trade. They were all free traders in Lancashire, and they wanted free trade carried out in India. They did not want Lancashire to be favoured. All they wanted was to be put on the same level with their Indian competitors, and if the Secretary of State could not see his way to abolish these duties altogether, he hoped the whole law would, at any rate, put the two countries on exactly the same footing. They wished all success to India, but at the same time they wanted to be treated with justice, and he hoped the noble lord would see to this as quickly as he possibly could. The Secretary of State had spoken of the desirability of developing the country with railways. He hoped that would be done, but perhaps he might be allowed to say that in India they did not know how to make railways at a proper speed. The noble lord had said with a feeling of pride, that there were now 18,000 miles of railways in India, but if a nation on the other side of the Atlantic had had to deal with India for the last 50 years they would have had, not 18,000, but 180,000 miles of railways. The policy enunciated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies would be most welcome news to every business man in the House. The right hon. gentleman had spoken of the family funds being used for the development of the family estates, and he sincerely trusted that that idea would not stop at the door of the Colonial office, but would go on to the India office. He trusted the noble lord

would take advantage of the present state of the money market, when there was a complete glut of money and when investors were begging to have their money invested in some safe thing, to borrow money at an almost nominal rate for the purpose of developing the railway system in India. He was sure he was echoing the feelings of every Lancashire member when he wished every prosperity to India and every success to the noble lord who now filled the position of Secretary of State. (Cheers).

Sir HENRY FOWLER: I wish to make only two or three remarks arising out of the lucid statement the noble Lord has made. I congratulate him on his return, after an interval of 20 years, to his own sphere of duty at the India Office, and on his presenting the financial statement to the House as Secretary of State. (Hear, hear.) I think the clearness and statesmanlike manner of his exposition will commend itself to the consideration of the House. (Hear, hear.) There are one or two questions on which I should like to say a word or two, and the first is the question of the exchange. I think the figures the noble Lord gave cannot be challenged. I agree with him that the real financial difficulty at the present time is the enormous increase in the burden arising from exchange. I am glad to see that during the currency of the financial year that burden does not appear to have been so heavy as I anticipated at the time I made my last financial statement. The price that the Secretary of State has been receiving for his bills during the last three months is a very encouraging sign. A matter about which I was very much exercised when I was in office was the mode in which these bills are sold. I was not satisfied that the Indian Government got the full market price for what they had to sell. The Secretary of State is the only seller of the commodity, and there is only a limited number of buyers; and, whether right or wrong, I arrived at the conclusion that the buyers had a good deal to do with fixing the price which was offered. Had I been in office I should have devoted a considerable amount of further attention to the question, with a view to ascertaining whether some better mode of selling bills could not be devised. I know that the question is beset with difficulties, and possibly in the first instance it may be advisable to appoint a Departmental Committee to consider the question. Then, with reference to the debt, the noble Lord was quite accurate in what he said, and I will only make one addition to that. He alluded to the increase in the debt borrowed, during the last few years, for the purpose of meeting the deficits in expenditure, and I think he said it amounted to something like £9,000,000; but he will recollect that there was a large increase in the balance in the Indian Treasury which, of course, was not remitted; and, therefore, although the increase in the debt was a very large sum, against that must be set off the money not remitted. Then the noble Lord made some very just remarks with reference to the salt tax. I would commend to the hon. member who has just sat down what the noble Lord said on that question. I venture to predict this—that, whoever sits on that side of the Table, and whoever is responsible for the finances of India, and from whatever party he is drawn, whenever the time comes when he may be in the happy position of possessing such a surplus as may enable him to propose a reduction in the burdens of the people of India, the very first burden he will have to consider, with a view to its reduction, will be the salt tax—(hear, hear)—which is such a heavy burden on the population of India, and produces at the present time a revenue of £8,000,000. Then I also agree with what the noble Lord said with reference to railways. My desire was in every way to encourage the promotion and construction of railways, and I think that the noble Lord is on the right lines with reference to the necessity for small guarantees. I certainly think we ought to increase our State enterprises, and even to encourage private enterprise to come into the market. The railways in India form a part of the Public Works Department, and there is a member of Council set apart to attend to public works, but he changes every five years. The consequence is that so soon as a great Indian administrator has thoroughly mastered the principles of railway policy in India, he ceases to hold office and a new man has to begin again. I was myself of opinion that it would be very desirable to have a change in that Department, and it appeared to me that what was wanted in India was a general railway manager, someone not unlike the managers of our own great railway companies, a man perfectly familiar with all the details not only of railway finance, but of railway management; and I think it is well worth the consideration of the India Office whether it would not be wise to endeavour to make some change in that Department in the way of having an officer set apart to superintend railway matters. I was very glad to hear the noble lord's remarks with regard to Provincial finance. A great deal of the additional expenditure in India arises in that Department, and where outlay is sometimes complained of, I do not say unjustly, but, perhaps, not with perfect accuracy, a great deal of that outlay is made by Provincial Governments. With reference to home charges, a Commission is now sitting to investigate that matter, and I would venture to express the hope that the result of that enquiry may be to diminish the heavy pressure of Home Charges on Indian finance and to carry out the opinion already expressed by former Secretaries of State, like the Duke of Argyll, as well as by former Viceroys, as to the excessive nature of the demands made on the Indian Exchequer with reference to Home Charges. The noble lord paid a very just tribute of respect to the eminent services of Sir John Strachey. (Hear, hear.) When I tell the House that he went out to India as an East India cadet something more than half a century ago, that he has filled nearly every office in the Civil Service, rising from the lowest to the very highest, having at one time been acting Viceroy, that in every Department he has carried on affairs with the greatest ability, that the financiers of India are greatly indebted to him, and that everybody who is interested in India is also much indebted to him for his charming book on India, I think everybody will agree in the tribute the noble lord has very properly paid to that eminent servant of the Crown. (Hear, hear.) It may be said that I take an ignorant, optimistic view of the finances of India, but I am glad to find that my view has the high sanction of the noble lord, who has returned to the India Office after an interval of 20 years. He had acquaintance with Indian finance in 1874-80, he finds what it is to-day, and I am glad to find that, from his long experience, he is able in the House of Commons to endorse the views expressed by myself 12 months ago. Whatever our opinion may be as to whether India is economically or extravagantly governed, I hope there will always be, as there always has been in this House, a determination on Indian questions to make the interests of India supreme. (Hear, hear.) On no other grounds can we hold that Empire. I do not believe that any House of Commons which fairly represents the opinion of the English people will depart from that principle, or will refuse to render support to the Government of India when they believe that they are carrying out their difficult and onerous duties loyally, with a due regard to those matters in which the interests of the people of India can be separated from the interests of the people of this country. (Hear, hear.)

SIR W. WEDDERBURN'S AMENDMENT. THE ACCOUNTS "INACCURATE AND MISLEADING."

Sir W. WEDDERBURN said no doubt by Act of Parliament it was required that a financial statement should be placed on the Table by the middle of May, but the fact was that was never done. He did not complain on that account of the present Government. He had rather to thank the Leader of the House for not attempting to take the Budget last night. He was glad to hear some of the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord. He stated that his principle was that India should be administered for the benefit of India. The noble Lord also stated that he should hold the balance steadily and firmly as between all contending interests. The holding the balance firmly was a very difficult thing indeed, and the noble Lord would need all his determination to do so, because they must remember that there were two very antagonistic views on Indian subjects. On the one hand there was the European official view of all questions, and on the other hand there was the general public opinion of the Indian people. On the official side there was all that power to which the noble Lord referred. They were always in power; they had complete authority over every question. What was the position of the people of India? They had been referred to as being dumb, and it was very difficult to have their views placed before the country. One of the complaints made by those who criticised the Indian Government was that far too much of the revenue was spent on military purposes. One reason for this was that the military element was too strongly represented on the Council of the Viceroy. They did not say that the

money was wrongly spent, but they said that the whole standard of expenditure in India was more than the country could afford. The noble lord, the Secretary of State for India, attributed our financial difficulties to loss on exchange; but that was not the principal cause of the present difficulty. They said that the military policy was the principal cause of it. The Government claimed that they had no control over loss by exchange, but that was only true as regards the automatic increase. In the last seven years the increase in civil and military expenditure had been Rx.5,429,000, and the increased loss by exchange on this amount was Rx.848,000. This was within the control of the Government, and amounted to a total of Rx.6,277,000 against Rx.4,195,000, the automatic loss by exchange. The total increase in unreproductive military and civil expenditure with attendant exchange was thus about Rx.10,500,000, and this had swallowed up Rx.5,000,000 the increase in revenue, Rx.2,500,000 economics in other departments, and Rx.3,000,000 new taxation. The increase in revenue was Rx.5,000,000, and that was not obtained without inflicting great hardship upon the people. I meant a further turning of the screw, a more rigid and severe collection of the revenue. Something had been said about the pressure on the people of the salt tax. Any severity in the collection of the tax would add much hardship. Then there was the increase in the land revenue. Complaints were made as to the excessive enhancement of the revenue. The rent of small holdings had been raised to an enormous extent, as much as tenfold at one stroke. That had been done all over the country, and it was producing a feeling of dissatisfaction and unrest which was of the most dangerous kind. He hoped this matter would receive very careful attention. A hearing should be given to the complaints that were being made, and the mere assurance of local officials should not satisfy the Secretary of State. Three millions more had been raised by the new taxation. hon. members from Lancashire should clearly understand that the extra three millions which had been obtained by the import duties had directly been raised in order to fill up this vacuum of three millions for the increase of civil and military expenditure. The figures given above were the official figures, only brought to account in a somewhat different manner. He considered the mode followed by the Government of India, especially as regards loss by exchange, and computation of the public debt, to be inaccurate and misleading, and he had put down an amendment to that effect. The particulars he had set forth in a printed memorandum which he had circulated to the noble lord and to members of the House. It was very difficult to understand these accounts at the very best, and the question of the debt which was raised in his proposed Amendment was very important indeed. It required a very expert knowledge properly to allocate different amounts between three different headings. An item of expenditure might either be put down as current expenditure, it might find its way into ordinary debt, or it might be put aside as a debt on capital account, invested in public works of a reproductive kind. Very great care should be exercised as regards the allocation of any item, and any confusion that might arise amongst these three headings might lead to considerable misunderstanding. The particular item to which he had addressed his Amendment on the Paper would be found at page 82 of the financial statement. In column three of that statement would be found the permanent debt incurred during the year 1893-4. It would there be seen that there was the figure 4,043,311, but nothing was stated as to what that figure was, whether tens of rupees or pounds sterling. He asked the noble Lord what that figure was, because it would be found that that amount had been made up out of several different items. In these financial statements the debt of India was shown under two forms; the debt in India, which was shown in tens of rupees, and the debt in England, which was shown in pounds sterling. The new debt incurred in India during the year 1893-4 was set down at Rx. 3,719,000, and during that year Rx. 1,110,000 of debt was discharged, leaving the amount of nett debt incurred during that year at Rx.2,609,000. The new debt which India incurred in England during the year 1893-4 was set down at £2,686,000; during the year £1,251,000 of the debt was discharged, leaving the nett amount of debt incurred here £1,435,000. These two items together produced the figure of 4,043,000 to which he had referred. What was it? It was mixed pounds and tens of rupees; possibly a bi-metallic currency of a novel kind. (Laughter). He, therefore, asserted this item of 4,043,000 was inaccurate and misleading. The figure must be either pounds sterling or tens of rupees; if tens of rupees, then it was quite evident that something must be added in order to bring the £ sterling to the denomination of Rx. He had done that, and, putting the exchange according to what it stood at when the debt was incurred, instead of 4,043,000, it made Rx.4,950,000. On the other hand, if they were pounds sterling, the rupees must be reduced to that denomination, and then the item would be about £3,000,000. A very great discrepancy, therefore, arose. He believed that the intention of the financial statement was that to show the amount in tens of rupees; but, not only the public but the Indian Government itself, had been misled; and to prove this, he would refer to a statement at page 94 of the financial paper. The noble Lord would find, at page 95, this same item of 4,043,000, and it was there called tens of rupees. The reason why this matter was so important was because it affected the credit and position of the Indian Government whether an increase or a decrease was made in the ordinary debt or whether an increase or decrease was made on the reproductive capital. He would also point out to the noble Lord that, apparently, credit was taken in these accounts for this distinction, and he would refer to page 80, at the foot of which appeared an item termed expenditure not charged to revenue. The amount, the total of which purported to be expenditure upon reproductive public works, amounted to a total of 3,621,000. He presumed that it was intended to set that amount off against the debt of 4,043,000. But, if this were the case, it made a very great difference whether the amount were Rx.4,043,000, or Rx.4,950,000; and he would ask the noble Lord to state what had become of the difference. The same doctrine must, he contended, be applied to the whole debt, and as regards the last 10 years this error would create a difference of Rx.12,000,000. It was very desirable that the public should be encouraged to look into the question of Indian Accounts. They were like the shareholders in a big concern, and they were entitled to have the accounts so presented that they could understand the whole effect of them very easily. As to the Famine Fund, if the noble Lord would look again into its history he would find that special taxes were levied and allocated for the maintenance of the fund, and when Lord Lytton was questioned with respect to its permanence, he most indignantly repudiated the idea of its being touched. As to compensation to the Services for loss by exchange, the people of India were willing that those who served them should have fair and reasonable remuneration; but they complained of the indiscriminate nature of the compensation given. The man who entered the Service when the rupee was at 1s. 6d. was reasonably disappointed when it fell to 1s. 1d., but the man who entered the Service when the rupee was at the lower figure had no right to complain. The difficulties of the Government of India were not primarily due to the loss by exchange, but to extravagance, and the fall in exchange should have been foreseen and provided against from year to year. The Government of India had not any claim to treat the fall as a decree of Providence against which it was useless to contend. The fall in the rupee should be met by corresponding economies. The proportions of extra expenditure fairly debitable to loss on the exchange as compared with that debitable to increased civil and military expenditure was as two to three. A great additional expenditure would be involved by the maintenance of the road to Chitral, and there seemed every probability that some such item of expenditure would appear every year. In the 10 years before this "forward" military policy was undertaken—namely, 1874-84—the total expenditure on these small frontier wars was only Rx.161,000. In the next 10 years the expenditure had risen to Rx.4,925,877. That was about half-a-million of tens of rupees every year on frontier expeditions. The subsidies to border tribes were increasingly heavy. As to interfering with the Government of India, he hoped the noble lord would exercise his own judgment, and decide clearly on the merits of the case, and would not be too much swayed by men who pushed their opinions most honestly, but who were immensely prejudiced by their professional relations and desire for distinction. The accounts of the Indian Government were, on the whole, well kept, good accounts; but the policy of expenditure was what he complained about. The Indian Government should first find what revenue was available, and should then regulate the expenditure accordingly. With regard to railways, there was a general tendency to ask the right hon. gentleman to increase the expenditure on railways, and there

again he hoped the noble lord would hold the b[al]ance firmly. There were many powerful interests in this country concerned in pushing the railways in India, such, for instance, as those who supplied the machinery, the rails and the stores. There was one direction in which large economies could be effected by the Government of India, without in the least degree affecting the efficiency of the administration, except, indeed, to improve it. He referred to the increasing employment of natives in the service of their own country. The natives were willing to accept smaller salaries than foreigners. It was, no doubt, true that there were certain appointments which must be held by Europeans in India, but he thought that the number might be limited. The proposal to decentralise and develope the system of provincial financial administration met with his most cordial approval, as he believed that that was a direction in which economy would be attained. It was quite evident that in a great country like India the form of taxation in one part was not suitable to another part. One of the most unfortunate results of the present financial difficulties was that the balances belonging to the different Provincial Governments had been swept into the Imperial Treasury. Those balances represented the economy of the different provinces, and it was a great disaster to local progress and development that they should be spent upon frontier expeditions. He suggested that if the salary of the Secretary of State for India were placed upon the British Estimates it would bring the interest of the House of Commons to bear on the question of Indian expenditure. It was most important that the Secretary of State should know the opinion of the people of India, for whose interests, however, no member was responsible. He would ask the noble lord, therefore, to learn what the Indian opinion was, as he felt certain that the safety of the Empire would be better attained by increasing their contentment, and by lightening taxes, by giving money for purposes of education and sanitation, and the small improvements that the people required. The people of India had no wish that the Russians should come into India, and with a sympathetic administration the condition of the country would be enormously improved, and ultimately India might be made so prosperous that her trade with Great Britain would be larger than our trade with all the rest of the world. He concluded by moving, as an Amendment, to add at the end of the Question the words—"But it is to be regretted that these accounts are inaccurate and misleading as regards the net amount of public debt incurred."

MR. T. R. BUCHANAN observed that his hon. friend the member for Banffshire had dealt at length with the various questions affecting India, and every one who knew the hon. member as he did, would know that his heart was entirely single in his desire to see the reforms he had advocated carried out. He should like to say a few words touching some of these reforms.

The CHAIRMAN (interposing) observed that the hon. member could not discuss the general question, but must confine his observations to the particular point dealt with by the amendment now before the Committee.

MR. BUCHANAN: The hon. baronet, in his speech, was allowed to deal with a variety of other matters.

The CHAIRMAN: He made a speech dealing with a variety of other matters, but he concluded by moving an amendment; and that amendment having been put from the chair, the discussion must now be confined to the subject-matter of the amendment.

MR. BUCHANAN replied that he had no observations to add on the specific subject dealt with by the amendment.

On the return of the Chairman, after the usual interval,

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON, in reply to the question raised by the hon. member for Banffshire, said whether one agreed with the view of that hon. member or not, one could not doubt that in his conduct he was actuated by a sincere desire to improve the condition of the mass of the people of India. (Hear, hear.) The hon. member, in his speech, dealt with a number of topics, but he spent most of his time in discoursing on the way in which certain accounts were presented to Parliament. The hon. gentleman was a member of the Royal Commission on the administration of the expenditure of India, and he would suggest to him that the question of the necessity of altering the form of these accounts on the lines indicated by the hon. [b]aronet was one which could be much better dealt with inside that Commission. The hon. member had raised various complicated questions, and it was almost impossible for anyone, even the highest-trained expert, to deal with the minute matters contained in an account covering a hundred pages. One of the difficulties about the Indian Government was that their revenues were in silver. They had a rupee revenue, and certain obligations in gold and certain in silver. When an obligation in gold was replaced or renewed by a similar obligation in gold there was no object in bringing in the exchange. But where a gold obligation was replaced by a silver obligation, then the exchange would come in, and *vice versâ*, if a silver obligation was replaced by a gold obligation then the question of exchange would again come in. This was the principle adopted in the accounts. He did not think it was possible in any particular form more accurately to convey the position of these obligations than in that adopted by the Indian Government. If any better plan could be formulated the hon. member could bring it forward in the Commission of which he was a member. He would now pass to the general questions which the hon. member had raised.

The CHAIRMAN observed that it would be out of order to discuss the general question until this particular amendment had been disposed of.

SIR W. WEDDERBURN intimated that after what the noble lord had said as to the form of the accounts he did not wish to press his amendment. It appeared to be a matter as to which there was some doubt, and he hoped the experts would look into it.

The amendment was, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. BUCHANAN agreed with the noble lord that the question of the form of accounts was a fit matter for the investigation of the Commission which had been referred to. He did not altogether agree with what had been said by the hon. member for Banffshire as to the functions of this House with regard to the control over the Government and administration of India. His own general opinion was that the less the House interfered with the details of the government of India the better. (Hear, hear.) He was sorry that the hon. member seemed rather to deprecate the great extension of railways in India, because he thoroughly believed there was no way in which they could better develop the resources of India and prevent the recurrence of famine than by an extension and improvement of the railway system. He wished to know from the Secretary for India whether, in view of the fact that Indian finance had turned out better than was expected, the military and other works which had been interrupted last year, in consequence of financial pressure, would now be proceeded with, and whether the provincial balances would not be drawn upon in future. He hoped that, with better financial prospects, those useful works would again be undertaken and carried through. As one who had no interest, commercial or political, in the question of the Indian cotton duties, he should like to say that there were hon. members like himself, and very many electors in the country, who looked upon these duties purely as a political question affecting the Government of India. These import duties, as they well knew, were imposed by the Government of India as a financial necessity; and as the only, or at all events the least burdensome, way out of their difficulties. The Government of India were unanimous on the subject. He was gratified to observe that the noble lord, in the Chitral debate, relied largely on the fact that the Government of India were unanimous in recommending the occupation of Chitral. And although he was expressing disagreement with the right hon. member for Wolverhampton and those who sat on his own side of the House, he was bound to say that he agreed with the noble lord rather than the right hon. member for Wolverhampton on that subject. He thought the rule laid down by the noble lord yesterday, in regard to frontier policy, should also be carefully observed in the matter of the import duties. He heard with some satisfaction the speech made by the noble lord last night, because it was useless to disguise the fact that his speech of last February made some, both here and in India, somewhat anxious as to the line the present Government might take upon this question. They were much reassured by the statement of the noble lord. They would view with very great jealousy indeed any evidence that the Secretary of State or the Home Government was putting any kind of pressure on the Government of India to adopt a line of policy, with regard to finance or any other matters, that

was not wholly or principally actuated by the interests and the welfare of India, and that alone.

Mr. W. J. GALLOWAY, in rising to address the House for the first time, craved that generous indulgence which the House never refused to a new member. He desired to endorse what fell from the hon. member for Bury in the earlier part of the debate. He maintained that no adequate reason had been advanced for the imposition of the cotton duties. No necessity whatever had been made out for those duties being imposed. In his financial statement the noble lord told them that the total amount received from the Import Duties was Rx. 300,000, and that the amount received from Excise Duties was somewhere about Rx. 13,000. These figures demonstrated beyond all doubt that the duties had acted to the detriment of the manufacturers in this country, and to the advantage of the manufacturers in India. The late Secretary of State laid it down, in consenting to the imposition of the duties, that he should require that they should not be protective, and that an equivalent in Excise Duties should be imposed on all goods manufactured in India. He submitted that the figures adduced by the noble lord showed conclusively that promise of the right hon. gentleman had not been carried out, and he could only hope that in the course of the present year the noble lord would see his way to remove those duties, or at all events to remove the injustice from which Lancashire at the present moment suffered. In Lancashire it was believed that the difficulties in Indian Finance were due almost entirely to the fluctuations in exchange, but during the last twelve months the rate of exchange had been steadier than during the previous nine years. For his own part he believed they had touched the bottom in this matter, and that in future they would not see those violent fluctuations in the value of silver which had occurred during the last few years. All that Lancashire asked for was fair play. They asked that they should be treated in exactly the same way, neither better nor worse, than the Indian manufacturer, and he hoped the noble lord would see his way to doing something to alleviate the distress which existed in Lancashire owing to so many mills being closed. Referring to the visit of the Shahzada to this country, he asked the noble lord to state in next year's budget the cost of that visit under a separate head, instead of including it, as he was afraid was usually the case with such items, under the head of miscellaneous expenses.

Mr. A. J. BALFOUR: My hon. friend, who has made in very clear and forcible language his first contribution to our debates, is the last of many speakers who have risen to place the cause of Lancashire before the House and the country. I think it will be felt by all impartial auditors that, considering the condition of the cotton trade in Lancashire, considering the lively interest which is felt by their constituents in the condition of that trade, and considering how vitally is bound up with the prosperity of that trade, I was going to say the continuance of Lancashire as a great manufacturing centre, I think it will be felt by every impartial auditor that these gentlemen have not approached this question with heat, but have endeavoured to discuss it with temperance, and have shown an appreciation of the difficulties of India, as well as of the position of Lancashire. It appears to me that the general principles which ought to animate the Government of this country and the Government of India in matters of this kind are not very difficult to arrive at. The difficulty is not in determining what the principles should be, but how those principles should be applied; and I think it a most extraordinary statement to assert, as the hon. member for Aberdeenshire asserted, that the Government of India are never to have any regard whatever for the interests of members of the same Empire living outside the borders of that Empire. I do not hold that view. I believe the British Empire is one great organisation existing for the benefit of its members in whatever part of the world they may live; and it appears to me to be as extreme and untrue a statement to say that the Indian Government is never to have regard to the interests of England as to say that the English Government is never to have regard to the interests of India. It is evident that both the Government of India and the Government of England are bound to consider, not merely their own interests, but the interests of the vast Empire of which they are both members. But though I think that correction of the hon. member's statement is a necessary correction—though I think it ought to be made, and that it is merely a false sentimentality which prevents its being made and recognised—I do also think that the great and overwhelming power possessed by this House, and the fact that this House is constituted of men who directly represent, not India, but constituencies in this country, should make us, and ought to make us, and I hope always will make us, particularly anxious in dealing with these questions that we do not allow the special interests of our constituencies to override the broader interests of the Empire; and I do not think there is any set of men more anxious, even under difficult circumstances, to recognise that principle than the members for Lancashire. While those are the general principles that ought to animate us, you are liable to enter into the region of controversial detail when you come to their application; and yet, on this particular occasion, it seems to me that there is less controversy than might be supposed between the two sides of the House. I cannot make out that the right hon. gentleman the late Secretary of State for India differs in any important particular either from my noble friend or from the other gentlemen who sit on this side of the House. He found it necessary to impose a customs duty in India. He stated, in terms as explicit as terms could be, that that customs duty was not an excuse for a protective duty, and was not to be made an excuse for a protective duty. He laid it down in language quite unmistakable in its import that, if the customs duty should have a protective character, then the general system of taxation must be so modified by putting on a countervailing excise duty that that protective character must be wholly eliminated. That gives that fair play to Lancashire which Lancashire asks for—(cheers)—and I think that both the country at large and Lancashire in particular may trust my noble friend to carry out a policy, which is not his only, as distinguished from the policy of the right hon. gentleman opposite, but is a policy which has been declared and accepted by both parties alike in this House and in this country. (Hear, hear.) I go further, and say that I confidently expect that in that policy, in which both parties in this country are agreed, they will find a cordial co-operation from the Government of India, who have to work out the details so many miles away. (Cheers). I do not wish to enter into the very difficult and complicated controversy, on which I hold a very strong opinion, but which is only indirectly bound up with this subject. But I am obliged—after what fell from the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, who laid it down as a principle never to be departed from, that the Indian Government are to be allowed an absolutely free hand to manage their own financial operations—to remind him that the Indian Government have over and over again implored to be allowed to modify their currency system in the direction of a bimetallic ratio, and have never been allowed to do so by the Government of this country. That may be right or it may be wrong, but it shows that the financial freedom for which the hon. gentleman pleads has never yet been granted to the Government of India. I hope that the time may come when these import duties may be done away with; when the financial position of India will render such a step possible, as it is desirable, both in the interest of the Indian consumer and the Lancashire producer. I do not know that we can look forward to that time until probably there is some reversion to the relations between the value of the Indian rupee and the British sovereign, and I should greatly fear that, until something in the direction of currency reform can be accomplished, we shall find it very difficult in India to do something in the direction of these customs duties. Till that day comes, as I earnestly hope it may, we shall have to content ourselves with insisting that such customs duties as have to be imposed shall not be allowed to carry with them as an indirect consequence undue or exceptional favour to the Indian manufacturer. (Hear, hear).

Mr. B. L. COHEN joined in congratulating the noble lord on the interesting statement he had made. He would only say, in comment on the observations of the hon. member for Banffshire, that he had been answered by anticipation by the noble lord, who pointed out that while the expenditure in this country had increased during the last decade by £9,500,000, in India it would positively have decreased had it not been for the operation of the exchange for which the Indian Government could not be held responsible. That gratifying comparison was an evidence not only of the admirable organisation throughout the whole Indian Empire, but also that these military operations had never been undertaken without good reason being established in the minds of those responsible for

the government of India, and without careful economy in their management. He passed to the first of the subject to which he desired to draw attention, namely, what the late Secretary of State referred to as the unsatisfactory way in which the Indian Council sold its drafts. The right hon. gentleman told the committee that it had been his intention to alter the present system, and he felt convinced that the noble lord would carry out that intention. He had no experience or knowledge of the arrangements in operation for the sale or purchase of Indian Council drafts, but he could speak with considerable experience of the combinations which had been made in the case of Colonial stock which had been offered for tender at the Bank of England. He was not prepared with any specific scheme whereby the India office could make sure of securing the best prices, but he thought that the Department would do well to bring their arrangements more into harmony with the arrangements which would be made by any ordinary banking firm having to draw upon their correspondents. The noble lord, in his opinion, had resolved upon the right method of dealing with the Indian railway guarantees. The system under which the guarantees were given in old and recent times did not appeal to the common sense of a business man. He supposed, when a guarantee of 5 per cent. was given, it was found that the capital could not be raised unless that interest was given, but such a sum was more than sufficient return to investors who had in addition a reversionary interest in any future prosperity of the undertakings. He hoped, if the shareholder was to have a reversionary interest in the success of an undertaking in the future, as he thought he ought, that the guarantee would be so reduced as not to give more than a sufficient return to the investor. If it was decided that there was to be no reversionary interest, then, and then only, should the guarantee be for the whole amount which was found to be necessary for the creation of the capital. There was a much bigger problem than this to which he hoped that the noble lord's attention would be given during the recess. He referred to the conditions under which capital was raised with the guarantee of the Secretary of State in Council. Had not the time arrived when such capital ought to be created with the Imperial guarantee in lieu of the guarantee of the Indian Government? It was difficult to compute what would have been the difference to the Indian Exchequer if all the capital raised during the last fifty years with the guarantee of the Secretary of State had been raised with the guarantee of the Imperial Exchequer. It was not easy to make the computation, and it was, of course, impossible to alter what had taken place. But he should like to explain how matters stood now. The Indian Government debt in this country at present was about 121 millions sterling, including the 13 millions issued for redeeming annuities. The capital of the Indian railways amounted in ordinary stock to about 11 millions, and in debenture stock to over 12 millions. To this there had to be added annuities of £1,135,000 a year, which he capitalised at between 35 and 40 millions. Thus, altogether, they were dealing with a debt of £229,000,000. If this money had been secured under an Imperial guarantee, the amount payable by India in interest would have been enormously reduced. The difference between the credit of the Indian Government and the British Government was smaller now than when that capital was created, so if the Government were to adopt his view the gain to the Indian Exchequer would now be less than it would have been if the change had been effected in past times. To the Imperial Exchequer the change would not cause a difference of a shilling. It was time that the fiction of the difference between the guarantee of the Indian Exchequer and the guarantee of the Imperial Exchequer should cease. Indian 3 per cent. stock now stood at about 109, and British $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stock was at 106. Why should not the Indian Government have the advantage of the superiority of credit—in his judgment unmerited superiority—which attached to an Imperial guarantee. It would probably be said by some hon. members that the British Exchequer was not responsible for the financial obligations of India. No doubt it was not responsible legally, but the risk of guaranteeing this debtor could not be considered seriously—certainly the risk was not regarded seriously in the City. Moreover, although the Imperial Exchequer was not legally responsible for the debt of India, there was no one in that House or outside of it, who fancied that the British Treasury would not come in aid of the Indian Exchequer, were it possible to suppose India in default. Indian Government stock was at this moment a Parliamentary security in which trustees could invest. Possibly it might be urged against him that this course would be a precedent which the colonies would wish to take advantage of. He answered that objection by saying that there was not one single respect in which the debt of India and colonial debts were identical or even similar. Whilst our colonies were self-governed, India could not do a single thing without the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council and of that House. Indian Government stock was, therefore, subject to Parliamentary control, and he held that it was the duty of this country to act in aid of the Indian Exchequer in respect of the large creations of debt which would have to be made and were being made every year by means of debentures which had to be renewed, and for other fresh capital that had to be raised. This would not impose on the Imperial Exchequer one farthing of pecuniary liability, and would enormously and for ever reduce the burdens on the Indian Exchequer.

Mr. W. E. M. TOMLINSON said that the Committee of Lancashire manufacturers had hoped for a slightly more sympathetic statement than they had received. No doubt it was the intention of the noble lord to see that absolute fairness was observed in the matter of the countervailing duties, but he wished him to understand that, from the point of view of the Lancashire manufacturers, no attempt to remedy the protective effect of the import duties by an Excise duty would do. Lancashire would never be satisfied until the remission of these duties was brought about altogether. Although he quite agreed that the remission of the Salt Tax was a desirable thing, he hoped that the suggestion of the right hon. gentleman, the late Secretary of State, that it should have precedence would not find favour. He would ask his right hon. friend to give an assurance that the Lancashire Committee should have a full opportunity of considering the reply which he received from the Government of India to their memorial.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON thanked the right hon. gentleman opposite for the kind way in which he had spoken of his statement, and assured him that the various suggestions he had made should have his careful attention. With regard to the suggestion that some improvement in the method of selling Indian Bills should be effected, he believed it was possible to introduce some improvements, but it was a difficult question. As to the visit of the Shahzada, the expenses would be brought into the accounts of the present year. He did not think the amount would be as large as the original estimate, and it was only right to say that every private entertainment given by the Shahzada would be paid out of his own private purse. With regard to what had been said by the hon. member for Banffshire, he was quite prepared to consider any reasonable proposition the hon. gentleman might put before him in reference to the Government of India; but what he wished to point out was that, if the hon. gentleman wished to call attention to any defect in the administration in India, it would be better for him to confine himself to one particular point, and not to indulge in a general diatribe against the whole administration of that country. He agreed with the hon. gentleman that the utmost consideration should be paid to the wishes of the people of India, but when the hon. gentleman got up and said he wished to speak on behalf of the people of India, he demurred altogether to that phraseology. He did not in the least dispute the excellent motives of the particular body of which the hon. gentleman was one of the representatives, but he denied altogether that the body represented the great mass of the people of India. (Hear, hear.) As to the suggestion of his hon. friend behind him that there should be an Imperial guarantee of the Indian debt, that was not a new proposal. It was made many years ago, but there seemed to him to be an absolutely insuperable objection to any general guarantee of that kind. The Indian Government ought to have as much independence as it was possible to give them. Could that independence be secured if behind that Government there was an Imperial guarantee? (Hear, hear.) If such a condition of things existed and the country possessed a Commander-in-Chief who desired to embark in large military operations, what a splendid opportunity he would have of doing so with an Imperial guarantee at his back. These were not the only objections. If there was an imperial guarantee attached to the debt of India, that very fact would give every member of the House of Commons an inherent and almost necessary right to interfere with the Indian Government in such a way as

would make it absolutely impossible to work the machine. His belief was that it was far better to keep the debt separate. It might be now and then desirable for the House to assist the Indian revenue, as had been done before, but in that case let it be done by a money grant. Unless the two accounts were kept separate it would be almost impossible to impress on the Indian Government that sense of responsibility for the administration of their own affairs which was so desirable. (Hear, hear.) He thanked the Committee for the kind manner in which they had received his statement, and he was glad to find that on the great mass of Indian questions there was not a very wide difference of opinion between members in different parts of the House: and he would do his best during his tenure of office to try and maintain that kindly and cordial feeling which had characterised the debate. (Cheers.)

Mr. TOMLINSON said the noble lord had not answered his question.

Lord G. HAMILTON said the memorial referred to had gone out to Inda, but the dispatch to be sent with it would not go for a day or two. A deputation from Lancashire sought to see him some time back, and he told them that there would be no advantage in seeing them at that particular time. He told them, howver, that if they wished to discuss the matter some months later he should be glad to meet them. To that promise he still adhered, and that would answer the hon. member's question.

The Reslution was then agreed to, and the House resumed.